PIVTR-D

Decide these before the incident

Settle these in advance and refer to them during the response. Working out who can authorize taking production offline while the file shares are encrypting costs minutes that containment needs.

Who authorizes what

Adapted from Table 8, pp. 97 to 98. The isolation, shutdown and ransom rows are mine. The role names and containment tiers are placeholders. Replace them with yours before anyone relies on this. The roles are described in The organization.

DecisionAuthorityDelegateRecord required
Declare an incidentAnyone on duty; the Incident Commander confirms or changes it within 15 minutesSenior analyst on dutyIncident record (T1) with declaration time and rationale
Isolate an endpointSOC or IR analystNone neededContainment decision record (T3)
Isolate a server or serviceService owner with Incident CommanderIncident Commander alone if the owner is unreachable inside the response windowContainment decision record (T3) with impact assessment
Shut down production, or anything touching regulated servicesNamed executiveCISO after hours, ratified next business dayContainment decision record (T3) plus executive approval
Expand scope to other business unitsIncident Commander, CISO notifiedNoneScope expansion entry with the trigger
Exit the loop, technical closureIncident Commander on eradication validationSenior analyst with written approvalSigned technical closure record (T5)
Accept residual riskCISO or named risk ownerBoard-level executive for significant incidentsSigned risk acceptance naming the risks (T6)
Notify a regulatorLegal counsel with the CISOGeneral counselDecision log with timeline and regulator named (T17)
Speak to media or the publicPublic Information Officer (Communications Lead) with legal sign-offCEO for material incidentsApproved statement under version control (T18)
Pay a ransomWritten position agreed in advance, then named executive with counselNoneDecision log naming counsel and carrier consulted

When containment cannot wait

Table 17, p. 227. Map each trigger to an approved action during preparation.

TriggerIndicatorsApproved action
Active destructionEncryption spreading across shares, event logs wiped, database tables droppedIsolate immediately
ExfiltrationLarge transfers to cloud storage, bulk queries against personal data, archives sent to external sitesContain urgently to cap exposure
Safety or critical systemsICS, medical devices, payment processing, other safety-critical infrastructureAct immediately to prevent operational disruption or physical harm
Regulatory clockData or services under HIPAA, PCI DSS, GDPR, NIS2, DORA, CRA, or a local equivalentContain rapidly to limit affected records

Which containment posture

Table 16, p. 223. The chapter's step-by-step reference adds a fourth posture, deceptive containment, which uses honeypots or decoy systems.

SituationPosture
Destruction or ransomware underwayActive, required
Regulated data with a compliance clockActive, required
Safety-critical or high-availability system at riskActive, required
Attacker shows awareness of defendersActive, strongly favored
Short dwell time, limited monitoring maturityActive, strongly favored
Extended dwell time, mature monitoringAdaptive, strongly favored
Unknown scope, uncertain sophisticationAdaptive, preferred
Commodity malware on a low-value assetPassive, possible
Controlled deception environmentPassive, possible
Three panels: Passive Containment with honeypots and deception, Active Containment with segmentation and isolation, Adaptive Containment with progressive restrictions, above an arrow showing movement between them.
Figure 75. Posture changes within a single incident as understanding improves, which is what the arrow shows.

Risk levels and what they trigger

Levels from p. 171. The trigger column is mine, and the thresholds should be yours.

LevelMeaningWhat it triggers
LowMinor anomaly, minimal impactAnalyst handles it, logged, first report within 2 days
MediumWorth investigating, operations unaffectedIncident Commander informed, first report within 4 hours, then daily updates
HighConfirmed incident affecting operations or data integrityTeam activated, the on-call Incident Commander takes command, decision makers briefed within 2 hours, then hourly executive updates until mitigated, then every 4 hours
CriticalMajor incident requiring executive escalation and immediate containmentContainment authority granted, counsel engaged, first executive report within 1 hour, then every 30 minutes until mitigated, then every 2 hours

Severity, reporting deadlines and incident type

The companion guide, Incident Command, sizes the organization by NIMS complexity type. This table links the two.

Every incident gets two ratings. Severity measures impact, and sets how fast and how high the incident is reported. Complexity type measures how hard the incident is to manage, and sets how large the organization is. A single stolen laptop full of patient records can be high severity and Type 5, and a noisy but harmless worm across three data centers can be low severity and Type 3.

PIVTR-D risk levelSeverityFirst reportFull reportUsual starting type
LowSEV 4Within 2 daysWithin 5 business days5
MediumSEV 3Within 4 hoursWithin 72 hours5 or 4
HighSEV 2Within 2 hoursWithin 48 hours4 or 3
CriticalSEV 1Within 1 hourWithin 24 hours3, 2 or 1

The reporting deadlines are Wright's sample SLA, Table 5, p. 84. The severity labels and starting types are placeholders. Replace them with your own and publish the result once, in writing.

