Decide these before the incident
Settle these in advance and refer to them during the response. Working out who can authorize taking production offline while the file shares are encrypting costs minutes that containment needs.
Who authorizes what
Adapted from Table 8, pp. 97 to 98. The isolation, shutdown and ransom rows are mine. The role names and containment tiers are placeholders. Replace them with yours before anyone relies on this. The roles are described in The organization.
| Decision | Authority | Delegate | Record required |
|---|---|---|---|
| Declare an incident | Anyone on duty; the Incident Commander confirms or changes it within 15 minutes | Senior analyst on duty | Incident record (T1) with declaration time and rationale |
| Isolate an endpoint | SOC or IR analyst | None needed | Containment decision record (T3) |
| Isolate a server or service | Service owner with Incident Commander | Incident Commander alone if the owner is unreachable inside the response window | Containment decision record (T3) with impact assessment |
| Shut down production, or anything touching regulated services | Named executive | CISO after hours, ratified next business day | Containment decision record (T3) plus executive approval |
| Expand scope to other business units | Incident Commander, CISO notified | None | Scope expansion entry with the trigger |
| Exit the loop, technical closure | Incident Commander on eradication validation | Senior analyst with written approval | Signed technical closure record (T5) |
| Accept residual risk | CISO or named risk owner | Board-level executive for significant incidents | Signed risk acceptance naming the risks (T6) |
| Notify a regulator | Legal counsel with the CISO | General counsel | Decision log with timeline and regulator named (T17) |
| Speak to media or the public | Public Information Officer (Communications Lead) with legal sign-off | CEO for material incidents | Approved statement under version control (T18) |
| Pay a ransom | Written position agreed in advance, then named executive with counsel | None | Decision log naming counsel and carrier consulted |
When containment cannot wait
Table 17, p. 227. Map each trigger to an approved action during preparation.
| Trigger | Indicators | Approved action |
|---|---|---|
| Active destruction | Encryption spreading across shares, event logs wiped, database tables dropped | Isolate immediately |
| Exfiltration | Large transfers to cloud storage, bulk queries against personal data, archives sent to external sites | Contain urgently to cap exposure |
| Safety or critical systems | ICS, medical devices, payment processing, other safety-critical infrastructure | Act immediately to prevent operational disruption or physical harm |
| Regulatory clock | Data or services under HIPAA, PCI DSS, GDPR, NIS2, DORA, CRA, or a local equivalent | Contain rapidly to limit affected records |
Which containment posture
Table 16, p. 223. The chapter's step-by-step reference adds a fourth posture, deceptive containment, which uses honeypots or decoy systems.
| Situation | Posture |
|---|---|
| Destruction or ransomware underway | Active, required |
| Regulated data with a compliance clock | Active, required |
| Safety-critical or high-availability system at risk | Active, required |
| Attacker shows awareness of defenders | Active, strongly favored |
| Short dwell time, limited monitoring maturity | Active, strongly favored |
| Extended dwell time, mature monitoring | Adaptive, strongly favored |
| Unknown scope, uncertain sophistication | Adaptive, preferred |
| Commodity malware on a low-value asset | Passive, possible |
| Controlled deception environment | Passive, possible |
Risk levels and what they trigger
Levels from p. 171. The trigger column is mine, and the thresholds should be yours.
| Level | Meaning | What it triggers |
|---|---|---|
| Low | Minor anomaly, minimal impact | Analyst handles it, logged, first report within 2 days |
| Medium | Worth investigating, operations unaffected | Incident Commander informed, first report within 4 hours, then daily updates |
| High | Confirmed incident affecting operations or data integrity | Team activated, the on-call Incident Commander takes command, decision makers briefed within 2 hours, then hourly executive updates until mitigated, then every 4 hours |
| Critical | Major incident requiring executive escalation and immediate containment | Containment authority granted, counsel engaged, first executive report within 1 hour, then every 30 minutes until mitigated, then every 2 hours |
Severity, reporting deadlines and incident type
The companion guide, Incident Command, sizes the organization by NIMS complexity type. This table links the two.
