Energy and water utilities
- Ask the control room for the state of the grid, plant, pipeline or treatment process before any containment step.Operations
- Confirm which rows apply to each site and system; record in T1 who decided each clock started.Legal advisor
- Record in T1 two times: when the incident occurred, for Form DOE-417, and when it was determined reportable, for CIP-008.Planning
- File each report due in the first hour: E-ISAC and CISA, DOE-417, the NRC Operations Center.Liaison
- Get engineering sign-off in T3 before isolating any control system host.Incident Commander
Then work the page: Reporting obligations, Terms, Roles, What changes in each phase, Records, Who you work with.
This page is for responders at electric utilities and other owners of the bulk electric system (BES), nuclear power plants, oil and natural gas pipelines, and drinking water and wastewater systems. One company can own all four. Each kind of asset has its own regulator, its own clock and its own reporting channel.
Electric clocks are the shortest. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) standard CIP-008 gives 1 hour after a determination, and Form DOE-417 gives 1 hour after the incident. Water systems have no federal cyber incident reporting rule in November 2026, so state rules and drinking water public notice set their clocks.
Every response step touches a physical process. Use the OT scenario for the technical work. This page adds to the phase playbooks for scope, contain, eradicate and recover. Incident Command seats for OT incidents are on Command by incident type.
This sector page is an addition to the book. Primary sources checked: FERC letter order approving CIP-008-6 (84 FR, June 26, 2019); NERC CIP-008-6 requirement training; Form DOE-417 and its instructions (OMB 1901-0288, expires May 31, 2027); 10 CFR 73.77; TSA Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01D; EPA AWIA Section 2013 page; 40 CFR 141.202; FERC Order No. 919 and Order No. 907. Checked November 2026.
Reporting obligations
Counsel and the NERC compliance lead confirm which rows apply. Record in T1 who decided that each clock started, and when. The notification deadlines table lists other regimes, including state breach laws for customer data.
| Obligation | Who reports to whom | Clock | Starts when | What the report contains |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CIP-008-6 R4, Reportable Cyber Security Incident | Responsible Entity with high or medium impact BES Cyber Systems to the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). The standard names CISA's National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) | 1 hour; updates within 7 calendar days of each new or changed attribute | The entity determines, under its R1.2 process, that a Cyber Security Incident is a Reportable Cyber Security Incident | To the extent known: functional impact, attack vector used, level of intrusion achieved or attempted |
| CIP-008-6 R4, attempt to compromise | Same entity to E-ISAC and CISA | By the end of the next calendar day; updates within 7 calendar days | The entity determines that a Cyber Security Incident was an attempt to compromise a high or medium impact BES Cyber System or its Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS) | The same three attributes. The R1.2.1 criteria define what counts as an attempt |
| CIP-003-8 and CIP-003-9, Attachment 1, Section 4, low impact | Responsible Entity with low impact BES Cyber Systems to E-ISAC, unless prohibited by law | No fixed clock in the standard; the entity's plan sets it | Determining that an identified Cyber Security Incident is a Reportable Cyber Security Incident | As the plan sets. Section 4.5 requires a test of the plan at least once every 36 calendar months: a response to an actual Reportable Cyber Security Incident, a drill or tabletop exercise, or an operational exercise |
| Form DOE-417, Emergency Alert (criteria 1 to 9) | Balancing authorities, reliability coordinators, electric utilities and generating entities of 300 MW or more to the Department of Energy (DOE). Nuclear plants regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are excluded | 1 hour | The incident. Criterion 2 is a Reportable Cyber Security Incident; criterion 3 is any other cyber event that causes interruptions of electrical system operations | Schedule 1, and for criterion 2 the cyber attributes on Schedule 2 line T. Line W chooses sharing with NERC, E-ISAC and CISA Central. Final report within 72 hours of the incident |
| Form DOE-417, Normal Report (criteria 10 to 13) | Same filers to DOE | 6 hours | The incident, when no criterion 1 to 9 applies. Criterion 11 is a cyber event that could potentially impact electric power system adequacy or reliability | Schedule 1; final report within 72 hours |
| Form DOE-417, criterion 14 | Same filers to DOE | By the end of the next calendar day | Determining that a Cyber Security Incident was an attempt to compromise a high or medium impact BES Cyber System | Schedules 1 and 2. Shared with E-ISAC and CISA Central, a criterion 2 or 14 filing can satisfy CIP-008 reporting |
