PIVTR-D
RScenario

Identity provider and help desk compromise

An attacker resets multifactor authentication (MFA) through the help desk, registers a new factor, or takes an identity provider administrator account. Protect the response channel and the administrator accounts first, because the attacker watches the response and can re-add what you remove.

First moves
  1. Move the incident to the out-of-band channel named in T1 and verify every participant on the response bridge.Incident Commander
  2. Export the identity provider logs into the evidence register.Intelligence/Investigations
  3. Pull help desk tickets, call recordings and phone records for every password, MFA and device change in the window.Intelligence/Investigations
  4. List accounts with a password or MFA reset in the window, administrators first.Operations
  5. Suspend help desk resets of administrator accounts unless the CISO approves each one.CISO
  6. Turn off self-service password and MFA reset and route resets through a verified manual process.Operations

Then work the page: Scope, Contain and eradicate, Keep it closed, Coordinate and notify.

An attacker who controls the identity provider reaches every application behind it. One route starts with a phone call. The caller poses as an employee, quotes personal details found online, and asks the help desk to reset the password and move MFA to a new phone.

With an administrator account the attacker resets other users' factors, grants roles, and adds a federated identity provider that signs them in as other users.

Mandiant's M-Trends 2026 reports voice phishing at 11% of intrusions in 2025, second to exploits at 32%, and tracks UNC3944 targeting IT help desks to bypass MFA. Caesars Entertainment reported in September 2023 that a social engineering attack on an outsourced IT support vendor led to theft of its loyalty program database.

This page adds to the phase playbooks for scope, contain, eradicate and recover.

This scenario is an addition to the book. Sources checked October 2026: M-Trends 2026; Microsoft Learn Entra audit activities and Entra data retention; Okta's event type catalog; FBI and CISA AA23-320A, Scattered Spider (updated July 29, 2025); Okta on the support system root cause, the November 29, 2023 update and retention; Caesars Form 8-K; Google Workspace retention. Sources checked September 2026: GTIG UNC3944 hardening guidance; Okta on cross-tenant impersonation; Microsoft on Octo Tempest; Okta System Log events and security event list; Google Workspace admin user settings, delegated admin settings and user event references.

What is different

RouteKnown casesWhat the response has to cover
Help desk resets password and MFAAA23-320A: Scattered Spider actors posed as employees to have help desk staff reset passwords and transfer MFA to devices they controlled, then registered their own MFA tokens.Every reset and factor change the help desk made in the window, matched to a verified request
Super administrator taken, inbound federation addedOkta reported on August 31, 2023 that callers had IT service desks reset all MFA factors on privileged accounts. With Super Administrator access the attacker set up a second identity provider as an "impersonation app", and in some cases removed second-factor requirements from authentication policies. AA23-320A reports federated identity providers added with automatic account linking.Identity providers, routing rules, sign-on policies and admin roles
Federated domain in Entra IDMicrosoft reported in October 2023 that Octo Tempest federated existing domains, or added and federated new ones, then forged SAML tokens with MFA satisfied for any user.Domain authentication settings and every domain added in the window
Identity vendor breachedFrom September 28 to October 17, 2023, an attacker in Okta's support case system accessed files belonging to 134 customers. Some were HAR files containing session tokens, which the attacker used to hijack sessions at 5 customers. The attacker also downloaded the names and email addresses of all support system users.Sessions of administrators who shared files with the vendor, and phishing aimed at them

A password reset leaves the attacker's factors, devices, roles and federation settings working. Remove each one.

The attackers also watch the response. AA23-320A reports Scattered Spider joining incident calls and searching Slack, Teams and Exchange Online, and Microsoft saw Octo Tempest join and transcribe calls. Run the incident on the out-of-band channel named in T1, and verify every participant on a response bridge.

Scope

Generic steps are on Scope. Export the identity provider logs first, into the evidence register.

