PIVTR-D
RCloud playbooks

Google Cloud playbooks

This page covers a Google Cloud organization and the Google Workspace or Cloud Identity accounts that sign in to it. It gives the logs to keep, what to search, and the playbooks for 22 incident types in seven categories. Each playbook lists where to look and the commands to contain it. Commands use the current gcloud CLI, and queries use the Cloud Logging query language with gcloud logging read.

Playbooks

Identity and access

Stolen credentials, taken-over accounts and the access an attacker leaves behind.

Compute and containers

Workloads, servers and clusters used or abused by an attacker.

Data and storage

Exposed, copied, encrypted or deleted data, and stolen secrets.

Network and edge

Attacks on availability and on names and endpoints you own.

Pipelines and supply chain

Build systems and image registries that reach production.

Evasion and guardrails

Logging and controls turned off to hide an attack.

Provider and accidental

Incidents with no attacker: a vendor's bug, a provider's or operator's mistake, or a provider outage.

First 15 minutes, any incident

#Item
1Copy the incident window out of the _Default bucket now. Data Access, Policy Denied and Workspace login entries age out after 30 days by default: gcloud logging copy _Default storage.googleapis.com/<bucket> --location=global --log-filter='<filter>' --project=<project>
2Confirm organization sinks exist and route. Check each sink's filter and disabled field: gcloud logging sinks list --organization=<org-id>
3Identify the caller from the first suspicious entry. Read principalEmail, serviceAccountKeyName, serviceAccountDelegationInfo and requestMetadata.callerIp
4Pull everything that principal did, per project: gcloud logging read 'protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail="<principal>"' --project=<project> --freshness=30d
5List active Security Command Center findings: gcloud scc findings list <org-id> --filter='state="ACTIVE"'
6Snapshot the disks of affected VMs before any change: gcloud compute disks snapshot <disk> --zone=<zone> --snapshot-names=<case-id>-<disk>
7Set deletion protection on the same VMs: gcloud compute instances update <vm> --zone=<zone> --deletion-protection

Native detections to playbooks

Security Command Center findings map to the playbook to open first. Storage exposure, secrets theft, dangling DNS, CI/CD abuse, registry tampering and the provider and accidental playbooks have no finding in this table, so start from the log searches on their pages.

DetectionSourceOpen
Initial Access: Leaked Service Account Key UsedEvent Threat DetectionService account key
Persistence: Service Account Key CreatedEvent Threat DetectionService account key
Persistence: Service Account Key CreatedEvent Threat DetectionService accounts and bindings
Persistence: IAM Anomalous GrantEvent Threat DetectionService accounts and bindings
Defense Evasion: Project-Level Service Account Token Creator Role AddedEvent Threat DetectionService accounts and bindings
Privilege Escalation: New Service Account is Owner or EditorEvent Threat DetectionService accounts and bindings
Persistence: Project SSH Key AddedEvent Threat DetectionService accounts and bindings
Initial Access: Suspicious Login BlockedEvent Threat Detection, WorkspaceGoogle account
Initial Access: Account Disabled HijackedEvent Threat Detection, WorkspaceGoogle account
Persistence: Two Step Verification DisabledEvent Threat Detection, WorkspaceOrg admin or super admin
Persistence: SSO Settings ChangedEvent Threat Detection, WorkspaceOrg admin or super admin
Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Cross-Project Permission UseEvent Threat DetectionImpersonation and delegation
Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Impersonation of Service Account for Admin ActivityEvent Threat DetectionImpersonation and delegation
Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Token Generation (cross-project access token)Event Threat DetectionImpersonation and delegation
Persistence: New GeographyEvent Threat DetectionAttached service account
Discovery: Service Account Self-InvestigationEvent Threat DetectionAttached service account
Execution: Cryptocurrency Mining Hash MatchVirtual Machine Threat DetectionCompute Engine instance
Defense Evasion: RootkitVirtual Machine Threat DetectionCompute Engine instance
Impact: Many Instances CreatedEvent Threat DetectionCompute Engine
Impact: GPU Instance CreatedEvent Threat DetectionCompute Engine
Privilege Escalation: Changes to sensitive Kubernetes RBAC objectsEvent Threat DetectionGoogle GKE
Execution: Suspicious Exec or Attach to a System PodEvent Threat DetectionGoogle GKE
Execution: Container EscapeContainer Threat DetectionGoogle GKE
Credential Access: Find Google Cloud CredentialsContainer Threat DetectionGoogle GKE
Exfiltration: BigQuery Data ExfiltrationEvent Threat DetectionCloud SQL and BigQuery
Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Restore Backup to External OrganizationEvent Threat DetectionCloud SQL and BigQuery
Impact: Deleted Google Cloud Backup and DR VaultEvent Threat DetectionDeletion and ransomware
Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR expire all imagesEvent Threat DetectionDeletion and ransomware
Allowed Traffic Spike, Increasing Deny RatioSecurity Command Center, Cloud ArmorCloud Armor and load balancing
Defense Evasion: Organization Policy ChangedEvent Threat DetectionSinks, audit config, org policy
Persistence: New AI API MethodEvent Threat DetectionAgent Platform (Vertex AI)
Persistence: New Geography for AI ServiceEvent Threat DetectionAgent Platform (Vertex AI)
Initial Access: Dormant Service Account Activity in AI ServiceEvent Threat DetectionAgent Platform (Vertex AI)
Persistence: Sensitive AI Permission Added to Custom RoleEvent Threat DetectionAgent Platform (Vertex AI)