| EOP-004-4, event reporting | Registered entity to the Electric Reliability Organization and others in its operating plan | 24 hours or the end of the next business day, whichever is later | Recognizing that an event meets an Attachment 1 threshold | The Attachment 1 report or a DOE-417 shared with NERC, which satisfies it for criteria 6, 7 and 15 to 26 |
| 10 CFR 73.77(a)(1), nuclear, 1 hour | Licensee subject to 10 CFR 73.54 or 73.110 to the NRC Headquarters Operations Center by telephone, through the Emergency Notification System (ENS) | 1 hour | Discovery of a cyber attack that adversely impacted safety-related, important-to-safety, security or emergency preparedness functions, or their support systems | The event. Use secure communications for Safeguards Information; if none is available, report without it and say so |
| 10 CFR 73.77(a)(2) and (a)(3), nuclear, 4 and 8 hours | Same licensee to the NRC Operations Center | 4 hours; 8 hours | 4 hours: discovery of a cyber attack that could have caused such an impact, or a suspected or actual attack by someone with physical or electronic access, or a notice to another agency about a related event. 8 hours: information on activity that may indicate intelligence gathering or pre-operational planning | The event. A written follow-up on NRC Form 366 within 60 days for (a)(1), (a)(2)(i) and (a)(2)(ii) |
| 10 CFR 73.77(b), nuclear, recordable | Licensee to its corrective action program | 24 hours | Discovery of a vulnerability, weakness, failure or deficiency in the cyber security program, and each notification under (a) | The entry. Keep follow-up reports three years |
| TSA Security Directive Pipeline-2021-01 series | Hazardous liquid or natural gas pipeline, or liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility, that TSA notified is critical, to CISA Central through the CISA reporting form or by telephone | As soon as practicable, and within 24 hours | Identifying a cybersecurity incident: unauthorized access to IT or OT, malware on IT or OT, denial of service, or any incident that disrupts operations | Reporter's name and contact, the impact or potential impact on IT or OT, and responses planned or under consideration |
| 40 CFR 141.202, Tier 1 public notice | Public water system to its consumers, and consultation with the primacy agency | As soon as practical, and within 24 hours, for each | The system learns of a waterborne emergency, such as a treatment process failure, or another situation with significant potential for serious adverse health effects from short-term exposure | The Tier 1 notice; the primacy agency decides any added notice |
| New York, 10 NYCRR Subpart 5-1, Appendix 5-E | Community water system serving more than 3,300 people to the Department of Health (DOH), through the state cybersecurity incident reporting form | 24 hours | Determining that a cybersecurity incident has occurred that created or may create a public health hazard (section 5-E.9 of the adopted text). DOH's pages say discovery or detection | As DOH prescribes. Reporting has applied since March 11, 2026; other requirements apply from January 1, 2027 |
| New York, 6 NYCRR 750-2.7(h), wastewater | State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) permittee to the Regional Water Engineer, or Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) dispatch | Online form and call within 24 hours; written report within 30 days | Awareness of a cybersecurity incident. In effect since March 26, 2026 | The DEC online form, which can also go to the state homeland security office and DOH |
| New York Public Service Commission (PSC), Case 25-M-0302, 16 NYCRR Part 1200 | Regulated electric, gas, steam and water utilities to the Department of Public Service. The rule exempts municipal corporations, electric and water-works corporations serving fewer than 50,000 customers, gas corporations that are small businesses, and telegraph and telephone companies | 72 hours (confirm against the Part 1200 text) | Certain cybersecurity incidents, as the rule defines them | As the rule sets. The PSC adopted Part 1200 on April 16, 2026. The State Register notice of adoption gives June 1, 2026 as the effective date |
CIP-008-6 took effect January 1, 2021. FERC's Order No. 919 of March 19, 2026 approved the virtualization revisions, including CIP-008-7.1 and a revised Reportable Cyber Security Incident definition. NERC's plan makes them effective July 1, 2028, the first day of the first calendar quarter 24 months after the order's May 26, 2026 effective date. An entity can adopt them early by notifying its Regional Entity.
CIP-003-9 took effect April 1, 2026, the first day of the first calendar quarter 36 months after FERC approved it on March 16, 2023. Its Attachment 1, Section 6 adds vendor electronic remote access controls for low impact systems: methods to determine that access, to disable it, and to detect malicious communications over it. Order No. 907 approved CIP-015-1, internal network security monitoring inside the Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP). The order took effect September 2, 2025; compliance dates follow NERC's implementation plan. Order No. 907 also told NERC to extend it to EACMS and Physical Access Control Systems (PACS).
