Edge device exploitation: VPNs, firewalls and gateways
An attacker exploits a VPN, firewall or remote access gateway, often before a patch exists. Protect the evidence on the appliance first, and treat every secret it stored as stolen.
- Read the vendor advisory, the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog entry and any emergency directive for affected versions, indicators and collection steps.Intelligence/Investigations
- List every appliance running the affected product, including standby and virtual units.Operations
- Collect evidence per the vendor's instructions before any reboot, upgrade or reset: tech support file, core dump or memory snapshot, configuration.Operations
- Disconnect a compromised device from the network and keep it powered on until collection ends.Operations
- Set the window from the earliest exploitation date reported.Planning
- Open a vendor security case and send a T19 evidence request.Liaison
Then work the page: Scope, Contain and eradicate, Rotate every secret, Recover, Coordinate and report.
VPN concentrators, firewalls, remote access gateways and load balancers face the internet and store credentials for the directory. Attackers exploit them in bulk, often before a patch exists. M-Trends 2026 estimates the mean time to exploit at minus 7 days, and notes that VPNs and routers typically lack EDR telemetry.
The appliance is the victim and also a security control, so its logs and its integrity checker can be wrong. Build the response on evidence recorded elsewhere, the vendor's instructions, and rotating every secret the device stored.
This page adds to the phase playbooks for scope, contain, eradicate and recover. The supply chain scenario covers the vendor relationship, and Evidence collection covers custody.
This scenario is an addition to the book. Sources checked October 2026: M-Trends 2026 for the time to exploit, edge device telemetry and BRICKSTORM dwell time; BOD 26-04 as summarized by Tenable and the Cloud Security Alliance (confirm against the directive text on cisa.gov, which would not open); CISA ED 24-01, its Supplemental Direction V1, AA24-060B and ED 25-03; NCSC RayInitiator and LINE VIPER report; NetScaler; Mandiant on session hijacking and remediation; Palo Alto Networks; Volexity on CVE-2024-3400; Fortinet and its advisory FG-IR-25-934. Sources checked September 2026: the BOD 26-04 announcement, the revoked BOD 22-01, and Volexity on Ivanti memory forensics.
What is different
| Case | What happened | What the response has to cover |
|---|---|---|
| Ivanti Connect Secure, 2024 | Emergency Directive (ED) 24-01 from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), issued January 19, 2024, had federal agencies apply Ivanti's mitigation XML and run its External Integrity Checker Tool. Supplemental direction on January 31 ordered every instance disconnected by February 2. AA24-060B reported that attackers could deceive the checker and might keep root-level persistence through a factory reset. | Treat a clean integrity check as one input. Assume credentials stored on the appliance are compromised. |
| Citrix NetScaler CVE-2023-4966 | Leaked session tokens let attackers take over sessions with no password or MFA. Mandiant saw exploitation from late August 2023, and fixed builds shipped October 10. Stolen sessions could persist after the update, and the appliance's web server logged no requests to the vulnerable endpoint. | Patch, then end every session. Detection depends on WAF and network logs. |
| PAN-OS GlobalProtect CVE-2024-3400 | Command injection, CVSS 10.0, published April 12, 2024. Volexity saw attempted exploitation from March 26. The attacker used a highly privileged service account configured on the firewall to move inside over SMB and WinRM, and took the Active Directory database. | Hunt for use of the appliance's own accounts. Palo Alto asked for tech support files before upgrading a suspect device. |
| FortiGate SSL-VPN, 2025 | On April 10, 2025 Fortinet reported that an attacker used older FortiOS flaws to plant a symbolic link in the SSL-VPN language file folder. The link kept read-only access to files, including configuration, after patching. In February 2026 Fortinet published CVE-2025-68686, a bypass of its fix for this link, fixed in FortiOS 7.6.2 and 7.4.7. | Patching can leave persistence. Fortinet said to treat all configuration as potentially compromised. |
| Cisco ASA and Firepower, 2025 | CISA's ED 25-03 (September 25, 2025) ordered compromised devices disconnected and left powered on. NCSC found the RayInitiator bootkit survives reboots and firmware upgrades, and LINE VIPER suppresses chosen syslog messages and reboots the device when a core dump starts. | Collect before any reset. Distrust on-box logs. Replace hardware the vendor cannot verify. |
Scope
Generic steps are on Scope. Build the timeline from sources the attacker could not edit.