Every incident gets two ratings. Severity measures impact, and sets how fast and how high the incident is reported. Complexity type measures how hard the incident is to manage, and sets how large the organization is. A single stolen laptop full of patient records can be high severity and Type 5, and a noisy but harmless worm across three data centers can be low severity and Type 3.
| PIVTR-D risk level | Severity | First report | Full report | Usual starting type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low | SEV 4 | Within 2 days | Within 5 business days | 5 |
| Medium | SEV 3 | Within 4 hours | Within 72 hours | 5 or 4 |
| High | SEV 2 | Within 2 hours | Within 48 hours | 4 or 3 |
| Critical | SEV 1 | Within 1 hour | Within 24 hours | 3, 2 or 1 |
The reporting deadlines are Wright's sample SLA, Table 5, p. 84. The severity labels and starting types are placeholders. Replace them with your own and publish the result once, in writing.
Choosing the type
Start at Type 5 and move up to the highest row that is true. Re-check at every operational period, because the type can go down as well as up.
| If this is true | The type is at least |
|---|---|
| One or two people can close it within the first operational period | 5 |
| It needs several people or teams, but should close within one operational period | 4 |
| It will run past one operational period | 3 |
| A supervisor would have more than seven people reporting | 3 |
| It needs people or tools beyond what the organization has, such as an outside response firm | 2 |
| It disrupts critical infrastructure or needs coordination with government at a national level | 1 |
Rows follow the NIMS complexity type descriptions in FEMA's IS-200 course.
Notification deadlines
The sector pages list the full obligations, triggers and report contents for federal agencies, defense contractors, healthcare, financial services, energy and water utilities, transportation, state and local government, and education. This table is the summary.
A starter list of common notification deadlines, checked in October and November 2026. Rules change and each depends on facts only counsel can weigh, so counsel confirms which apply before anyone relies on this. Record who decides that each clock has started, because that decision is what starts it.
| Regime | Who tells whom | Deadline | Clock starts | Then |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Banking agencies' incident notification rule (12 CFR Part 53, 225 Subpart N, 304 Subpart C) | Bank or bank holding company to its primary federal regulator: OCC, Federal Reserve or FDIC | As soon as possible, and within 36 hours | The bank determines that a notification incident occurred | Bank service providers tell each affected bank as soon as possible after determining that an incident has materially disrupted or degraded, or is reasonably likely to, covered services for 4 hours or more |
| NCUA, 12 CFR 748.1(c) | Federally insured credit union to NCUA | As soon as possible, and within 72 hours | Reasonably believing a reportable cyber incident occurred, or notice of one from a third party | No sensitive PII or indicators of compromise in the first report |
| SEC Form 8-K, Item 1.05 | US public company to the SEC | 4 business days | The company determines the incident is material, which it must do without unreasonable delay after discovery | An amended 8-K within 4 business days after information missing from the first filing is determined or becomes available |
| SEC Regulation S-P | Broker-dealer, funding portal, investment company, SEC-registered investment adviser or transfer agent to each individual whose sensitive customer information was, or is reasonably likely to have been, accessed or used without authorization | As soon as practicable, and within 30 days | Becoming aware that unauthorized access to or use of customer information occurred or is reasonably likely to have occurred | Service providers must tell the firm within 72 hours. Compliance dates were December 3, 2025 for larger entities and June 3, 2026 for smaller ones |
| GDPR, Articles 33 and 34 | Controller to the supervisory authority, and to data subjects when the risk to them is high | 72 hours to the authority, where feasible. Without undue delay to data subjects | Becoming aware of the breach | Information can follow in phases. A late notice gives the reasons for the delay |