The 24-hour pipeline rule dates from Pipeline-2021-01B and appears in Pipeline-2021-01D (May 29, 2024), the latest version this page could read. TSA reissues the directives each year. TSA proposed rules to replace them on November 7, 2024, and this page found no final rule.
For water, Section 1433 of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), as amended by America's Water Infrastructure Act (AWIA) of 2018, sets no incident clock. It requires community water systems serving more than 3,300 people to certify a risk and resilience assessment (RRA), covering electronic and automated systems, and an emergency response plan (ERP) within six months after it.
The current cycle's RRA deadlines are March 31, 2025 (100,000 or more people), December 31, 2025 (50,000 to 99,999) and June 30, 2026 (3,301 to 49,999). ERPs are due September 30, 2025, June 30, 2026 and December 31, 2026. EPA rescinded its 2023 sanitary survey cybersecurity memorandum in October 2023. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) reported no proposed EPA cybersecurity rule as of August 2026.
CISA sent its final rule under the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA) to the Office of Management and Budget on October 1, 2026. This page found no publication by November 2, 2026. CIRCIA reporting, 72 hours for a covered incident and 24 hours after a ransom payment, starts only after the final rule takes effect.
Sources: FERC letter order, Docket RD19-3-000, 84 FR, June 26, 2019; NERC, CIP-008-6 requirement training (effective January 1, 2021); WECC, Incident and Event Reporting, October 15, 2025 (CIP-003-8 Section 4 and EOP-004-4 R1 and R2); Form DOE-417 and instructions, OMB 1901-0288, expiring May 31, 2027; eCFR 10 CFR 73.77, current as of October 23, 2026; TSA SD Pipeline-2021-01D and the January 2025 ratification notice (24 hours since 01B); TSA proposed rule, November 7, 2024; FERC Order No. 919, 91 FR 13957, March 24, 2026, and Troutman Pepper, FERC approves virtualization CIP standards, April 2026; ReliabilityFirst, CMEP monthly update letter, August 2026 (the 11 revised standards take effect July 1, 2028); NERC CIP-003-9, Attachment 1, Sections 4 and 6, and its implementation plan, read November 2026; Certrec, NERC CIP updates for 2026 (April 1, 2026); FERC Order No. 907, July 2, 2025; EPA AWIA page, updated May 14, 2026; 40 CFR 141.202; CRS, July 2026 Water System Cyber Incidents, August 27, 2026; NYSDOH cybersecurity overview, FAQ and adopted rule text and Appendix 5-E, sections 5-E.1 and 5-E.9, read November 2026; NYSDEC cybersecurity incident reporting; NY PSC release, April 16, 2026; New York State Register, May 6, 2026, notice of adoption PSC-27-25-00021-A (Part 1200 added to Title 16, filed April 17, 2026, effective June 1, 2026, with the exemptions; its summary gives no reporting clock), read November 2026; Hodgson Russ, PSC draft rules, June 26, 2025; Bond, Schoeneck & King, New York's new water systems and public utilities cybersecurity regulations, July 15, 2026 (72-hour clock; it gives June 1, 2027 as the effective date); Paubox, CIRCIA final rule at the White House, October 8, 2026.
