Transportation: rail, transit, aviation, maritime and pipelines
- Check train control, positive train control (PTC), signals, supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), vessel and airport systems for safety impact.Safety Officer
- Record in T1 when the incident was identified; the clock to the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) starts there.Planning
- Page the Transportation Security Administration Cybersecurity Coordinator or the Coast Guard Cybersecurity Officer.Liaison
- Confirm with counsel which rows apply; record who decided each clock started.Legal advisor
- For a maritime incident, call the National Response Center (NRC) without delay and file a separate CISA report.Liaison
Then work the page: Reporting obligations, Terms, Roles, What changes in each phase, Records, Who you work with.
This page is for responders at railroads, rail transit and bus systems, airports and air carriers, and vessels and facilities under the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA). Pipelines are on the Energy page.
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) directives and security programs send cyber incidents to CISA; the Coast Guard rule sends them to the NRC. Safety comes first. A cyber incident on train control, a vessel or an airfield system is a safety event, and the operations control center (OCC) decides whether service runs.
This page adds to the phase playbooks for scope, contain, eradicate and recover. Use it with the OT scenario. Incident Command seats for this sector are on Command by incident type.
This sector page is an addition to the book. Primary sources: TSA Security Directive (SD) 1582-21-01C, SD 1580/82-2022-01C and TSA's 2026 notices; 49 CFR 1570.203; the Coast Guard final rule and 33 CFR Part 101 Subpart F; the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) two-hour notification guide. Checked November 2026.
Reporting obligations
Counsel confirms which rows apply. Record in T1 who decided each clock started, and when. The notification deadlines table lists other regimes.
| Obligation | Who reports to whom | Clock | Starts when | What the report contains |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TSA SD 1580-21-01 series (freight rail) and SD 1582-21-01 series (passenger rail and rail transit) | Freight railroads in 49 CFR 1580.101, passenger railroads and rail transit systems in 1582.101, and others TSA designates, to CISA at cisa.gov/forms/report or (888) 282-0870. Bus-only operations are excluded | As soon as practicable, and no later than 72 hours | The owner/operator identifies a cybersecurity incident, including one still under investigation | Contact details, affected systems and locations, description, detection dates, indicators, impact and planned response, as available. Say the report satisfies the directive. SD 1582-21-01C (October 2024) said 24 hours; TSA's 2026 notices state 72 hours. Confirm against the current revision |
| 49 CFR 1570.203, significant security concerns | Freight rail, passenger rail, rail transit and over-the-road bus owner/operators to TSA | As soon as possible, and within 24 hours | Initial discovery of a potential threat or significant security concern, such as a threat or suspicious activity | Reporter, affected train, vehicle or facility, route, description, who was notified, action taken, source of any threat |
| TSA Information Circulars IC 2021-01 and IC Surface-2025-01 (voluntary) | Surface owner/operators to the TSA Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) | 12 hours, recommended | Discovery of an actual or potential significant cybersecurity incident | A voluntary call. The directives do not require it |
| TSA airport and aircraft operator security programs | Airport operators and aircraft operators to CISA | 24 hours | As the security program sets | The amendments are Sensitive Security Information (SSI), and this page found no public TSA document that states the clock. Press reports give 24 hours, and a Department of Homeland Security notice of April 19, 2024 says the 24-hour pipeline deadline mirrors the aviation requirement; confirm against your TSA-approved security program |
| TSA SD Pipeline-2021-01 series | Pipeline owner/operators to CISA | As soon as practicable, and within 24 hours | Identification of a cybersecurity incident | See Energy |
| 33 CFR 101.620(b) and 101.650(g), reportable cyber incident | Owners or operators of MTSA vessels, facilities and outer continental shelf facilities to the NRC, 1-800-424-8802 | Without delay | An incident that leads, or could reasonably lead, to substantial loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability of a covered system, or to a transportation security incident | Reporting source, location with address, type of vessel or facility, brief summary and impact. In force since July 16, 2025. Both paragraphs apply to entities that have not reported to the Coast Guard under 33 CFR 6.16-1 or are not subject to it |
| 33 CFR 6.16-1, as amended by Executive Order 14116 (February 21, 2024) | Any vessel, harbor, port or waterfront facility to the FBI, CISA and the Captain of the Port (COTP) | Immediately | Evidence of sabotage, subversive activity, or an actual or threatened cyber incident | NVIC 02-24 Change 1: an NRC report reaches the COTP and the FBI's CyWatch. CISA needs its own report |
| 33 CFR 160.216, hazardous condition | Vessel owner, agent, master, operator or person in charge to the nearest Coast Guard Sector Office or Group Office | Immediately | A hazardous condition on board a vessel, or caused by a vessel or its operation. The January 17, 2025 final rule added "cyber incident" to the definition (160.202) | The Coast Guard's FAQ names the nearest COTP or Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection (OCMI) for this notice. It says foreign vessels also report hazardous conditions on the Notice of Arrival (160.206) |
| 49 CFR 674.33(a), rail transit safety events | Rail transit agency to its State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) and FTA, through the DOT Transportation Operations Center | 2 hours | Occurrence of a listed event, from any cause: fatality, two or more injuries, derailment, certain collisions, evacuation for life safety, unintended train movement | Agency, date, time, location, line, casualties, event type |
TSA's proposed rule "Enhancing Surface Cyber Risk Management" (89 FR 88488, November 7, 2024) would codify the directives in 49 CFR parts 1500, 1503, 1520, 1570, 1580, 1582, 1584 and 1586. It adds cyber risk management programs and incident reporting for over-the-road bus operators. Comments closed February 5, 2025.
