PIVTR-D
IPhase playbook

Identification

STARTS WHENTelemetry and reports flowing. Runs continuously.
DONE WHENAn event of interest raised with evidence references attached.
RECORDSAn alert, hunt finding or outside report with evidence references, which opens T1 at verification. Each reference points to an item in the evidence register.

Identification covers alerting, detection and hunting. It never stops. For a single event it ends when someone raises the event with evidence references and hands it to verification.

Reports also arrive from outside the organization. Log them, check who sent them, and check the claim before you share anything.

Incidents reported from outside

Intake

#ItemOwner
1Log the report on arrival: time, channel, the reporter's contact details, and the original message with headers or the caller's exact wordsOperations
2Check the reporter's identity and authority before you share anything with themLiaison
3Limit the first reply to receipt, a reference number, and who will follow up by whenLiaison
4For law enforcement, leak-site and customer reports, tell the Legal advisor before the call backLegal advisor
5Keep files and samples the reporter sends as received, hash them and enter them in the evidence registerIntelligence/Investigations
6Check the claim against internal telemetry for the systems and times givenIntelligence/Investigations
7Carry the report into T1 at verification, with REPORTED and REPORT SOURCE filled inOperations

First-call questions

#ItemOwner
1Ask who they are, their organization, and how to reach themLiaison
2Ask what they observed: systems, addresses, accounts, data samples, with times and time zoneLiaison
3Ask how they came to see it: their own logs, a seized server, a leak site, a customer complaintLiaison
4Ask whether it is ongoing, and whether other organizations are affectedLiaison
5Ask what they want from you, and any limits, such as delaying public disclosure or keeping indicators confidentialLiaison
6Ask whether they will share indicators or samples, how, and under which Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) labelLiaison
7Ask whom else they have toldLiaison

A caller who says they are law enforcement

#ItemOwner
1Take the caller's name, agency, office, badge or employee number and case number, and end the call politelyLiaison
2Look up the office's main number yourself, from the agency's official website or the contact list built in preparation. For the FBI, use the field office list on fbi.gov.Liaison
3Call that number and ask for the named personLiaison
4Share information once the switchboard confirms them, with the Legal advisor on the lineLegal advisor
5Record the contact in T13Liaison

First check by source

SourceArrives asFirst check
Law enforcementA call, email or visit saying your systems or data came up in an investigationVerify the caller (above). The Legal advisor joins the call back.
Partners and customersInvoices or payment changes from your domain they did not expect, or your credentials or keys used against themMail and sign-in logs for the accounts named; the business email compromise and supply chain scenarios
Security researchers and bug reportsEmail to the security.txt contact, a bug bounty submission, a support ticketReproduce in test, and search logs for anyone else who used the flaw
Leak sites and threat intelligenceYour name on a leak site, credentials in stealer logs, data offered for saleMatch samples against internal systems. Counsel decides before anyone downloads claimed data.
Vendor advisoriesA vendor bulletin or a CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities entry naming a product you runWhere you run it, which version, whether it faces the internet; then hunt for the published indicators (edge device scenario)

Outside reports are common. Mandiant's M-Trends 2026 reports that organizations first detected the intrusion themselves in 52% of its 2025 investigations, up from 43% in 2024, so in nearly half the first word came from outside. NIST SP 800-61 Revision 3 asks for mechanisms that let third parties report possible incidents, and says those reports should be carefully monitored and taken seriously.

This section is an addition to the book. Sources checked October 2026: M-Trends 2026 (Mandiant, March 23, 2026); NIST SP 800-61r3, RS.MA-02; CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog.

Decisions and records

  • Decide whether to raise the event to verification. Raise it with the evidence references attached.
  • Counsel decides before anyone downloads data an attacker claims to have taken.
  • Record each evidence reference in the evidence register. Verification opens T1 from the alert, hunt finding or report.
Watch out
  • Treat any caller's request for money, credentials, remote access or urgent data as fraud until the call back confirms who they are.
  • A single baseline averaged across business units defines normal too broadly for anomalies to surface. Scope baselines per business unit or per function.
  • Hunt from a catalog, with a hypothesis, a named data source, and a cadence. Findings from unstructured hunting are hard to repeat and harder to defend.

Detection methods

Alerting is what reaches you, detection is the engineered logic behind it, and hunting finds whatever neither one caught. Alerting and detection fire only when their logic matches, so activity outside that logic keeps its dwell time until a hunt finds it.

Layer the methods, and map detection logic to MITRE ATT&CK so the rules keep working when attackers change their tools. Final classification stays with an analyst, because no model knows about the migration that started on Monday.

MethodStrong onWeak on
SignatureKnown malware and patterns at machine speed, few false positivesNew variants, zero days, and any attacker who has read the signature
BehavioralMass encryption, off-hours access, living off the land, insider misuseDepends on a tuned baseline. One company-wide baseline hides anomalies.
Machine learningSubtle patterns, triage and prioritizationNo organizational context, so the final call stays with a person
HybridLayered coverage that keeps working when attackers change toolsCost and complexity of operating several platforms together

Spend hunting hours above the automation line, on the artifacts an adversary cannot cheaply swap out. Adversaries change hashes and IP addresses cheaply, and automation already covers them at machine speed.

The Pyramid of Pain, from hash values at the bottom through IP addresses, domain names, network and host artifacts, tools, to TTPs at the top, labeled trivial through tough.
Figure 52. The Pyramid of Pain, David Bianco, 2013.
LayerCost to changeWho chases it
Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)ToughAnalysts. Methods the adversary cannot abandon.
ToolsChallengingAnalysts, with detections built on tool behavior
Network and host artifactsAnnoyingAnalysts, on beaconing, process chains, lateral movement
Domain namesSimpleAutomation, with analysts pivoting from the hits
IP addressesEasyAutomation
Hash valuesTrivialAutomation. High confidence, short shelf life.
Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.