Oracle Cloud playbooks
This page covers Oracle Cloud Infrastructure tenancies that use IAM with identity domains: the logs to keep, what to search, and the playbooks for 22 incident types in seven categories. Each playbook lists where to look and the commands to contain it. Commands use the OCI CLI, and queries run against the Audit service or Logging Search.
Playbooks
Identity and access
Stolen credentials, taken-over accounts and the access an attacker leaves behind.
Compute and containers
Workloads, servers and clusters used or abused by an attacker.
Data and storage
Exposed, copied, encrypted or deleted data, and stolen secrets.
Network and edge
Attacks on availability and on names and endpoints you own.
Pipelines and supply chain
Build systems and image registries that reach production.
Evasion and guardrails
Logging and controls turned off to hide an attack.
Provider and accidental
Incidents with no attacker: a vendor's bug, a provider's or operator's mistake, or a provider outage.
First 15 minutes, any incident
| # | Item |
|---|---|
| 1 | Work from a break-glass administrator account in a group the suspect identity cannot modify |
| 2 | Find the home region, the only region where users, groups, policies and dynamic groups change. Check is-home-region in the output of oci iam region-subscription list |
| 3 | Export Audit for each compartment and subscribed region, as in Evidence: oci audit event list -c <compartment-ocid> --region <region> --start-time <utc> --end-time <utc> --all > audit-<region>.json |
| 4 | Record who made the call that raised the alert, and from where: data.identity.principalName, principalId, credentials, ipAddress and userAgent |
| 5 | Pull open Cloud Guard problems: oci cloud-guard problem list -c <tenancy-ocid> --compartment-id-in-subtree true --access-level ACCESSIBLE --lifecycle-detail OPEN |
| 6 | Back up the boot volumes of involved instances before any isolation: oci bv boot-volume-backup create --boot-volume-id <ocid> --display-name <case-id> |
| 7 | Allow about 15 minutes before treating a missing Audit event as absent |
Native detections to playbooks
Cloud Guard problems map to the playbook to open first, using the detector rule names in the Oracle documentation. Kubernetes, instance principal misuse, resource hijacking, Generative AI abuse, Vault access, DDoS, dangling DNS, CI/CD abuse, registry tampering, cross-tenancy access and the provider and accidental playbooks have no dedicated rule in this table. Start from the log searches on their pages. A problem appears only after Cloud Guard is enabled with a target that covers the compartment.
| Detection | Source | Open |
|---|---|---|
IAM API keys Created | Cloud Guard, activity detector | API key or auth token |
IAM API keys Created | Cloud Guard, activity detector | Users, keys, federation |
IAM Auth Token Created | Cloud Guard, activity detector | API key or auth token |
IAM Customer Keys created | Cloud Guard, activity detector | API key or auth token |
IAM OAuth 2.0 credentials created | Cloud Guard, activity detector | Users, keys, federation |
IAM User created | Cloud Guard, activity detector | Users, keys, federation |
User added to group | Cloud Guard, activity detector | Users, keys, federation |
IAM User UI password created or reset | Cloud Guard, activity detector | Identity domain user |
Local user authenticated without MFA | Cloud Guard, activity detector | Identity domain user |
Suspicious Ip Activity | Cloud Guard, activity detector | Identity domain user |
Security policy modified | Cloud Guard, activity detector | Tenancy administrator |
IAM User capabilities modified | Cloud Guard, activity detector | Tenancy administrator |
Bastion session created | Cloud Guard, activity detector | Compute instance |
VCN Security List ingress rules changed | Cloud Guard, activity detector | Compute instance |
VCN Network Security Group ingress rule changed | Cloud Guard, activity detector | Compute instance |
Instance terminated | Cloud Guard, activity detector | Deletion and ransomware |
Database System terminated | Cloud Guard, activity detector | Deletion and ransomware |
Tenancy admin privilege granted to group | Cloud Guard, configuration detector | Tenancy administrator |
Policy gives too many privileges | Cloud Guard, configuration detector | Tenancy administrator |
User does not have MFA enabled | Cloud Guard, configuration detector | Identity domain user |
API key is too old | Cloud Guard, configuration detector | API key or auth token |
Bucket is public | Cloud Guard, configuration detector | Object Storage |
Read Log access disabled for bucket | Cloud Guard, configuration detector | Cloud Guard, logs, Security Zones |
Database System is publicly accessible | Cloud Guard, configuration detector | Databases and backups |
Instance is publicly accessible | Cloud Guard, configuration detector | Compute instance |
Oracle documentation: Cloud Guard detector recipe reference (activity and configuration detector rules). Rule names are as published, and the recipe a rule belongs to can change with a Cloud Guard update, so check the names in your tenancy's recipes. Checked October 2026: all 24 rule names, including the two Storage rules in the configuration recipe. Read Log access disabled for bucket is off in the Oracle-managed configuration recipe and works only in a clone.
Before an incident
| Log | Default retention | Turn on / keep |
|---|---|---|
| Audit service (API calls from the Console, CLI, SDKs and other services) | 365 days, set at tenancy level. The Audit configuration API accepts 90 to 365 days, so confirm the value with oci audit config get -c <tenancy-ocid> | Nothing to turn on. Archive the _Audit logs to Object Storage with Connector Hub to keep more than a year |
| Identity domain events (sign-ins, MFA, user and group changes) | Written to the Audit service, so 365 days | Search them in Audit by data.additionalDetails.eventId. The identity domain AuditEvents API stopped returning new data after December 15, 2024 |
Object Storage service logs, categories read and write | Off until enabled. Once enabled, 30 days by default, up to 180 in 30-day steps | Enable both categories on every sensitive bucket. read covers GET, LIST and HEAD. write covers PUT, POST and DELETE |
| VCN flow logs | Off until enabled. Stored in a Logging log group, 30 days by default, up to 180 | Enable at the VCN, subnet, VNIC or resource level. A capture filter can sample traffic, so check its sampling rate |
| Logging Search | Each query covers at most 14 days | Use oci audit event list for longer windows. Grant responders read log-groups, read log-content and AUDIT_EVENT_READ in advance |
| Cloud Guard problems | None until Cloud Guard is enabled | Enable Cloud Guard with a target on the root compartment. Clone the Oracle-managed configuration, activity and threat detector recipes so you can tune them. Enable Security Zones on sensitive compartments |
| Connector Hub archive in Object Storage | Set by the target bucket | Add a retention rule to the archive bucket and keep it in a compartment the workload administrators cannot manage |
| Events rules with notifications | No log. They alert on changes as they happen | Create rules for changes to IAM policies, users, groups, identity providers, and network gateways, security lists, NSGs, route tables and VCNs, as in the CIS OCI benchmark |
Oracle documentation: Audit log retention period, contents of an Audit log event, Logging overview, Logging Search, enabling logging for a resource, details for Object Storage logs, VCN flow logs, identity domain audit event APIs, Cloud Guard concepts, Security Zones, CIS 1.2 controls. Checked September 2026. Rechecked October 2026: Logging Search (a 14-day range per query), viewing Audit log events (events usually appear within 15 minutes), and the Audit configuration and every command in OCI CLI 3.94.2; the Audit configuration model (retentionPeriodDays, minimum 90, maximum 365) and creating a log (retention in 30-day increments up to 180 days). The Audit log retention period page could not be opened in October 2026.