PIVTR-D

Cloud playbooks

Each of the four providers has 22 playbooks in seven categories. A playbook lists where to look, the event names to search for, and the commands to contain and remove the attack. Each provider also has a page with the log setup, the first 15 minutes for any incident, and a table from the provider's own detections to the playbook to open. Use them with the cloud scenario, which covers what every cloud incident has in common.

Identity and access

Stolen credentials, taken-over accounts and the access an attacker leaves behind.

PlaybookAWSAzureGoogle CloudOracle Cloud
Long-lived credentials leakedA long-lived key or secret is stolen and used to change permissions.IAM user access keysService principal secretService account keyAPI key or auth token
Human account takeoverAn attacker signs in as a person, then registers their own factors or changes the password.Console or Identity Center userEntra ID userGoogle accountIdentity domain user
Backdoor and persistenceAccess that survives the first clean-up: new principals, credentials, trust and federation.Roles, keys, trust policiesApps, credentials, federationService accounts and bindingsUsers, keys, federation
Organization-level admin compromiseThe highest administrative identity is used, so every account or project is in scope.Root or management accountGlobal AdministratorOrg admin or super adminTenancy administrator
Cross-account and third-party access abusedAccess granted to a partner, a guest or another account is used from outside your control.Cross-account rolesGuests and LighthouseImpersonation and delegationCross-tenancy policies

Compute and containers

Workloads, servers and clusters used or abused by an attacker.

PlaybookAWSAzureGoogle CloudOracle Cloud
Workload credentials used off the hostCredentials issued to a workload are stolen and used from somewhere else.EC2 instance roleManaged identityAttached service accountInstance principal
Compromised server or virtual machineAn attacker has a shell on a cloud server. Preserve it before you isolate it.EC2 instanceVirtual machineCompute Engine instanceCompute instance
Kubernetes cluster compromiseA pod, node or cluster credential is used to reach the cluster API, other workloads or the cloud account.Amazon EKSAzure AKSGoogle GKEOracle OKE
Compute hijacked for miningCompute is created or taken over to mine cryptocurrency at your cost.EC2 and quota abuseVirtual machinesCompute EngineCompute
AI model service abusedStolen credentials run paid AI models, or reach the prompts, data and agents behind them.Amazon BedrockAzure OpenAIVertex AIOCI Generative AI

Data and storage

Exposed, copied, encrypted or deleted data, and stolen secrets.

PlaybookAWSAzureGoogle CloudOracle Cloud
Object storage exposed or data takenA bucket or container is opened to the internet, or its contents are copied out.S3Storage accountsCloud StorageObject Storage
Database exposed or copiedA managed database, snapshot or backup is opened to the internet, shared or copied out.RDS and snapshotsSQL and databasesCloud SQL and BigQueryDatabases and backups
Data deletion and ransomwareData, backups or encryption keys are deleted or encrypted to cause loss or force a payment.Deletion and ransomwareDeletion and ransomwareDeletion and ransomwareDeletion and ransomware
Secrets and encryption keys stolenSecret stores and key management are read to collect credentials for the next step.Secrets Manager and SSMKey VaultSecret Manager and KMSVault

Network and edge

Attacks on availability and on names and endpoints you own.

PlaybookAWSAzureGoogle CloudOracle Cloud
DDoS or application-layer attackTraffic floods or request patterns take a public endpoint down or scrape it.Shield and WAFDDoS Protection and WAFCloud ArmorWAF and load balancer
Dangling DNS and subdomain takeoverA DNS record points at a cloud resource you deleted, and an attacker claims that name.Route 53 recordsAzure DNS recordsCloud DNS recordsOCI DNS records

Pipelines and supply chain

Build systems and image registries that reach production.

PlaybookAWSAzureGoogle CloudOracle Cloud
CI/CD pipeline abusedA pipeline, its secrets or its trust in the cloud account is used to deploy attacker code or take credentials.CI/CD and OIDC trustDevOps and federated credentialsCI/CD and federationDevOps and build credentials
Container image tamperingAn image in your registry is replaced or added, and workloads pull it.ECR imagesACR imagesArtifact Registry imagesOCIR images

Evasion and guardrails

Logging and controls turned off to hide an attack.

PlaybookAWSAzureGoogle CloudOracle Cloud
Logging or guardrails turned offAudit logs, detection or preventive policy is stopped or changed to hide activity.CloudTrail, GuardDuty, SCPsDiagnostic settings, Defender, PolicySinks, audit config, org policyCloud Guard, logs, Security Zones

Provider and accidental

Incidents with no attacker: a vendor's bug, a provider's or operator's mistake, or a provider outage.

PlaybookAWSAzureGoogle CloudOracle Cloud
Data exposed by a bugA code or configuration change, yours or a vendor's, shows one customer's data to another. No attacker is involved.Bug-caused exposureBug-caused exposureBug-caused exposureBug-caused exposure
Data lost through provider or operator errorA provider's mistake or your own change deletes resources or data that production depends on.Provider or operator deletionProvider or operator deletionProvider or operator deletionProvider or operator deletion
Regional outage or service disruptionA provider region or service fails, and you run on degraded service or fail over.Provider outageProvider outageProvider outageProvider outage

Same job, different names

JobAWSAzureGoogle CloudOracle Cloud
Control-plane audit logCloudTrailActivity Log, and Entra ID audit and sign-in logsCloud Audit LogsAudit service
Threat detectionGuardDutyMicrosoft Defender for CloudSecurity Command CenterCloud Guard
Organization-wide guardrailService control policiesAzure PolicyOrganization PolicySecurity Zones and quotas
Workload identityInstance profile roleManaged identityAttached service accountInstance principal
Temporary data linkPresigned URLShared access signatureSigned URLPre-authenticated request

Retention, log names and commands differ by provider and license. Each provider page states what was checked against the provider's documentation and when.

Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.