Google Cloud playbooks
This page covers a Google Cloud organization and the Google Workspace or Cloud Identity accounts that sign in to it. It gives the logs to keep, what to search, and the playbooks for 22 incident types in seven categories. Each playbook lists where to look and the commands to contain it. Commands use the current gcloud CLI, and queries use the Cloud Logging query language with gcloud logging read.
Playbooks
Identity and access
Stolen credentials, taken-over accounts and the access an attacker leaves behind.
Compute and containers
Workloads, servers and clusters used or abused by an attacker.
Data and storage
Exposed, copied, encrypted or deleted data, and stolen secrets.
Network and edge
Attacks on availability and on names and endpoints you own.
Pipelines and supply chain
Build systems and image registries that reach production.
Evasion and guardrails
Logging and controls turned off to hide an attack.
Provider and accidental
Incidents with no attacker: a vendor's bug, a provider's or operator's mistake, or a provider outage.
First 15 minutes, any incident
| # | Item |
|---|---|
| 1 | Copy the incident window out of the _Default bucket now. Data Access, Policy Denied and Workspace login entries age out after 30 days by default: gcloud logging copy _Default storage.googleapis.com/<bucket> --location=global --log-filter='<filter>' --project=<project> |
| 2 | Confirm organization sinks exist and route. Check each sink's filter and disabled field: gcloud logging sinks list --organization=<org-id> |
| 3 | Identify the caller from the first suspicious entry. Read principalEmail, serviceAccountKeyName, serviceAccountDelegationInfo and requestMetadata.callerIp |
| 4 | Pull everything that principal did, per project: gcloud logging read 'protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail="<principal>"' --project=<project> --freshness=30d |
| 5 | List active Security Command Center findings: gcloud scc findings list <org-id> --filter='state="ACTIVE"' |
| 6 | Snapshot the disks of affected VMs before any change: gcloud compute disks snapshot <disk> --zone=<zone> --snapshot-names=<case-id>-<disk> |
| 7 | Set deletion protection on the same VMs: gcloud compute instances update <vm> --zone=<zone> --deletion-protection |
Native detections to playbooks
Security Command Center findings map to the playbook to open first. Storage exposure, secrets theft, dangling DNS, CI/CD abuse, registry tampering and the provider and accidental playbooks have no finding in this table, so start from the log searches on their pages.
| Detection | Source | Open |
|---|---|---|
Initial Access: Leaked Service Account Key Used | Event Threat Detection | Service account key |
Persistence: Service Account Key Created | Event Threat Detection | Service account key |
Persistence: Service Account Key Created | Event Threat Detection | Service accounts and bindings |
Persistence: IAM Anomalous Grant | Event Threat Detection | Service accounts and bindings |
Defense Evasion: Project-Level Service Account Token Creator Role Added | Event Threat Detection | Service accounts and bindings |
Privilege Escalation: New Service Account is Owner or Editor | Event Threat Detection | Service accounts and bindings |
Persistence: Project SSH Key Added | Event Threat Detection | Service accounts and bindings |
Initial Access: Suspicious Login Blocked | Event Threat Detection, Workspace | Google account |
Initial Access: Account Disabled Hijacked | Event Threat Detection, Workspace | Google account |
Persistence: Two Step Verification Disabled | Event Threat Detection, Workspace | Org admin or super admin |
Persistence: SSO Settings Changed | Event Threat Detection, Workspace | Org admin or super admin |
Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Cross-Project Permission Use | Event Threat Detection | Impersonation and delegation |
Privilege Escalation: Anomalous Impersonation of Service Account for Admin Activity | Event Threat Detection | Impersonation and delegation |
Privilege Escalation: Suspicious Token Generation (cross-project access token) | Event Threat Detection | Impersonation and delegation |
Persistence: New Geography | Event Threat Detection | Attached service account |
Discovery: Service Account Self-Investigation | Event Threat Detection | Attached service account |
Execution: Cryptocurrency Mining Hash Match | Virtual Machine Threat Detection | Compute Engine instance |
Defense Evasion: Rootkit | Virtual Machine Threat Detection | Compute Engine instance |
Impact: Many Instances Created | Event Threat Detection | Compute Engine |
Impact: GPU Instance Created | Event Threat Detection | Compute Engine |
Privilege Escalation: Changes to sensitive Kubernetes RBAC objects | Event Threat Detection | Google GKE |
Execution: Suspicious Exec or Attach to a System Pod | Event Threat Detection | Google GKE |
Execution: Container Escape | Container Threat Detection | Google GKE |