| NIS2, Article 23 | Essential or important entity to its CSIRT or competent authority | 24-hour early warning, 72-hour notification | Becoming aware of a significant incident | Final report 1 month after the notification |
| DORA, Article 19, and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301 | EU financial entity to its competent authority | 4 hours after classifying the incident as major, and within 24 hours of becoming aware | Classification as a major ICT-related incident | Intermediate report within 72 hours of the initial notification, final report within 1 month of the latest intermediate report |
| Cyber Resilience Act, Article 14 | Manufacturer of a product with digital elements, through ENISA's single reporting platform, to its coordinating CSIRT and ENISA | 24-hour early warning, 72-hour notification | Becoming aware of an actively exploited vulnerability or a severe incident. Applies from September 11, 2026 | Final report 14 days after a corrective or mitigating measure is available for a vulnerability, or 1 month after the notification for an incident |
| NYDFS Part 500.17 | Covered entity to the Superintendent | 72 hours. 24 hours after any extortion payment | Determining that a cybersecurity incident occurred at the covered entity, an affiliate or a third-party service provider | Written explanation of an extortion payment within 30 days: why it was necessary, the alternatives considered and the diligence performed |
| HIPAA Breach Notification Rule | Covered entity to individuals, HHS and, for more than 500 residents of a state or jurisdiction, the media | Without unreasonable delay, and within 60 calendar days | Discovery of the breach | Breaches of 500 or more go to HHS at the same time as the individual notices. Breaches of fewer than 500 go to HHS within 60 days after the end of the calendar year of discovery. Business associates tell the covered entity within the same 60-day limit |
| FTC Health Breach Notification Rule, 16 CFR 318 | Vendor of personal health records or related entity not covered by HIPAA to individuals, the FTC and, for 500 or more residents of one state, the media | Without unreasonable delay, and within 60 calendar days | Discovery of a breach of security, which includes an unauthorized disclosure | The FTC at the same time as individuals for 500 or more; within 60 days after the end of the calendar year for fewer |
| DFARS 252.204-7012 | Defense contractor to DoD, through dibnet.dod.mil | 72 hours | Discovery of the incident | Keep images and packet captures at least 90 days after the report |
| CISA Federal Incident Notification Guidelines and OMB M-25-04 | Federal civilian agency to CISA, and for a major incident to CISA, OMB, its Inspector General and Congress | 1 hour to CISA. 1 hour to CISA and OMB after a major incident determination. 7 days to Congress and the Inspector General | Identification by the agency's top-level SOC, CSIRT or IT department. For Congress, a reasonable basis to conclude a major incident occurred | Updates as facts arrive. A breach that is a major incident needs a report to Congress within 30 days of discovery |
| NISPOM, 32 CFR 117.8(f) | Cleared defense contractor to DCSA | Immediately | A cyber incident on a classified information system DCSA approved | Report the technique, a malware sample if isolated, and DoD program information potentially compromised |
| FCC CPNI breach rule, 47 CFR 64.2011 | Telecommunications carrier to the Secret Service and FBI, through the FCC's central reporting facility | As soon as practicable, and within 7 business days | Reasonably determining that a breach of customer proprietary network information (CPNI) occurred | Customers after the law enforcement notice, once 7 full business days have passed unless an exception applies. The 2024 amendments add the FCC, a 30-day customer deadline and a harm-based exception. The eCFR text, current to October 23, 2026, does not include them and links to them as a pending amendment, and this page found no FCC notice of an effective date. On July 31, 2026, the Sixth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and vacated the August 2025 panel decision that upheld them. The full court heard argument on October 21, 2026, and no en banc opinion had been published by November 10, 2026 |