Choosing the type

Start at Type 5 and move up to the highest row that is true. Re-check at every operational period, because the type can go down as well as up.

If this is trueThe type is at least
One or two people can close it within the first operational period5
It needs several people or teams, but should close within one operational period4
It will run past one operational period3
A supervisor would have more than seven people reporting3
It needs people or tools beyond what the organization has, such as an outside response firm2
It disrupts critical infrastructure or needs coordination with government at a national level1

Rows follow the NIMS complexity type descriptions in FEMA's IS-200 course.

Notification deadlines

The sector pages list the full obligations, triggers and report contents for federal agencies, defense contractors, healthcare, financial services, energy and water utilities, transportation, state and local government, and education. This table is the summary.

A starter list of common notification deadlines, checked in October and November 2026. Rules change and each depends on facts only counsel can weigh, so counsel confirms which apply before anyone relies on this. Record who decides that each clock has started, because that decision is what starts it.

RegimeWho tells whomDeadlineClock startsThen
Banking agencies' incident notification rule (12 CFR Part 53, 225 Subpart N, 304 Subpart C)Bank or bank holding company to its primary federal regulator: OCC, Federal Reserve or FDICAs soon as possible, and within 36 hoursThe bank determines that a notification incident occurredBank service providers tell each affected bank as soon as possible after determining that an incident has materially disrupted or degraded, or is reasonably likely to, covered services for 4 hours or more
NCUA, 12 CFR 748.1(c)Federally insured credit union to NCUAAs soon as possible, and within 72 hoursReasonably believing a reportable cyber incident occurred, or notice of one from a third partyNo sensitive PII or indicators of compromise in the first report
SEC Form 8-K, Item 1.05US public company to the SEC4 business daysThe company determines the incident is material, which it must do without unreasonable delay after discoveryAn amended 8-K within 4 business days after information missing from the first filing is determined or becomes available
SEC Regulation S-PBroker-dealer, funding portal, investment company, SEC-registered investment adviser or transfer agent to each individual whose sensitive customer information was, or is reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without authorizationAs soon as practicable, and within 30 daysBecoming aware that unauthorized access to or use of customer information occurred or is reasonably likely to have occurredService providers must tell the firm within 72 hours. Compliance dates were December 3, 2025 for larger entities and June 3, 2026 for smaller ones
GDPR, Articles 33 and 34Controller to the supervisory authority, and to data subjects when the risk to them is high72 hours to the authority, where feasible. Without undue delay to data subjectsBecoming aware of the breachInformation can follow in phases. A late notice gives the reasons for the delay
NIS2, Article 23Essential or important entity to its CSIRT or competent authority24-hour early warning, 72-hour notificationBecoming aware of a significant incidentFinal report 1 month after the notification
DORA, Article 19, and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301EU financial entity to its competent authority4 hours after classifying the incident as major, and within 24 hours of becoming awareClassification as a major ICT-related incidentIntermediate report within 72 hours of the initial notification, final report within 1 month of the latest intermediate report
Cyber Resilience Act, Article 14Manufacturer of a product with digital elements, through ENISA's single reporting platform, to its coordinating CSIRT and ENISA24-hour early warning, 72-hour notificationBecoming aware of an actively exploited vulnerability or a severe incident. Applies from September 11, 2026Final report 14 days after a corrective or mitigating measure is available for a vulnerability, or 1 month after the notification for an incident
NYDFS Part 500.17Covered entity to the Superintendent72 hours. 24 hours after any extortion paymentDetermining that a cybersecurity incident occurred at the covered entity, an affiliate or a third-party service providerWritten explanation of an extortion payment within 30 days: why it was necessary, the alternatives considered and the diligence performed
HIPAA Breach Notification RuleCovered entity to individuals, HHS and, for more than 500 residents of a state or jurisdiction, the mediaWithout unreasonable delay, and within 60 calendar daysDiscovery of the breachBreaches of 500 or more go to HHS at the same time as the individual notices. Breaches of fewer than 500 go to HHS within 60 days after the end of the calendar year of discovery. Business associates tell the covered entity within the same 60-day limit
FTC Health Breach Notification Rule, 16 CFR 318Vendor of personal health records or related entity not covered by HIPAA to individuals, the FTC and, for 500 or more residents of one state, the mediaWithout unreasonable delay, and within 60 calendar daysDiscovery of a breach of security, which includes an unauthorized disclosureThe FTC at the same time as individuals for 500 or more; within 60 days after the end of the calendar year for fewer
DFARS 252.204-7012Defense contractor to DoD, through dibnet.dod.mil72 hoursDiscovery of the incidentKeep images and packet captures at least 90 days after the report
CISA Federal Incident Notification Guidelines and OMB M-25-04Federal civilian agency to CISA, and for a major incident to CISA, OMB, its Inspector General and Congress1 hour to CISA. 1 hour to CISA and OMB after a major incident determination. 7 days to Congress and the Inspector GeneralIdentification by the agency's top-level SOC, CSIRT or IT department. For Congress, a reasonable basis to conclude a major incident occurredUpdates as facts arrive. A breach that is a major incident needs a report to Congress within 30 days of discovery
NISPOM, 32 CFR 117.8(f)Cleared defense contractor to DCSAImmediatelyA cyber incident on a classified information system DCSA approvedReport the technique, a malware sample if isolated, and DoD program information potentially compromised