Terms
| Term | Meaning | PIVTR-D equivalent |
|---|---|---|
| BES | Bulk electric system: transmission elements operated at 100 kV or higher, and real and reactive power resources connected at 100 kV or higher, with the inclusions and exclusions NERC lists | none |
| BES Cyber System | One or more BES Cyber Assets grouped to perform reliability tasks. A BES Cyber Asset is one whose loss, degradation or misuse would adversely affect BES reliability within 15 minutes. CIP-002 rates each system high, medium or low impact | Critical system in the containment triggers |
| Responsible Entity | The registered entity a CIP standard applies to, such as a transmission operator or generator owner | none |
| ESP | Electronic Security Perimeter: the logical border around a network of BES Cyber Systems | Containment boundary in T3 |
| EACMS | Electronic Access Control or Monitoring Systems: firewalls, jump hosts, authentication servers and log collectors that control or watch access to an ESP | In scope for CIP-008 reporting |
| PACS | Physical Access Control Systems: badge readers and controllers for a Physical Security Perimeter (PSP) | none |
| BCSI | BES Cyber System Information. CIP-011 protects it, including in evidence sent to vendors | Evidence handling; restricted data |
| Cyber Security Incident | A malicious act or suspicious event that compromises or attempts to compromise an ESP, PSP or EACMS of a high or medium impact system, or disrupts or attempts to disrupt a BES Cyber System | Incident |
| Reportable Cyber Security Incident | A Cyber Security Incident that compromised or disrupted a BES Cyber System performing reliability tasks, or the ESP or EACMS of a high or medium impact system | A clock start recorded in T1 |
| Attempt to compromise | What the entity's R1.2.1 criteria define. Its report is due by the end of the next calendar day | none |
| CIP Exceptional Circumstance | A situation that threatens safety or BES reliability, such as risk of injury, a natural disaster, or a Cyber Security Incident requiring emergency assistance. Some requirements, including CIP-007 log retention, are excused during one | none; record who invoked it in T1 |
| CIP Senior Manager | The single senior official accountable for the CIP program | CISO or the executive group |
| E-ISAC | The Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, run by NERC | Liaison contact in T17 |
| Reliability coordinator | The entity with the widest real-time view of the grid; it can direct operators to act | none |
| Balancing authority, transmission operator | Entities that balance load and generation, and operate transmission, in real time | none |
| EMS | Energy management system: the control center's supervisory system for the grid | Critical system |
| SCADA | Supervisory control and data acquisition: central monitoring and control of remote sites | OT; see the OT scenario |
| DCS | Distributed control system: process control within a plant | OT |
| Safety instrumented system (SIS) | An independent control system that brings a process to a safe state when limits are passed | Checked by the Safety Officer first |
| Islanding | Running part of the grid, a plant or an OT network apart from the rest | Containment option in T3 |
| Black start | Restoring the grid from a full outage using generators that start without outside power | Recovery order in Recover |
| Load shed | Cutting customer load on purpose to keep the system stable | none; an operations decision |
| Critical Digital Asset | At a nuclear plant, a digital asset the 10 CFR 73.54 cyber security program protects | Critical system |
| ENS | Emergency Notification System, the NRC's reporting telephone line | none |
| Cybersecurity Coordinator (TSA pipeline) | A primary and an alternate, US citizens eligible for a clearance under the pipeline directives, reachable by TSA and CISA 24 hours a day | Liaison |
| CIRP | Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan the Pipeline-2021-02 series requires | The incident response plan |
| Primacy agency | The state, or EPA, agency that runs drinking water rules for a system | Regulator in T17 |
| Community water system | A public water system serving the same people year round. AWIA covers those over 3,300 people | none |
| RRA, ERP | Risk and resilience assessment; emergency response plan, both under SDWA 1433 | Preparation |
| Tier 1 notice | Drinking water public notice within 24 hours, such as a boil water notice | T16 notice |
Sources: the definitions in the FERC CIP-008-6 order and NERC training above; ReliabilityFirst, CIP Exceptional Circumstances, quoting the NERC Glossary; TSA SD Pipeline-2021-01D; TSA 2021-02 series information collection notice, August 1, 2025; DOE-417 form. BES, BES Cyber Asset, BES Cyber System and the grid entity roles are from NERC's Rules of Procedure, Appendix 2, effective June 27, 2024, read November 2026. NERC's definitions redline for the Order No. 919 revisions keeps the 15-minute test and adds Virtual Cyber Assets and Shared Cyber Infrastructure.
