PIVTR-D
RAzure playbook · Identity and access

Partner, guest or Lighthouse access abused

An attacker uses a guest account, a partner's technician, or a managed service provider's Azure Lighthouse delegation to reach your tenant with credentials that live in another tenant. The attacker may also invite new guests, trust multifactor authentication (MFA) claims from a partner tenant, or widen a partner's roles. Disable the abused external identity and cut its partner path first, because its password and MFA sit in the other tenant, out of your reach.

Look here

LogSearch for
SigninLogsSign-ins from other tenants. CrossTenantAccessType values include b2bCollaboration, b2bDirectConnect, microsoftSupport and serviceProvider: SigninLogs | where CrossTenantAccessType != "none" | summarize count() by UserPrincipalName, UserType, HomeTenantId, HomeTenantName, CrossTenantAccessType, IPAddress, AppDisplayName
AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogsToken refreshes after the first sign-in, with the same query run on this table
AuditLogs, guestsGuests invited, redeemed, changed or given roles: Invite external user, Redeem external user invite, Update user, Add member to role and Add app role assignment to service principal
AuditLogs, cross-tenant settingsPartner and default cross-tenant access and sync settings added or changed: AuditLogs | where OperationName in ("Add a partner to cross-tenant access setting", "Update a partner cross-tenant access setting", "Update the company default cross-tenant access setting", "Create a partner cross-tenant identity sync setting", "Update a partner cross-tenant identity sync setting") | project TimeGenerated, OperationName, InitiatedBy, TargetResources
AuditLogs, delegated adminPartner relationships added: Add partner to company and Set Partnership, and entries in the category: DelegatedAdminServiceProviderConstraints
AzureActivityLighthouse onboarding, under Microsoft.ManagedServices as registrationDefinitions/write and registrationAssignments/write. Provider users appear by name in Caller, without their tenant or role
Lighthouse delegations nowDelegations on each subscription: az managedservices assignment list --include-definition
Guests nowGuest accounts in the tenant: az ad user list --filter "userType eq 'Guest'"
Partner settings nowCross-tenant partner settings. The cmdlet needs the scope Policy.Read.All: Get-MgPolicyCrossTenantAccessPolicyPartner

Contain

#Item
1Save the current-state output above, and the partner's role list on the Partners page in the Microsoft 365 admin center
2Disable each abused guest: Update-MgUser -UserId <guest-object-id> -AccountEnabled:$false
3Revoke the guest's sessions: Revoke-MgUserSignInSession -UserId <guest-object-id>
4List the guest's Azure roles: az role assignment list --assignee <guest-object-id> --all
5Remove those roles, and remove its directory roles as in the tenant compromise playbook: az role assignment delete --ids <assignment-id>
6Block inbound B2B collaboration from the partner tenant in cross-tenant access settings, and clear its inbound MFA and device trust
7Remove the abused granular delegated admin privileges (GDAP) roles, or end the relationship, on the Partners page in the Microsoft 365 admin center
8Remove the Lighthouse delegation as Owner of the subscription destructive, the provider must onboard again: az managedservices assignment delete --assignment <assignment-id>
9Delete guests the attacker invited destructive, after export. Deleted users stay restorable for 30 days

Eradicate and recover

#Item
1Review every change the external identities made in AzureActivity and AuditLogs, and clean persistence with the backdoor playbook
2Ask the partner for their own investigation of the technician or guest account, and record their answer in the timeline
3Limit who can invite guests in External collaboration settings, and restrict guest access to directory objects
4Assign the built-in Azure Policy that allows Lighthouse delegations only to named managing tenants, and the one that audits delegations
5Trust inbound MFA only from partner tenants you have reviewed, and require MFA for guests with Conditional Access
6Give GDAP relationships the fewest roles and an end date. A GDAP relationship lasts at most two years and can auto-extend by six months unless it includes the Global Administrator role
Watch out
  • Lighthouse role assignments for provider users are hidden from Access control (IAM) and from role assignment APIs in your tenant. List delegations with az managedservices assignment list.
  • Removing one Lighthouse delegation can remove access granted through other delegations from the same provider that share a principal and role. Confirm the legitimate provider access after removal.
  • GDAP technicians sign in with their partner tenant accounts, so your guest list omits them. Find them through CrossTenantAccessType, serviceProvider and HomeTenantId.
  • A guest's password and MFA live in its home tenant. Your controls are the guest object, its sessions, its roles and your cross-tenant settings.

Microsoft Learn: Entra audit log activity reference; Azure Lighthouse view and manage service providers, remove a delegation, monitor delegation changes; SigninLogs and AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs table references; Microsoft Graph PowerShell reference for the cmdlets used; Azure CLI reference for az managedservices. Checked October 2026. GDAP FAQ, auto-extend GDAP and restore deleted users: checked October 2026. Cross-tenant access overview, delegated administration primer and List partners in crossTenantAccessPolicy: checked September 2026.

Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.