FCC CPNI breach rule, 47 CFR 64.2011Telecommunications carrier to the Secret Service and FBI, through the FCC's central reporting facilityAs soon as practicable, and within 7 business daysReasonably determining that a breach of customer proprietary network information (CPNI) occurredCustomers after the law enforcement notice, once 7 full business days have passed unless an exception applies. The 2024 amendments add the FCC, a 30-day customer deadline and a harm-based exception. The eCFR text, current to October 23, 2026, does not include them and links to them as a pending amendment, and this page found no FCC notice of an effective date. On July 31, 2026, the Sixth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and vacated the August 2025 panel decision that upheld them. The full court heard argument on October 21, 2026, and no en banc opinion had been published by November 10, 2026
TSA security directivesFreight rail, passenger rail, transit and pipeline owners and operators to CISARail and transit: as soon as practicable, and within 72 hours. Pipeline: as soon as practicable, and within 24 hoursIdentifying a reportable cybersecurity incidentTSA states the 72-hour rail and transit rule in its September 1, 2026 notice; the 24-hour pipeline rule dates from Pipeline-2021-01B. TSA reissues the directives each year. Confirm against the current version on the TSA security directives page
CIRCIACovered critical infrastructure entity to CISA72 hours, and 24 hours after a ransom paymentReasonably believing a covered incident occurredNot in force until CISA publishes the final rule. CISA sent it to OMB for review on October 1, 2026, and this page found no publication by November 2, 2026. Reporting starts only after the final rule takes effect. Check CISA for its status
NERC CIP-008-6, Requirement R4Electric Responsible Entity with high or medium impact BES Cyber Systems to the E-ISAC and CISA1 hour for a Reportable Cyber Security Incident. By the end of the next calendar day for an attempt to compromiseThe entity determines, under its own process, that the incident is reportable or was an attempt to compromiseUpdates within 7 calendar days of each new or changed attribute: functional impact, attack vector, level of intrusion. CIP-008-7.1, approved by FERC Order No. 919 on March 19, 2026, takes effect July 1, 2028, or earlier for an entity that adopts it early
Form DOE-417, Electric Emergency Incident and Disturbance ReportBalancing authorities, reliability coordinators, electric utilities and some generating entities to DOE1 hour for criteria 1 to 9, including a Reportable Cyber Security Incident or a cyber event that interrupts electrical system operations. 6 hours for criteria 10 to 13The incidentFinal report within 72 hours of the incident. An attempted compromise (criterion 14) is due by the end of the next calendar day after determination. Shared with E-ISAC and CISA through line W, the form can satisfy CIP-008
NRC, 10 CFR 73.77Nuclear power plant licensee to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center by telephone1 hour after discovery of a cyber attack that adversely impacted safety, security or emergency preparedness functions. 4 hours if it could have. 8 hours for signs of pre-attack planningDiscovery of the cyber attack, or receipt of the informationRecord in the corrective action program within 24 hours. Written follow-up on NRC Form 366 within 60 days of the telephone notice for the 1-hour and most 4-hour events
Coast Guard MTS cyber rule (33 CFR 101.620(b), 101.650(g))Owner or operator of an MTSA vessel, facility or outer continental shelf facility to the National Response Center (NRC)Without delayA reportable cyber incident: one that leads, or could reasonably lead, to substantial loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability of a covered system, or to a transportation security incidentIn force since July 16, 2025. The duty applies to entities that have not reported to the Coast Guard under 33 CFR 6.16-1 or are not subject to it. Under 33 CFR 6.16-1, evidence of an actual or threatened cyber incident at any vessel, harbor, port or waterfront facility goes immediately to the FBI, CISA and the Captain of the Port. NVIC 02-24 Change 1 says an NRC report reaches the Captain of the Port and the FBI, and CISA needs its own report
New York General Municipal Law Article 19-cMunicipal corporation, including a school district or BOCES, or public authority to the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services (DHSES)72 hours. 24 hours after a ransom paymentReasonably believing that a cybersecurity incident occurred (995-b). For the 24-hour notice, the ransom payment (995-c)Written explanation within 30 days of a ransom payment (995-c): why payment was necessary, the amount, how it was paid, alternatives considered, and diligence on alternatives and on compliance with state and federal rules, including OFAC's. Reports are exempt from FOIL under General Municipal Law 995-b(3)
FBI CJIS Security Policy v6.1, IR-6Staff to the agency's incident response capability. The agency reports incident information to its incident handlers, to the CJIS Systems Officer, SIB Chief or Interface Agency Official, and to the FBI CJIS ISO1 hourDiscovery of a suspected incident affecting criminal justice informationIR-6 in v6.1 (June 25, 2026) says "immediately but not to exceed one (1) hour after discovery". Local agencies follow their CJIS Systems Agency's form
IRS Publication 1075Agency receiving federal tax information to TIGTA and the IRS Office of SafeguardsImmediately, and within 24 hoursIdentifying a possible issue involving FTIDo not wait for an internal investigation. Tell Safeguards before notifying taxpayers and share media releases first. A 2026 draft revision is pending
Federal Student Aid breach report (SAIG enrollment agreement, GENERAL-24-46)Title IV institution, through its Destination Point Administrator or GLBA Qualified Individual, to Federal Student Aid on the Cybersecurity Breach Intake Form24 hoursThe incident is known or identifiedOther SAIG organizations, such as servicers, email support@fps.ed.gov. The form asks whether the breach is suspected or known
FTC Safeguards Rule, 16 CFR 314.4(j)Financial institution under FTC jurisdiction to the FTC, on its online formAs soon as possible, and within 30 daysDiscovery of unauthorized acquisition of unencrypted customer information of 500 or more consumersUnauthorized access is presumed acquisition without reliable evidence otherwise. A law enforcement request can delay FTC public disclosure up to 30 days, then up to 60 more. Title IV institutions agree in their Program Participation Agreement to follow the Safeguards Rule
US state breach lawsOrganization to affected residents, and often the state attorney generalVaries. California, Colorado, Florida and Washington set 30 daysDiscovery of the breach, in most statesAttorney general thresholds vary, often at 500 residents
Cyber insurance policyInsured to the carrierThe policy's notice clauseUsually discoveryPanel vendors may be required. Read the policy before an incident