| Source outside the appliance | What it shows |
|---|---|
| Syslog forwarded before the compromise | Events as first recorded, for comparison with the logs on the box |
| NetFlow, upstream firewall and IDS | Connections from the appliance's internal address, and its outbound traffic |
| WAF or reverse proxy in front of the appliance | Requests to the vulnerable endpoint |
| Directory and identity provider logs | Binds and sign-ins by the appliance's service accounts and VPN users |
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Read the vendor advisory, KEV entry and any emergency directive, and record affected versions, indicators and collection steps | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 2 | List every appliance running the affected product, including standby and virtual units | Operations |
| 3 | Capture appliance memory before running any integrity checker, because Ivanti's external checker reboots the appliance | Operations |
| 4 | Run the vendor integrity checker where one exists, and keep the tool version and output as evidence | Operations |
| 5 | Set the window from the earliest exploitation date reported, which can be weeks before the advisory | Planning |
| 6 | Hunt traffic from the appliance's internal addresses to internal hosts across the window | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 7 | Check every account the appliance uses (directory bind, RADIUS, local administrator, API) for use from any other source | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 8 | Check VPN sessions for one source address carrying several users' sessions, and for client addresses that change mid-session | Intelligence/Investigations |
Contain and eradicate
Generic steps are on Contain and Eradicate. Record decisions in T3 and send the vendor a T19 evidence request. Vendor collection usually needs the device running.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Collect evidence per the vendor's instructions before any reboot, upgrade or reset: tech support file, core dump or memory snapshot, configuration export | Operations |
| 2 | Disconnect a compromised device from the network, and keep it powered on until collection ends | Operations |
| 3 | Remove management interfaces from the internet, and make them reachable from the management network alone | Operations |
| 4 | After patching, end every active and persistent session with the vendor's commands, such as NetScaler's kill and clear lb persistentSessions | Operations |
| 5 | Reset or replace the device as the table below directs, then upgrade it to a fixed, supported version | Operations |
| 6 | Review the configuration line by line before reimport | Operations |
Rotate every secret the appliance stored
Rotate even when the integrity check passes. CISA's Supplemental Direction V1 for Ivanti covered the admin enable password, stored API keys, local user passwords, certificates and keys, and domain accounts.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 7 | Reset directory bind, RADIUS and other service accounts | Operations |
| 8 | Reset each domain account the appliance exposed twice, revoke its Kerberos tickets, then revoke its cloud tokens | Operations |
| 9 | Change local administrator and local user passwords | Operations |
| 10 | Revoke and reissue certificates and private keys, including the VPN server certificate and any SAML signing key | Operations |
| 11 | Replace API keys, IPsec pre-shared keys and SNMP community strings | Operations |
| 12 | Where the appliance cached VPN user passwords, reset them and revoke those users' sessions at the identity provider | Operations |
Reset or replace
| Condition | Action |
|---|---|
| Vendor's reset procedure removes all reported persistence | Factory reset per the vendor, upgrade, reimport the reviewed configuration |
| Persistence reported that survives reset, reboot or upgrade, as for Ivanti and Cisco ASA | Replace, or run the vendor's enhanced procedure with the vendor verifying the result. Palo Alto offered an Enhanced Factory Reset through support. |
| Device at or near end of support | Replace. ED 25-03 had agencies permanently disconnect ASA devices reaching end of support by September 30, 2025. |
Before a patch exists
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 13 | Apply the vendor mitigation, such as Ivanti's mitigation XML or Palo Alto Threat IDs 95187, 95189 and 95191 on the GlobalProtect interface. Then confirm it is in force. | Operations |
| 14 | If the business can run without the exposed feature until the patch ships, turn the feature off | Incident Commander |
Recover
Run the pre-restoration verification into T7, then add these.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Run the vendor's current integrity checker on the rebuilt device, and confirm a clean result before the device carries traffic | Operations |
| 2 | Confirm syslog forwarding, and alert when the device stops sending | Operations |
| 3 | Watch the new service account credentials for use from any source other than the device | Intelligence/Investigations |
Coordinate and report
Federal deadlines set the pace. ED 24-01 gave agencies three days to apply Ivanti's mitigation, and ED 25-03 gave one day to submit Cisco core dumps and update.
Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 26-04, issued June 10, 2026, replaced BOD 22-01. It sets patch deadlines by asset exposure, KEV listing, exploit automation and technical impact. For a KEV-listed flaw that gives total control of the system, it sets a three-day deadline and requires forensic triage for prior compromise. Published summaries differ on whether that tier also needs public exposure or an automatable exploit. An edge device is publicly exposed, so plan for the three-day tier until you have read the device's row in Table 1 of the directive.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Open a vendor security case, and log each vendor statement with date and time | Liaison |
| 2 | Report the compromise to CISA or the national computer emergency response team (CERT), and to law enforcement and the insurer with T13 | Liaison |
| 3 | Assess the data reached through the appliance against notification deadlines | Legal advisor |
- Patching closes the hole and leaves stolen sessions, planted files and stolen credentials working.
- Dwell time can outlast log retention. M-Trends 2026 reports BRICKSTORM dwell times of nearly 400 days. Keep forwarded appliance logs for more than a year.