Credential Access: Find Google Cloud Credentials | Container Threat Detection | Google GKE |
Exfiltration: BigQuery Data Exfiltration | Event Threat Detection | Cloud SQL and BigQuery |
Exfiltration: Cloud SQL Restore Backup to External Organization | Event Threat Detection | Cloud SQL and BigQuery |
Impact: Deleted Google Cloud Backup and DR Vault | Event Threat Detection | Deletion and ransomware |
Impact: Google Cloud Backup and DR expire all images | Event Threat Detection | Deletion and ransomware |
Allowed Traffic Spike, Increasing Deny Ratio | Security Command Center, Cloud Armor | Cloud Armor and load balancing |
Defense Evasion: Organization Policy Changed | Event Threat Detection | Sinks, audit config, org policy |
Persistence: New AI API Method | Event Threat Detection | Agent Platform (Vertex AI) |
Persistence: New Geography for AI Service | Event Threat Detection | Agent Platform (Vertex AI) |
Initial Access: Dormant Service Account Activity in AI Service | Event Threat Detection | Agent Platform (Vertex AI) |
Persistence: Sensitive AI Permission Added to Custom Role | Event Threat Detection | Agent Platform (Vertex AI) |
Google Cloud documentation: Security Command Center threat findings for Google Kubernetes Engine, Virtual Machine Threat Detection overview, Container Threat Detection overview and Event Threat Detection overview. Finding names for identity, Workspace, BigQuery, Cloud SQL, Backup and DR and Compute Engine are as cited on the linked playbooks. Event Threat Detection and Virtual Machine Threat Detection need the Premium or Enterprise tier. Checked September 2026. Re-checked October 2026: Security Command Center service tiers (threat detection in Premium; the Enterprise tier is deprecated and shuts down May 21, 2027). Re-checked October 2026: the four AI finding names, in Security Command Center AI threat findings.
Before an incident
| Log | Default retention | Turn on / keep |
|---|---|---|
| Admin Activity and System Event audit logs | 400 days in the _Required bucket. Not configurable | Always written. Copy them to the security information and event management (SIEM) system or a locked log bucket with an organization-level aggregated sink, then grant the sink's writer identity access to the destination: gcloud logging sinks create <sink> <destination> --organization=<org-id> --include-children --log-filter='logName:"cloudaudit.googleapis.com"' |
| Data Access audit logs | 30 days in the _Default bucket. Project _Default buckets accept 1 to 3,650 days | Off by default for every service except BigQuery. Enable DATA_READ and DATA_WRITE in the organization IAM policy auditConfigs for Cloud Storage, IAM, IAM Service Account Credentials (iamcredentials.googleapis.com) and other data services. Volume and cost can be large |
| Policy Denied audit logs | 30 days in _Default | Always written. Include them in the aggregated sink |
| Google Workspace or Cloud Identity audit logs: Admin, Login, OAuth Token, SAML, Enterprise Groups | 6 months in the Admin console. In Cloud Logging, Admin audit lands in the organization _Required bucket and Login audit in _Default. The organization _Default bucket keeps 30 days unless you set custom retention of 1 to 3,650 days. Keep Login audit longer by raising that retention or through the aggregated sink | Turn on sharing of Workspace data with Google Cloud in the Admin console. The aggregated sink then carries them |
| VPC Flow Logs | 30 days in Cloud Logging | Enable per subnet. Without the sampling flag this command keeps 50% of entries: gcloud compute networks subnets update <subnet> --region=<region> --enable-flow-logs --logging-flow-sampling=1.0 |
| Cloud Storage usage logs | Kept in the log bucket you name, under its own retention | The only record of access to public objects. Delivery is hourly and not guaranteed. Enable on sensitive buckets: gcloud storage buckets update gs://<bucket> --log-bucket=gs://<log-bucket> |
| Security Command Center findings | Varies by tier and finding state | Event Threat Detection needs the Premium or Enterprise tier. Share Workspace data with Google Cloud to get Workspace threat findings. Export findings to the SIEM |
Google Cloud documentation: Cloud Audit Logs overview, Cloud Logging quotas and retention, Enable Data Access audit logs, aggregated sinks, Google Workspace audit logs in Cloud Logging, VPC Flow Logs, Cloud Storage audit logging and usage logs, Security Command Center Event Threat Detection and data retention. Google Workspace Admin Help: data retention and lag times. Checked September 2026. Re-checked October 2026: Cloud Audit Logs overview (Data Access off by default except BigQuery; Policy Denied always generated); Store log entries (_Required fixed at 400 days; _Default 30 days by default); Audit logs for Google Workspace (Login and SAML audit are Data Access logs in _Default, whose retention accepts 1 to 3,650 days).