Sources checked November 2026 for the energy, maritime, state and local government and education rows: FERC letter order approving CIP-008-6 (84 FR, June 26, 2019); FERC Order No. 919 for the July 1, 2028 date; Form DOE-417 and instructions (OMB 1901-0288); eCFR 10 CFR 73.77; Coast Guard final rule, 90 FR 6298 (January 17, 2025) and NVIC 02-24 Change 1; New York DHSES reporting page and General Municipal Law 995-b and 995-c; FBI CJIS Security Policy v6.1 (June 25, 2026), control IR-6, at le.fbi.gov, and California DOJ bulletin 2026-ISRS-001; IRS reporting page for Publication 1075; FSA GENERAL-24-46 and the SAIG agreement form (OMB 1845-0002); 16 CFR 314.4(j) (FR Doc. 2023-24412). Also checked November 2026: eCFR 47 CFR 64.2011, current to October 23, 2026, and the Sixth Circuit docket for Ohio Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, No. 24-3133, on CourtListener, which records the en banc argument on October 21, 2026. Sources checked October 2026: DFARS 252.204-7012 (May 2024) at acquisition.gov; eCFR 32 CFR 117.8; CISA Federal Incident Notification Guidelines; California Civil Code 1798.82(a)(2), Colorado's attorney general data protection page, Florida Statutes 501.171 and Washington RCW 19.255.010; eCFR 12 CFR Part 53, 12 CFR 748.1, 17 CFR 248.30, 45 CFR Part 164 Subpart D and 16 CFR Part 318; the SEC's Regulation S-P compliance guide and Item 1.05 compliance guide; GDPR Article 33; NIS2 Article 23; Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301, Article 5; ENISA, The CRA Single Reporting Platform is launched, September 11, 2026; 23 NYCRR 500.17; OMB M-25-04; 47 CFR 64.2011 (October 1, 2025 edition) and 89 FR 9968; the Sixth Circuit's en banc order in Ohio Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, July 31, 2026, which Public Citizen reports vacated the panel decision; the current 47 CFR 64.2011 text at LII; TSA's September 1, 2026 notice and January 17, 2025 ratification of the pipeline directives; CISA's CIRCIA page, and Covington's report of the OMB submission (October 8, 2026), and Paubox, Cyber incident reporting rule reaches final White House review (October 14, 2026).

Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.