This page found no final rule as of November 2, 2026, and TSA's September 2026 notice still relies on the yearly directives. Check the Federal Register under RIN 1652-AA74.
The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA) final rule went to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on October 1, 2026. This page found no publication by November 2, 2026. CIRCIA reporting starts only after the final rule takes effect.
Sources: SD 1582-21-01C, effective October 24, 2024; TSA notices of April 16, 2026 and September 1, 2026 (OMB control number 1652-0074); TSA release of March 7, 2023; The Record, aviation 24-hour rule, August 29, 2022; Transportation Security Oversight Board notice of April 19, 2024 (Emergency Amendment 23-01; Pipeline-2021-01B moved the pipeline clock from 12 to 24 hours, which footnote 8 says mirrors the reporting requirements for other surface and aviation entities); 33 CFR 101.615, 101.620(b)(7), 101.635, 101.650(d), (e) and (g) and 101.655 in the regulatory text of the final rule, 90 FR 6298, January 17, 2025, and in the Cornell Legal Information Institute copy of the current CFR, read November 2026; eCFR 33 CFR 160.202 and 160.216, read November 2026; Executive Order 14116; NVIC 02-24 Change 1, November 12, 2025; Coast Guard rule FAQ, January 9, 2026 (33 CFR 160.206 and 160.216); TSA proposed rule; Paubox, CIRCIA at the White House, October 8, 2026, and Cyber incident reporting rule reaches final White House review, October 14, 2026.
Terms
| Term | Meaning | PIVTR-D equivalent |
|---|---|---|
| Cybersecurity incident (TSA) | An occurrence that, without lawful authority, jeopardizes or disrupts the integrity, confidentiality or availability of systems. Includes events still under investigation | Incident, from identification |
| Critical Cyber System | Any IT or OT system or data that, if compromised or exploited, could result in operational disruption (SD 1580/82-2022-01 series) | Critical system in the containment triggers |
| Cybersecurity Coordinator | The primary and at least one alternate named to TSA. One must be reachable by TSA and CISA 24 hours a day | Liaison |
| Cybersecurity Implementation Plan | The TSA-approved plan for segmentation, access control, monitoring and patching of Critical Cyber Systems | Preparation |
| Cybersecurity Assessment Plan | The annual plan and report testing the implementation plan, covering at least one third of the measures each year | Preparation |
| Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan | The directive plan for Critical Cyber Systems, naming responsible people by position, exercised at least once a year | This book's plan and response loop |
| SSI | Sensitive Security Information. 49 CFR 1520.5 lists security programs and security directives as SSI; TSA has published the rail directives | Restricted handling in Evidence |
| Train control | Systems that set routes, separate trains and enforce speed, including signals, interlockings (route and switch logic), CBTC and PTC | OT; see the OT scenario |
| CBTC | Communications-based train control: train location and movement authority sent by radio between trains and wayside equipment (IEEE 1474) | OT |
| PTC | Positive train control, required on certain main lines by 49 U.S.C. 20157 and defined in 49 CFR 236.1003. A Critical Cyber System under the 2022-01 series | OT |
| Wayside | Equipment along the track: signals, switch machines, track circuits, radios, field cabinets | OT asset in scope |
| SCADA | Supervisory control and data acquisition, here for traction power, tunnel ventilation, pumps and station systems | OT |
| Safety-critical system | A system whose modification would threaten life or safety at once. The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) puts signaling, interlocking and train protection in this zone | Safety Officer review in T3 |
| OCC | Operations control center: dispatches trains or vehicles and controls power and ventilation | Operations |
| ROC | Rail operations center, a name some railroads and transit systems give their OCC | Operations |
| Revenue service | Carrying passengers or freight for pay | Recover |
| Safety certification | Verifying a new or changed rail system is safe before revenue service. A rebuilt safety-critical system may need it | T7 pre-restoration sign-off |
| PTASP | Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan, 49 CFR part 673, with safety risk management and a chief safety officer | none |
| SSOA | State Safety Oversight Agency, 49 CFR part 674: oversees rail transit safety and receives event notices | Regulator in T17 |
| Reportable cyber incident | The Coast Guard trigger; see the reporting table | Incident with an NRC clock |
| CySO | Cybersecurity Officer (33 CFR 101.625), responsible for the cyber parts of the security plans | CISO |
| FSO, VSO, CSO | Facility, Vessel and Company Security Officers under MTSA security plans | Liaison to the COTP; physical security in Operations |
| Cybersecurity Plan | The cyber part of the vessel or facility security plan, due to the Coast Guard by July 16, 2027 | Preparation |
| COTP | Captain of the Port, the Coast Guard officer with authority over a port zone | Regulator and coordination body |
