Work the checks in order before anything returns to production. The indicator scan comes last, because scanning a half-patched box does not reflect the build that ships.
Then restore in dependency order, pilot first, and watch what returns. Isolated systems and images stay in the evidence register until the Legal advisor releases them.
Pre-restoration verification
#
Item
Owner
1
Root cause remediated. The vulnerability is patched, credentials rotated, or misconfiguration corrected, matched to the root cause analysis.
Operations
2
Patching current. Operating system, firmware and application updates missed while offline are installed.
Operations
3
Persistence removed. Every identified mechanism is confirmed gone.
Operations
4
Backup validated. For restores, the backup predates initial compromise according to the incident timeline.
Operations
5
Rebuild verified. For rebuilds, the build used trusted sources and clean installation media.
Operations
6
Controls live. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) is installed and reporting, the host firewall configured, and logging enabled.
Operations
7
Indicator scan, last. Every indicator from scoping and eradication is checked against the final build.
Operations
Then the rest
#
Item
Owner
8
Test the system against a written test plan
Operations
9
Record system owner acceptance in T8: what was tested, by whom, limitations accepted, formal sign-off
Planning
10
Configure enhanced monitoring before go-live: advanced audit policies, PowerShell script block logging on Windows, auditd rules on Linux, and logs confirmed flowing to the security information and event management (SIEM) platform
Operations
11
Enable the detection rules written during contain and eradicate on the restored system
Intelligence/Investigations
12
Coordinate production restoration across teams
Operations
13
Remove or keep each containment measure by a decision recorded in T3
Incident Commander
14
Capture recovery metrics for the debrief, from the key times
Planning
The introduction and the two checklists above are adapted from the book. Every section below is an addition to the book.
Pilot return
#
Item
Owner
1
Name the pilot: one site, team or application instance whose failure the business can absorb
Operations
2
Write the success criteria first: functions tested, error rates, no indicator hits
Planning
3
Run the pilot through one full business cycle, with the workaround still running
Operations
4
Decide full return with the system owner, and record the decision
Incident Commander
Re-enabling suspended accounts
#
Item
Owner
1
List every account suspended during containment from T3, and record each re-enable with its approver
Planning
2
Reset the password after the last rotation and after any directory restore
Operations
3
Check multifactor authentication (MFA) methods, devices, OAuth grants and mailbox rules, and remove what the attacker added
Operations
4
Confirm the person face to face or by a call to the number in the HR record
Operations
5
Enable a service account once every dependent application has the new credential
Operations
Tell users service is back
#
Item
Owner
1
Send T11 as each service returns. Say what is restored, what is still degraded, what users do now (sign in again, register MFA again, stop the workaround by a stated time), and the next update time.
Public Information Officer
2
Make claims about the attacker's access or the data only on evidence, and have counsel clear them before anything leaves the organization
A restore returns every secret as it stood on the backup date, including the passwords the incident already reset. Rotate again after each restore, using the table below.
A restored system that stops reporting may have been tampered with. Treat the silence as an alert and check before calling it a fault.
Restore order
Order
Restore
Before the next step
1
Identity: domain controllers, the identity provider, privileged and break-glass accounts
Secrets rotated again (below), replication healthy, Group Policy checked against a baseline
2
Core network services: Domain Name System (DNS), Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), time, routing, firewalls, remote access
Name resolution and time correct from every segment
3
The rest of Tier 0: certificate services, backup, virtualization management, deployment tools
EDR and log forwarding reporting
4
Line-of-business applications, in the priority order set in preparation
Pilot passed, owner acceptance in T8
Where DNS runs on the domain controllers, it comes back in step 1. Bring EDR and log collection up before step 1, so each restored system reports from its first boot.
Restore or rebuild
Rebuild where time allows. Record the choice and reason for each system in T7.
Condition
Choose
Tier 0 access was compromised
Rebuild the Tier 0 servers, and review directory objects, Group Policy and trusts, which a rebuilt domain controller replicates unchanged
No backup predates compromise start with confidence
Rebuild
Firmware, boot or hypervisor persistence suspected
Rebuild on replaced or reflashed hardware
System defined in code or a golden image
Rebuild
Data nobody can recreate
Rebuild, then restore the data alone from the latest backup taken before the attacker changed it, scanned for the incident's indicators
Backup predates compromise start, is verified untampered and restores cleanly in isolation, and a rebuild would miss the recovery time objective
Restore. State the data loss in T7 and accept the risk in T6, signed by the risk owner named in who authorizes what.
Credential hazards in restored backups
Microsoft's forest recovery guide lists every update to existing objects since the backup as lost, and the incident's resets are such updates.
Secret
After an Active Directory restore
User and administrator passwords
Old values return. Reset every account in scope again, in the eradicate reset waves.
Computer accounts
Old machine passwords return. Reset the restored domain controller's twice, as Microsoft's procedure does, and member servers in scope once.
KRBTGT
Old keys return, usually the ones the attacker stole, and golden tickets forged with them work again. Reset it twice, further apart than the maximum ticket lifetime, 10 hours by default.
Trusts
Old trust passwords return. After a breach, reset each on the trusting side and set the same one on the trusted side.
Group managed service accounts
After a writable domain controller's database was compromised, Microsoft advises a new Key Distribution Service (KDS) root key and recreated accounts, depending on the compromise.
Secrets on restored servers
Local administrator passwords, service credentials, application programming interface (API) keys, Secure Shell (SSH) and certificate keys return. Rotate each one again.
Start before the first restored system takes traffic. Run it for 30 days. Run it for 90 days after a SEV 1 or SEV 2, or where the attacker had privileged access, and for the dwell time where that is longer. Set the end date at closure, as the Incident Command retained monitoring list does.
Watch
Alert on
The incident
Its indicators, and the rules written during contain and eradicate
Identity
Sign-ins by accounts in scope, use of a rotated credential, new MFA methods, privileged group changes
Persistence
New services, scheduled tasks, run keys, Group Policy objects, cron jobs and systemd units
Egress
New destinations, file-sharing and remote access services
Telemetry health
A restored system that stops reporting. Treat the silence as an alert.
Exit criteria
#
Item
Owner
1
No hit on an incident indicator or rule for the full period
Intelligence/Investigations
2
Telemetry from every restored system unbroken for the full period
Operations
3
Incident rules moved into the standard rule set, each with an owner
Intelligence/Investigations
4
Clean-since date and planned length entered in T5, and the exit recorded in T1 with name and time
Incident Commander
What reopens the loop
Each starts a new pass, logged in T4. After closure, it reopens the incident under the same ID (T6).
Event
First move
A hit on an incident indicator or rule
Scope from the hit
Use of a rotated credential
Treat it as still in the attacker's hands, find the source, reset again
New persistence on a restored system, such as the attacker's Group Policy task in the Incident Command worked example
Isolate the system and rescope
A restored system goes silent
Check for tampering before calling it a fault
New facts from the investigation, a partner or law enforcement