| TSA security directives | Freight rail, passenger rail, transit and pipeline owners and operators to CISA | Rail and transit: as soon as practicable, and within 72 hours. Pipeline: as soon as practicable, and within 24 hours | Identifying a reportable cybersecurity incident | TSA states the 72-hour rail and transit rule in its September 1, 2026 notice; the 24-hour pipeline rule dates from Pipeline-2021-01B. TSA reissues the directives each year. Confirm against the current version on the TSA security directives page |
| CIRCIA | Covered critical infrastructure entity to CISA | 72 hours, and 24 hours after a ransom payment | Reasonably believing a covered incident occurred | Not in force until CISA publishes the final rule. CISA sent it to OMB for review on October 1, 2026, and this page found no publication by November 2, 2026. Reporting starts only after the final rule takes effect. Check CISA for its status |
| NERC CIP-008-6, Requirement R4 | Electric Responsible Entity with high or medium impact BES Cyber Systems to the E-ISAC and CISA | 1 hour for a Reportable Cyber Security Incident. By the end of the next calendar day for an attempt to compromise | The entity determines, under its own process, that the incident is reportable or was an attempt to compromise | Updates within 7 calendar days of each new or changed attribute: functional impact, attack vector, level of intrusion. CIP-008-7.1, approved by FERC Order No. 919 on March 19, 2026, takes effect July 1, 2028, or earlier for an entity that adopts it early |
| Form DOE-417, Electric Emergency Incident and Disturbance Report | Balancing authorities, reliability coordinators, electric utilities and some generating entities to DOE | 1 hour for criteria 1 to 9, including a Reportable Cyber Security Incident or a cyber event that interrupts electrical system operations. 6 hours for criteria 10 to 13 | The incident | Final report within 72 hours of the incident. An attempted compromise (criterion 14) is due by the end of the next calendar day after determination. Shared with E-ISAC and CISA through line W, the form can satisfy CIP-008 |
| NRC, 10 CFR 73.77 | Nuclear power plant licensee to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center by telephone | 1 hour after discovery of a cyber attack that adversely impacted safety, security or emergency preparedness functions. 4 hours if it could have. 8 hours for signs of pre-attack planning | Discovery of the cyber attack, or receipt of the information | Record in the corrective action program within 24 hours. Written follow-up on NRC Form 366 within 60 days of the telephone notice for the 1-hour and most 4-hour events |
| Coast Guard MTS cyber rule (33 CFR 101.620(b), 101.650(g)) | Owner or operator of an MTSA vessel, facility or outer continental shelf facility to the National Response Center (NRC) | Without delay | A reportable cyber incident: one that leads, or could reasonably lead, to substantial loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability of a covered system, or to a transportation security incident | In force since July 16, 2025. The duty applies to entities that have not reported to the Coast Guard under 33 CFR 6.16-1 or are not subject to it. Under 33 CFR 6.16-1, evidence of an actual or threatened cyber incident at any vessel, harbor, port or waterfront facility goes immediately to the FBI, CISA and the Captain of the Port. NVIC 02-24 Change 1 says an NRC report reaches the Captain of the Port and the FBI, and CISA needs its own report |
| New York General Municipal Law Article 19-c | Municipal corporation, including a school district or BOCES, or public authority to the Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services (DHSES) | 72 hours. 24 hours after a ransom payment | Reasonably believing that a cybersecurity incident occurred (995-b). For the 24-hour notice, the ransom payment (995-c) | Written explanation within 30 days of a ransom payment (995-c): why payment was necessary, the amount, how it was paid, alternatives considered, and diligence on alternatives and on compliance with state and federal rules, including OFAC's. Reports are exempt from FOIL under General Municipal Law 995-b(3) |