Roles
| Sector role | What they do in an incident | PIVTR-D or Incident Command seat |
|---|---|---|
| CIP Senior Manager | Approves the CIP cyber security policies, including how CIP Exceptional Circumstances are declared; briefed on every reportable incident | Executive group |
| System operator or control room shift supervisor | Runs the grid, plant, pipeline or treatment process; can stop or shed load at once for safety or reliability | Operations; initial Incident Commander for the physical process |
| Reliability coordinator | Outside entity that can issue operating instructions for islanding, load shed and restoration | Liaison, with Operations |
| NERC compliance lead | Runs the R1.2 determination, tracks CIP clocks and keeps CIP evidence | Planning, beside the Legal advisor |
| Protection, control and SCADA engineers | Sign off on any action touching relays, controllers or the EMS; verify logic and baselines | Operations, OT branch; approve T3 |
| Plant manager, chief operator in responsible charge | Decides manual operation and shutdown at a plant or treatment works | Operations |
| Nuclear shift manager | Makes 73.77 notifications with the licensing staff; runs the plant's emergency plan | Incident Commander for the plant, in unified command |
| TSA Cybersecurity Coordinator | Contact for TSA and CISA; files the 24-hour pipeline report | Liaison |
| Water quality manager | Decides with the primacy agency on Tier 1 notice and sampling | Technical Specialist beside the Public Information Officer |
| Mutual assistance coordinator | Requests crews and equipment from other utilities | Logistics |
What changes in each phase
Preparation
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Write the R1.2 criteria for a Reportable Cyber Security Incident and an attempt to compromise, naming who determines each | CISO |
| 2 | Keep a register of each site's rows: CIP impact rating, DOE-417 filer, NRC license, TSA critical designation, water system size, state rules | Legal advisor |
| 3 | Test E-ISAC portal and DOE-417 online accounts with named staff, and keep the DOE telephone, fax and email fallbacks | Liaison |
| 4 | For a critical pipeline, name a primary and an alternate Cybersecurity Coordinator reachable 24 hours a day | Liaison |
| 5 | Test the CIP-008 plan at least once every 15 calendar months, and the low impact plan every 36, with an OT scenario | Planning |
| 6 | Certify the RRA and ERP on EPA's schedule, with a cyber section in the ERP | Planning |
| 7 | Write manual operation, islanding and load shed steps for loss of the EMS or SCADA, and list black start dependencies on IT | Operations |
| 8 | Authorize forensic firms and equipment vendors for BCSI access before an incident | CISO |
| 9 | Keep EACMS and BES Cyber System logs longer than the 90 days CIP-007 requires | CISO |
| 10 | Join E-ISAC, WaterISAC or the Oil and Natural Gas ISAC (ONG-ISAC) | Liaison |
Identification and verification
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Ask the control room for the process state: stable, degraded or unsafe | Operations |
| 2 | Confirm safety instrumented systems and protective relays work | Safety Officer |
| 3 | Classify each affected asset: BES Cyber System, EACMS, PACS, PCA or none, with its impact rating | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 4 | Put the R1.2 determination to the named decider at each triage brief until it is decided | Incident Commander |
| 5 | Record the incident time and each determination time in T1 | Planning |
| 6 | If a DOE-417 criterion is met, file within 1 or 6 hours of the incident, and tick line W to share with E-ISAC and CISA | Liaison |
| 7 | If the incident is reportable under CIP-008, report to E-ISAC and CISA within 1 hour of the determination | Liaison |
| 8 | At a nuclear plant, call the NRC Operations Center within the 73.77 window | Liaison |
| 9 | At a critical pipeline, report to CISA within 24 hours of identification | Liaison |
| 10 | At a water system, if treatment or distribution may be unsafe, consult the primacy agency within 24 hours | Liaison |
Response loop
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Get engineering sign-off in T3 before isolating the EMS, SCADA, relays or controllers | Incident Commander |
| 2 | Agree islanding, load shed and manual operation with the reliability coordinator | Operations |
| 3 | Send CIP-008 updates within 7 calendar days of each new or changed attribute | Liaison |
| 4 | File the DOE-417 final report within 72 hours of the incident | Liaison |
| 5 | Copy EACMS and BES Cyber System logs before the 90-day rollover | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 6 | Mark BCSI in evidence and send it only to authorized recipients | Legal advisor |
| 7 | If a CIP Exceptional Circumstance is invoked, record who invoked it, when, and each requirement set aside | Planning |
| 8 | Before restore, check controller logic and configuration against CIP-010 baselines | Operations |
| 9 | At a nuclear plant, enter each notification in the corrective action program within 24 hours | Planning |
| 10 | Issue and lift boil water or do-not-use notices as the primacy agency directs | Public Information Officer |
| 11 | For New York wastewater, file the DEC written report within 30 days | Liaison |
Debrief
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Within 90 calendar days, document lessons learned, update the CIP-008 plan and tell everyone with a role in it | CISO |
| 2 | File the CIP-008 R2.3 records for each reportable incident and attempt | Planning |
| 3 | Send the NRC written follow-up on Form 366 within 60 days | Legal advisor |
| 4 | Revise the RRA and ERP with what the incident showed | Planning |
| 5 | Revise the TSA CIRP with what the incident showed | CISO |
| 6 | Self-report any CIP violation found during the response, on counsel's advice | Legal advisor |
Sources: CIP-008-6 R1 to R4 and CIP-003-8 Section 4 as cited above; 10 CFR 73.77(b) and (d); 40 CFR 141.202(b); 6 NYCRR 750-2.7(h); TSA SD Pipeline-2021-01D. CIP-007 log retention is CIP-007-6 R4 Part 4.3, read November 2026: where technically feasible, at least the last 90 consecutive calendar days of event logs, except under CIP Exceptional Circumstances. It applies to high impact BES Cyber Systems, medium impact BES Cyber Systems at Control Centers, and their EACMS, PACS and Protected Cyber Assets.
