Identification
Identification covers alerting, detection and hunting. It never stops. For a single event it ends when someone raises the event with evidence references and hands it to verification.
Reports also arrive from outside the organization. Log them, check who sent them, and check the claim before you share anything.
Incidents reported from outside
Intake
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Log the report on arrival: time, channel, the reporter's contact details, and the original message with headers or the caller's exact words | Operations |
| 2 | Check the reporter's identity and authority before you share anything with them | Liaison |
| 3 | Limit the first reply to receipt, a reference number, and who will follow up by when | Liaison |
| 4 | For law enforcement, leak-site and customer reports, tell the Legal advisor before the call back | Legal advisor |
| 5 | Keep files and samples the reporter sends as received, hash them and enter them in the evidence register | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 6 | Check the claim against internal telemetry for the systems and times given | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 7 | Carry the report into T1 at verification, with REPORTED and REPORT SOURCE filled in | Operations |
First-call questions
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Ask who they are, their organization, and how to reach them | Liaison |
| 2 | Ask what they observed: systems, addresses, accounts, data samples, with times and time zone | Liaison |
| 3 | Ask how they came to see it: their own logs, a seized server, a leak site, a customer complaint | Liaison |
| 4 | Ask whether it is ongoing, and whether other organizations are affected | Liaison |
| 5 | Ask what they want from you, and any limits, such as delaying public disclosure or keeping indicators confidential | Liaison |
| 6 | Ask whether they will share indicators or samples, how, and under which Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) label | Liaison |
| 7 | Ask whom else they have told | Liaison |
A caller who says they are law enforcement
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Take the caller's name, agency, office, badge or employee number and case number, and end the call politely | Liaison |
| 2 | Look up the office's main number yourself, from the agency's official website or the contact list built in preparation. For the FBI, use the field office list on fbi.gov. | Liaison |
| 3 | Call that number and ask for the named person | Liaison |
| 4 | Share information once the switchboard confirms them, with the Legal advisor on the line | Legal advisor |
| 5 | Record the contact in T13 | Liaison |
First check by source
| Source | Arrives as | First check |
|---|---|---|
| Law enforcement | A call, email or visit saying your systems or data came up in an investigation | Verify the caller (above). The Legal advisor joins the call back. |
| Partners and customers | Invoices or payment changes from your domain they did not expect, or your credentials or keys used against them | Mail and sign-in logs for the accounts named; the business email compromise and supply chain scenarios |
| Security researchers and bug reports | Email to the security.txt contact, a bug bounty submission, a support ticket | Reproduce in test, and search logs for anyone else who used the flaw |
| Leak sites and threat intelligence | Your name on a leak site, credentials in stealer logs, data offered for sale | Match samples against internal systems. Counsel decides before anyone downloads claimed data. |
| Vendor advisories | A vendor bulletin or a CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities entry naming a product you run | Where you run it, which version, whether it faces the internet; then hunt for the published indicators (edge device scenario) |
Outside reports are common. Mandiant's M-Trends 2026 reports that organizations first detected the intrusion themselves in 52% of its 2025 investigations, up from 43% in 2024, so in nearly half the first word came from outside. NIST SP 800-61 Revision 3 asks for mechanisms that let third parties report possible incidents, and says those reports should be carefully monitored and taken seriously.
This section is an addition to the book. Sources checked October 2026: M-Trends 2026 (Mandiant, March 23, 2026); NIST SP 800-61r3, RS.MA-02; CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog.
Decisions and records
- Decide whether to raise the event to verification. Raise it with the evidence references attached.
- Counsel decides before anyone downloads data an attacker claims to have taken.
- Record each evidence reference in the evidence register. Verification opens T1 from the alert, hunt finding or report.
- Treat any caller's request for money, credentials, remote access or urgent data as fraud until the call back confirms who they are.
- A single baseline averaged across business units defines normal too broadly for anomalies to surface. Scope baselines per business unit or per function.
- Hunt from a catalog, with a hypothesis, a named data source, and a cadence. Findings from unstructured hunting are hard to repeat and harder to defend.
Detection methods
Alerting is what reaches you, detection is the engineered logic behind it, and hunting finds whatever neither one caught. Alerting and detection fire only when their logic matches, so activity outside that logic keeps its dwell time until a hunt finds it.
Layer the methods, and map detection logic to MITRE ATT&CK so the rules keep working when attackers change their tools. Final classification stays with an analyst, because no model knows about the migration that started on Monday.
| Method | Strong on | Weak on |
|---|---|---|
| Signature | Known malware and patterns at machine speed, few false positives | New variants, zero days, and any attacker who has read the signature |
| Behavioral | Mass encryption, off-hours access, living off the land, insider misuse | Depends on a tuned baseline. One company-wide baseline hides anomalies. |
| Machine learning | Subtle patterns, triage and prioritization | No organizational context, so the final call stays with a person |
| Hybrid | Layered coverage that keeps working when attackers change tools | Cost and complexity of operating several platforms together |
Spend hunting hours above the automation line, on the artifacts an adversary cannot cheaply swap out. Adversaries change hashes and IP addresses cheaply, and automation already covers them at machine speed.
| Layer | Cost to change | Who chases it |
|---|---|---|
| Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) | Tough | Analysts. Methods the adversary cannot abandon. |
| Tools | Challenging | Analysts, with detections built on tool behavior |
| Network and host artifacts | Annoying | Analysts, on beaconing, process chains, lateral movement |
| Domain names | Simple | Automation, with analysts pivoting from the hits |
| IP addresses | Easy | Automation |
| Hash values | Trivial | Automation. High confidence, short shelf life. |