| FBI CJIS Security Policy v6.1, IR-6 | Staff to the agency's incident response capability. The agency reports incident information to its incident handlers, to the CJIS Systems Officer, SIB Chief or Interface Agency Official, and to the FBI CJIS ISO | 1 hour | Discovery of a suspected incident affecting criminal justice information | IR-6 in v6.1 (June 25, 2026) says "immediately but not to exceed one (1) hour after discovery". Local agencies follow their CJIS Systems Agency's form |
| IRS Publication 1075 | Agency receiving federal tax information to TIGTA and the IRS Office of Safeguards | Immediately, and within 24 hours | Identifying a possible issue involving FTI | Do not wait for an internal investigation. Tell Safeguards before notifying taxpayers and share media releases first. A 2026 draft revision is pending |
| Federal Student Aid breach report (SAIG enrollment agreement, GENERAL-24-46) | Title IV institution, through its Destination Point Administrator or GLBA Qualified Individual, to Federal Student Aid on the Cybersecurity Breach Intake Form | 24 hours | The incident is known or identified | Other SAIG organizations, such as servicers, email support@fps.ed.gov. The form asks whether the breach is suspected or known |
| FTC Safeguards Rule, 16 CFR 314.4(j) | Financial institution under FTC jurisdiction to the FTC, on its online form | As soon as possible, and within 30 days | Discovery of unauthorized acquisition of unencrypted customer information of 500 or more consumers | Unauthorized access is presumed acquisition without reliable evidence otherwise. A law enforcement request can delay FTC public disclosure up to 30 days, then up to 60 more. Title IV institutions agree in their Program Participation Agreement to follow the Safeguards Rule |
| US state breach laws | Organization to affected residents, and often the state attorney general | Varies. California, Colorado, Florida and Washington set 30 days | Discovery of the breach, in most states | Attorney general thresholds vary, often at 500 residents |
| Cyber insurance policy | Insured to the carrier | The policy's notice clause | Usually discovery | Panel vendors may be required. Read the policy before an incident |
Sources checked November 2026 for the energy, maritime, state and local government and education rows: FERC letter order approving CIP-008-6 (84 FR, June 26, 2019); FERC Order No. 919 for the July 1, 2028 date; Form DOE-417 and instructions (OMB 1901-0288); eCFR 10 CFR 73.77; Coast Guard final rule, 90 FR 6298 (January 17, 2025) and NVIC 02-24 Change 1; New York DHSES reporting page and General Municipal Law 995-b and 995-c; FBI CJIS Security Policy v6.1 (June 25, 2026), control IR-6, at le.fbi.gov, and California DOJ bulletin 2026-ISRS-001; IRS reporting page for Publication 1075; FSA GENERAL-24-46 and the SAIG agreement form (OMB 1845-0002); 16 CFR 314.4(j) (FR Doc. 2023-24412). Also checked November 2026: eCFR 47 CFR 64.2011, current to October 23, 2026, and the Sixth Circuit docket for Ohio Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, No. 24-3133, on CourtListener, which records the en banc argument on October 21, 2026. Sources checked October 2026: DFARS 252.204-7012 (May 2024) at acquisition.gov; eCFR 32 CFR 117.8; CISA Federal Incident Notification Guidelines; California Civil Code 1798.82(a)(2), Colorado's attorney general data protection page, Florida Statutes 501.171 and Washington RCW 19.255.010; eCFR 12 CFR Part 53, 12 CFR 748.1, 17 CFR 248.30, 45 CFR Part 164 Subpart D and 16 CFR Part 318; the SEC's Regulation S-P compliance guide and Item 1.05 compliance guide; GDPR Article 33; NIS2 Article 23; Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/301, Article 5; ENISA, The CRA Single Reporting Platform is launched, September 11, 2026; 23 NYCRR 500.17; OMB M-25-04; 47 CFR 64.2011 (October 1, 2025 edition) and 89 FR 9968; the Sixth Circuit's en banc order in Ohio Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, July 31, 2026, which Public Citizen reports vacated the panel decision; the current 47 CFR 64.2011 text at LII; TSA's September 1, 2026 notice and January 17, 2025 ratification of the pipeline directives; CISA's CIRCIA page, and Covington's report of the OMB submission (October 8, 2026), and Paubox, Cyber incident reporting rule reaches final White House review (October 14, 2026).