#ItemOwner
1Pull help desk tickets, call recordings, phone system records and chat transcripts for every password, MFA and device change in the windowIntelligence/Investigations
2Match each change to a request the account owner confirms, and list every unmatched change as suspectIntelligence/Investigations
3Interview the help desk staff who took the calls about caller ID, callback number and what the caller knewIntelligence/Investigations
4List MFA factors, passkeys and devices registered in the window, and flag any phone number or device found on several accountsIntelligence/Investigations
5List accounts with a password or MFA reset in the window, administrators firstOperations
6List admin role grants in the window with who granted themIntelligence/Investigations
7Compare identity providers, routing rules, federated domains and cross-tenant settings with the last approved configurationOperations
8Trace each suspect account's sign-ins into single sign-on (SSO) applications, cloud consoles and VPNIntelligence/Investigations
PlatformLog and retentionLook for
OktaSystem Log, 90 daysPassword and factor resets: user.account.reset_password, user.mfa.factor.reset_all. Factor changes: user.mfa.factor.deactivate, user.mfa.factor.activate. Role grants: user.account.privilege.grant. New identity providers and sign-ins through them: system.idp.lifecycle.create, user.authentication.auth_via_IDP. Admin console access: user.session.access_admin_app
Microsoft EntraAudit logs, 7 days on Free and 30 days on P1 or P2Resets and security info changes: Reset password, Admin registered security info, User registered security info, Admin deleted security info. Devices: Register device. Role grants: Add member to role. Domains and federation: Add unverified domain, Verify domain, Set domain authentication, Set federation settings on domain. Cross-tenant settings: Update a partner cross-tenant access setting
Google WorkspaceAdmin log events and User log events, 6 monthsAdmin changes to 2-Step Verification, recovery phones and roles: GENERATE_2SV_SCRATCH_CODES, CHANGE_RECOVERY_PHONE, GRANT_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE, ASSIGN_ROLE. User changes: 2sv_enroll, 2sv_disable, password_edit, recovery_phone_edit

Contain and eradicate

Generic steps and provider commands are in identity containment. Record each decision in T3.

Act on every suspect account in one change window, because an attacker who sees one reset moves to another account. Cloud steps are in Azure account takeover, Azure tenant compromise, Google Cloud super admin compromise and AWS account takeover.

#ItemOwner
1Remove attacker factors, devices and passkeys from every suspect account, then reset passwords and revoke sessions in the same changeOperations
2Export rogue identity providers, routing rules and federated domains, then remove themOperations
3Return domains federated without approval to managed authenticationOperations
4Remove roles granted in the window, and cut standing Super Administrator and Global Administrator assignments to named emergency accountsOperations
5Revoke every administrator's sessions. If the attacker had an admin role, revoke sessions tenant-wide, administrators first.Operations
6If the attacker reached the federation server or its signing key, rotate the token-signing certificates and rebuild the federation trustsOperations
7Turn off self-service password and MFA reset for the incident, and route resets through a verified manual processOperations
8Suspend help desk resets of administrator accounts unless the CISO approves each oneCISO
9Revoke API tokens and OAuth grants created by suspect accounts, as in SaaS and OAuth abuseOperations
10Check the suspect accounts' mailbox rules as in business email compromiseOperations

Keep it closed

#ItemOwner
11Write a help desk identity check: callback to the phone number in HR records, manager approval, and on-camera verification with photo ID for administrators and every MFA resetCISO
12Base verification on internal facts, and drop birth date, the last four digits of a Social Security number and other public dataCISO
13Require phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2 security keys, passkeys or smart cards) for every administrator, and remove SMS, voice and email methods from admin accountsOperations
14Allow MFA registration from managed devices or trusted locations alone, with an alert and a message to the user on each new factorOperations
15Cut standing admin roles to the fewest people with Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM) activation, Okta custom admin roles and Google Workspace custom admin rolesOperations
16Send alerts on new identity providers, federated domains and admin role grants to the on-call responderIntelligence/Investigations

Coordinate and notify

#ItemOwner
1Ask the outsourced help desk provider for call records and staff statements under the contract, with T19Liaison
2Give the identity vendor's security team the indicators, and ask for its own log reviewLiaison
3Assess the data reached through SSO applications against notification deadlinesLegal advisor
4Tell staff through T12 how the help desk will verify themPublic Information Officer
Watch out
  • An attacker with admin rights can re-add what you remove. Revoke admin sessions and roles in the same window as the cleanup.
  • Callers press agents with claimed seniority and urgency. The written check lets the agent end the call and call back on the number in HR records.
Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.