Google Cloud documentation: Security Command Center threat findings for Google Kubernetes Engine, Virtual Machine Threat Detection overview, Container Threat Detection overview and Event Threat Detection overview. Finding names for identity, Workspace, BigQuery, Cloud SQL, Backup and DR and Compute Engine are as cited on the linked playbooks. Event Threat Detection and Virtual Machine Threat Detection need the Premium or Enterprise tier. Checked September 2026. Re-checked October 2026: Security Command Center service tiers (threat detection in Premium; the Enterprise tier is deprecated and shuts down May 21, 2027). Re-checked October 2026: the four AI finding names, in Security Command Center AI threat findings.

Before an incident

LogDefault retentionTurn on / keep
Admin Activity and System Event audit logs400 days in the _Required bucket. Not configurableAlways written. Copy them to the security information and event management (SIEM) system or a locked log bucket with an organization-level aggregated sink, then grant the sink's writer identity access to the destination: gcloud logging sinks create <sink> <destination> --organization=<org-id> --include-children --log-filter='logName:"cloudaudit.googleapis.com"'
Data Access audit logs30 days in the _Default bucket. Project _Default buckets accept 1 to 3,650 daysOff by default for every service except BigQuery. Enable DATA_READ and DATA_WRITE in the organization IAM policy auditConfigs for Cloud Storage, IAM, IAM Service Account Credentials (iamcredentials.googleapis.com) and other data services. Volume and cost can be large
Policy Denied audit logs30 days in _DefaultAlways written. Include them in the aggregated sink
Google Workspace or Cloud Identity audit logs: Admin, Login, OAuth Token, SAML, Enterprise Groups6 months in the Admin console. In Cloud Logging, Admin audit lands in the organization _Required bucket and Login audit in _Default. The organization _Default bucket keeps 30 days unless you set custom retention of 1 to 3,650 days. Keep Login audit longer by raising that retention or through the aggregated sinkTurn on sharing of Workspace data with Google Cloud in the Admin console. The aggregated sink then carries them
VPC Flow Logs30 days in Cloud LoggingEnable per subnet. Without the sampling flag this command keeps 50% of entries: gcloud compute networks subnets update <subnet> --region=<region> --enable-flow-logs --logging-flow-sampling=1.0
Cloud Storage usage logsKept in the log bucket you name, under its own retentionThe only record of access to public objects. Delivery is hourly and not guaranteed. Enable on sensitive buckets: gcloud storage buckets update gs://<bucket> --log-bucket=gs://<log-bucket>
Security Command Center findingsVaries by tier and finding stateEvent Threat Detection needs the Premium or Enterprise tier. Share Workspace data with Google Cloud to get Workspace threat findings. Export findings to the SIEM

Google Cloud documentation: Cloud Audit Logs overview, Cloud Logging quotas and retention, Enable Data Access audit logs, aggregated sinks, Google Workspace audit logs in Cloud Logging, VPC Flow Logs, Cloud Storage audit logging and usage logs, Security Command Center Event Threat Detection and data retention. Google Workspace Admin Help: data retention and lag times. Checked September 2026. Re-checked October 2026: Cloud Audit Logs overview (Data Access off by default except BigQuery; Policy Denied always generated); Store log entries (_Required fixed at 400 days; _Default 30 days by default); Audit logs for Google Workspace (Login and SAML audit are Data Access logs in _Default, whose retention accepts 1 to 3,650 days).

Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.