Records
| Record | What changes |
|---|---|
| T1 Incident record | Add the incident time, each determination and its decider, asset classification and impact rating, and any CIP Exceptional Circumstance |
| T2 Triage brief | Add process state, customers out, megawatts lost and time left on each clock |
| T3 Containment decision | Add the engineer's sign-off and the reliability coordinator's agreement for grid actions |
| T13 Law enforcement and insurer contact | Record each agency told; under 73.77(a)(2)(iii) a notice to another agency can start a 4-hour NRC clock |
| T16 Notice to affected individuals or customers | Add the Tier 1 public notice and outage messages |
| T17 Regulator notification worksheet | One each for E-ISAC and CISA, DOE-417, NRC, TSA, the primacy agency and each state agency |
| T19 Vendor evidence and preservation request | To equipment makers and integrators; mark BCSI and limit recipients |
| Form DOE-417, NRC Form 366, DEC and DOH forms | Supplement T15 Incident report. Keep each as filed |
| CIP evidence | Kept by the NERC compliance lead for audit, apart from privileged work |
Keep NRC follow-up reports for three years or until the license ends (73.77(d)). Keep the RRA and ERP five years after certifying the ERP.
Who you work with
| Body | What they do for you | How to reach them |
|---|---|---|
| E-ISAC | Receives CIP-008 reports and shares grid threat information | The E-ISAC portal, through membership |
| NERC and its Regional Entities | Audit CIP compliance, receive EOP-004 reports and self-reports | Your Regional Entity's compliance contacts |
| Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) | Approves and enforces NERC standards under section 215 of the Federal Power Act, and directs new ones. It receives no CIP-008 report | Through NERC and your Regional Entity |
| DOE Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) | Leads DOE as sector risk management agency for energy, and Emergency Support Function 12 | DOE-417 online, or the DOE Operations Center |
| NRC Headquarters Operations Center | Receives 73.77 notifications | ENS, with the numbers in Appendix A to Part 73 |
| TSA | Issues the pipeline directives and inspects for them | Through the Cybersecurity Coordinator |
| EPA Office of Water Emergency Response and Cybersecurity (OWERC) | Central federal contact for water and wastewater incidents | The OWERC incident response team mailbox in EPA's reporting fact sheet |
| State primacy agency, state utility commission | Drinking water notice decisions; state cyber rules such as New York's | The ERP's contact list |
| WaterISAC, ONG-ISAC | Member threat sharing for water and for oil and gas | Membership |
| CISA | Receives CIP-008 and pipeline reports; technical help | cisa.gov/report or CISA Central |
| FBI | Investigation | Local field office, or ic3.gov |
EPA encourages water systems to report all cyber incidents to the FBI, CISA and EPA, and sets no deadline. Its December 2025 fact sheet lists what to include: who is reporting, the incident type, impact, detection, actions taken and who was told.
Protections for sharing with ISACs under the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 have run on short extensions. In September 2026 Congress passed one into early December 2026. Counsel checks the status before relying on them.
Sources: FERC Order No. 907 (FERC and NERC roles); DOE CESER, modified October 26, 2026; EPA, Cyber Incident Reporting Process, EPA 810-F-25-021, December 2025; Federal News Network, CR extends cyber info sharing law through December, September 2026.
- Two first-hour clocks start at different events. DOE-417 counts from the incident; CIP-008 counts from your determination. Record both times.
- A DOE-417 filing reaches E-ISAC and CISA only if line W says so. Tick it or file CIP-008 reports separately.
- CIP-008-7.1 and the virtualization definitions are approved and apply from July 1, 2028 or your early adoption date. Until then, report under CIP-008-6.
- CIP-007 requires 90 days of logs. Copy EACMS and BES Cyber System logs on the first day.
- Automatic endpoint isolation on an EMS, SCADA or HMI host can blind operators. Isolate only with engineering sign-off, as the OT scenario sets out.