| Airport security program, aircraft operator security program | TSA-approved programs under 49 CFR parts 1542 and 1544, with cyber amendments including Emergency Amendment 23-01 (March 7, 2023) | none |
Roles
| Sector role | What they do in an incident | PIVTR-D or Incident Command seat |
|---|---|---|
| Cybersecurity Coordinator (TSA) | Takes TSA and CISA calls, files the CISA report and supplements | Liaison |
| Cybersecurity Officer (Coast Guard) | Leads the cyber parts of the security plan; records and reports incidents to the owner or operator | CISO, with Liaison filing the NRC report |
| Facility, Vessel or Company Security Officer | Physical security measures, MTSA reports, contact with the COTP | Liaison; physical security group in Operations |
| Airport security coordinator (49 CFR 1542.3), aircraft operator security coordinator (1544.215) | TSA contact for the security program | Liaison |
| Chief safety officer (49 CFR 673) | Safety risk decisions, safety event reports, the SSOA | Safety Officer |
| OCC or dispatch superintendent, rail controllers | Run trains and vehicles, move to manual operation, stop or restrict service | Operations, service branch |
| Signals and train control engineering | Approve every action on train control and wayside systems; verify safe state | Operations, OT branch; approve T3 and T7 |
| Airport operations, airline operations control | Run the airfield, gates, baggage and flights on degraded systems | Operations |
| Railroad or transit police | Scene security, threats, link to the FBI | Liaison; Intelligence/Investigations for evidence |
| Emergency manager | Runs the incident action plan and the emergency operations center | Planning |
| Customer communications | Service alerts and announcements | Public Information Officer |
What changes in each phase
Preparation
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Name a primary and alternate Cybersecurity Coordinator to TSA, and report changes within 7 days | CISO |
| 2 | If a coordinator is not a US citizen, confirm a current NEXUS, Global Entry or comparable membership, per the January 15, 2026 revision | CISO |
| 3 | Keep the Critical Cyber System list current, with PTC listed where installed | CISO |
| 4 | Exercise the Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan at least once a year with the OCC and signals engineering | Planning |
| 5 | Test the manual controls that isolate industrial control systems from IT, and manual operating procedures | Operations |
| 6 | For MTSA entities, run cyber drills twice each calendar year and an exercise each year, no more than 18 months apart (33 CFR 101.635) | Planning |
| 7 | Train maritime staff with system access each year; train new staff within 5 days of access (101.650(d)) | Logistics |
| 8 | Turn off automatic EDR isolation on OCC, wayside and SCADA hosts | CISO |
| 9 | Test CISA, NRC and TSOC reporting access with named staff | Liaison |
| 10 | Join the ISAC for each mode you run | Liaison |
Identification and verification
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Check train control, PTC, signals, SCADA, vessel and airfield systems for safety impact first | Safety Officer |
| 2 | Record the identification time; an event under investigation can already start the TSA clock | Planning |
| 3 | Ask the OCC whether service is safe, and record its decision | Incident Commander |
| 4 | Classify the event against each row: cybersecurity incident, reportable cyber incident, safety event | Legal advisor |
| 5 | For a maritime incident, call the NRC, then report to CISA, and save both report numbers | Liaison |
| 6 | If an unintended train movement or other listed safety event occurred, notify the SSOA and FTA within 2 hours | Safety Officer |
| 7 | Mark SSI in notes, tickets and reports before they circulate | Planning |
Response loop
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Get signals engineering and OCC approval in T3 before containing a train control, PTC, CBTC or SCADA asset | Incident Commander |
| 2 | Record each decision to stop, restrict or restore service, with who made it | Planning |
| 3 | Send CISA supplements as facts arrive | Liaison |
| 4 | Brief the COTP on vessel movement, cargo operations and facility status | Liaison |
| 5 | Request logs, images and remote access records from signaling, CBTC and SCADA suppliers | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 6 | Before revenue service, confirm whether a restored safety-critical system needs safety certification | Safety Officer |
| 7 | Run test trains or a safe-state check before returning a line to service | Operations |
Debrief
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Update the Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan and the Critical Cyber System list | CISO |
| 2 | Feed findings into the next Cybersecurity Assessment Plan report | CISO |
| 3 | Enter safety hazards found into the PTASP safety risk management process | Safety Officer |
| 4 | Update the MTSA Cybersecurity Plan and next year's drill scenarios | Planning |
Sources: SD 1582-21-01C; SD 1580/82-2022-01C; 33 CFR 101.635 and 101.650(d); Coast Guard implementation timeline and training guidance; APTA APTA-SS-CCS-RP-002-13 (2013).
Records
| Record | What changes |
|---|---|
| T1 Incident record | Add identification time, CISA and NRC report numbers, affected Critical Cyber Systems and service status |
| T2 Triage brief | Add safety impact, service impact and hours left on each clock |
| T3 Containment decision | Add signals engineering, OCC and Safety Officer approval for OT actions |
| T7 Pre-restoration sign-off | Add the safety certification decision and test results before revenue service |
| T13 Law enforcement and insurer contact | Add railroad or transit police, the COTP and FBI CyWatch |
| T17 Regulator notification worksheet | One worksheet each for CISA, TSA, the NRC, the COTP, and the SSOA and FTA |
| T18 Interim statement and media inquiry log | Add service alerts. Counsel checks wording for SSI |
| T19 Vendor evidence and preservation request | Send to signaling, CBTC, SCADA and fare system suppliers |
| SSOA event report, NRC report | Join the incident record |
Who you work with
| Body | What they do for you | How to reach them |
|---|---|---|
| CISA | Receives TSA-required and maritime cyber reports; technical help | cisa.gov/forms/report, (888) 282-0870, or (844) 729-2472 for maritime reports |
| TSA | Directives, security programs, inspections, the TSOC | Your TSA inspector; the contact address in the directive |
| US Coast Guard | Enforces MTSA and the cyber rule | NRC at 1-800-424-8802; the local COTP; MTSCyberRule@uscg.mil for rule questions |
| FTA and SSOAs | Transit safety oversight. FTA publishes the Cybersecurity Assessment Tool for Transit; rail transit grantees certify a cybersecurity risk plan process (49 U.S.C. 5323(v)) | DOT Transportation Operations Center for 2-hour notices; your SSOA |
| Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) | Railroad safety, including PTC under 49 CFR part 236 | Your FRA regional office |
| Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) | Aircraft and air traffic safety. Its 2024 proposed rule on aircraft network security was not final as of June 2026 | Your FAA certificate office |
| Surface Transportation ISAC (ST-ISAC), Public Transportation ISAC (PT-ISAC), Over-the-Road Bus ISAC | Threat sharing for rail, transit and bus; PT-ISAC issues daily reports | Membership; PT-ISAC through APTA |
| Aviation ISAC (A-ISAC) | Threat sharing for airlines, airports and aerospace | Membership |
| Maritime Transportation System ISAC (MTS-ISAC) | Threat sharing for ports, terminals and vessel operators | Membership |
| Area Maritime Security Committee | Port coordination | Through the COTP |
| FBI | Investigation; receives NRC maritime reports through CyWatch | The local field office, or the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) |
Sources: FTA, Cybersecurity Resources for Transit Agencies; APTA PT-ISAC page; FAA proposed rule (August 21, 2024), status from Chemical Facility Security News, June 1, 2026.
- TSA reissues each directive every year and changes its text. The rail and transit window moved from 24 hours in the 2024 text to 72 hours in TSA's 2026 notices. Read the revision in force.
- The TSA clock starts at identification. Events still under investigation count, so file and supplement.
- An NRC call reaches the COTP and the FBI. CISA needs its own report under 33 CFR 6.16-1.
- Containing train control, PTC or SCADA is a safety decision. Signals engineering and the OCC approve it, and EDR auto-isolation on those hosts can stop trains.
- Runbooks that cite TSA's 2024 proposed rule or the FAA's 2024 proposal as law are wrong. This page found neither final.