PIVTR-D
RResponse loop

Recover

STARTS WHENEradication verified.
DONE WHENSystems in production under enhanced monitoring, owner sign-off on file.
RECORDST7 Pre-restoration sign-off and T8 System owner acceptance for each system, and a T11 Stakeholder status update when service returns.

Work the checks in order before anything returns to production. The indicator scan comes last, because scanning a half-patched box does not reflect the build that ships.

Then restore in dependency order, pilot first, and watch what returns. Isolated systems and images stay in the evidence register until the Legal advisor releases them.

Pre-restoration verification

#ItemOwner
1Root cause remediated. The vulnerability is patched, credentials rotated, or misconfiguration corrected, matched to the root cause analysis.Operations
2Patching current. Operating system, firmware and application updates missed while offline are installed.Operations
3Persistence removed. Every identified mechanism is confirmed gone.Operations
4Backup validated. For restores, the backup predates initial compromise according to the incident timeline.Operations
5Rebuild verified. For rebuilds, the build used trusted sources and clean installation media.Operations
6Controls live. Endpoint detection and response (EDR) is installed and reporting, the host firewall configured, and logging enabled.Operations
7Indicator scan, last. Every indicator from scoping and eradication is checked against the final build.Operations

Then the rest

#ItemOwner
8Test the system against a written test planOperations
9Record system owner acceptance in T8: what was tested, by whom, limitations accepted, formal sign-offPlanning
10Configure enhanced monitoring before go-live: advanced audit policies, PowerShell script block logging on Windows, auditd rules on Linux, and logs confirmed flowing to the security information and event management (SIEM) platformOperations
11Enable the detection rules written during contain and eradicate on the restored systemIntelligence/Investigations
12Coordinate production restoration across teamsOperations
13Remove or keep each containment measure by a decision recorded in T3Incident Commander
14Capture recovery metrics for the debrief, from the key timesPlanning

The introduction and the two checklists above are adapted from the book. Every section below is an addition to the book.

Pilot return

#ItemOwner
1Name the pilot: one site, team or application instance whose failure the business can absorbOperations
2Write the success criteria first: functions tested, error rates, no indicator hitsPlanning
3Run the pilot through one full business cycle, with the workaround still runningOperations
4Decide full return with the system owner, and record the decisionIncident Commander

Re-enabling suspended accounts

#ItemOwner
1List every account suspended during containment from T3, and record each re-enable with its approverPlanning
2Reset the password after the last rotation and after any directory restoreOperations
3Check multifactor authentication (MFA) methods, devices, OAuth grants and mailbox rules, and remove what the attacker addedOperations
4Confirm the person face to face or by a call to the number in the HR recordOperations
5Enable a service account once every dependent application has the new credentialOperations

Tell users service is back

#ItemOwner
1Send T11 as each service returns. Say what is restored, what is still degraded, what users do now (sign in again, register MFA again, stop the workaround by a stated time), and the next update time.Public Information Officer
2Make claims about the attacker's access or the data only on evidence, and have counsel clear them before anything leaves the organizationLegal advisor

Decisions and records

Watch out
  • A restore returns every secret as it stood on the backup date, including the passwords the incident already reset. Rotate again after each restore, using the table below.
  • A restored system that stops reporting may have been tampered with. Treat the silence as an alert and check before calling it a fault.

Restore order

OrderRestoreBefore the next step
1Identity: domain controllers, the identity provider, privileged and break-glass accountsSecrets rotated again (below), replication healthy, Group Policy checked against a baseline
2Core network services: Domain Name System (DNS), Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), time, routing, firewalls, remote accessName resolution and time correct from every segment
3The rest of Tier 0: certificate services, backup, virtualization management, deployment toolsEDR and log forwarding reporting
4Line-of-business applications, in the priority order set in preparationPilot passed, owner acceptance in T8

Where DNS runs on the domain controllers, it comes back in step 1. Bring EDR and log collection up before step 1, so each restored system reports from its first boot.

Restore or rebuild

Rebuild where time allows. Record the choice and reason for each system in T7.

ConditionChoose
Tier 0 access was compromisedRebuild the Tier 0 servers, and review directory objects, Group Policy and trusts, which a rebuilt domain controller replicates unchanged
No backup predates compromise start with confidenceRebuild
Firmware, boot or hypervisor persistence suspectedRebuild on replaced or reflashed hardware
System defined in code or a golden imageRebuild
Data nobody can recreateRebuild, then restore the data alone from the latest backup taken before the attacker changed it, scanned for the incident's indicators
Backup predates compromise start, is verified untampered and restores cleanly in isolation, and a rebuild would miss the recovery time objectiveRestore. State the data loss in T7 and accept the risk in T6, signed by the risk owner named in who authorizes what.

Credential hazards in restored backups

Microsoft's forest recovery guide lists every update to existing objects since the backup as lost, and the incident's resets are such updates.

SecretAfter an Active Directory restore
User and administrator passwordsOld values return. Reset every account in scope again, in the eradicate reset waves.
Computer accountsOld machine passwords return. Reset the restored domain controller's twice, as Microsoft's procedure does, and member servers in scope once.
KRBTGTOld keys return, usually the ones the attacker stole, and golden tickets forged with them work again. Reset it twice, further apart than the maximum ticket lifetime, 10 hours by default.
TrustsOld trust passwords return. After a breach, reset each on the trusting side and set the same one on the trusted side.
Group managed service accountsAfter a writable domain controller's database was compromised, Microsoft advises a new Key Distribution Service (KDS) root key and recreated accounts, depending on the compromise.
Secrets on restored serversLocal administrator passwords, service credentials, application programming interface (API) keys, Secure Shell (SSH) and certificate keys return. Rotate each one again.

Microsoft Learn, AD forest recovery guide: choosing a backup, initial recovery, KRBTGT and trusts; recovering from a Golden gMSA attack. Initial recovery, trusts and Golden gMSA checked October 2026; choosing a backup and KRBTGT checked September 2026.

Enhanced monitoring

Start before the first restored system takes traffic. Run it for 30 days. Run it for 90 days after a SEV 1 or SEV 2, or where the attacker had privileged access, and for the dwell time where that is longer. Set the end date at closure, as the Incident Command retained monitoring list does.

WatchAlert on
The incidentIts indicators, and the rules written during contain and eradicate
IdentitySign-ins by accounts in scope, use of a rotated credential, new MFA methods, privileged group changes
PersistenceNew services, scheduled tasks, run keys, Group Policy objects, cron jobs and systemd units
EgressNew destinations, file-sharing and remote access services
Telemetry healthA restored system that stops reporting. Treat the silence as an alert.

Exit criteria

#ItemOwner
1No hit on an incident indicator or rule for the full periodIntelligence/Investigations
2Telemetry from every restored system unbroken for the full periodOperations
3Incident rules moved into the standard rule set, each with an ownerIntelligence/Investigations
4Clean-since date and planned length entered in T5, and the exit recorded in T1 with name and timeIncident Commander

What reopens the loop

Each starts a new pass, logged in T4. After closure, it reopens the incident under the same ID (T6).

EventFirst move
A hit on an incident indicator or ruleScope from the hit
Use of a rotated credentialTreat it as still in the attacker's hands, find the source, reset again
New persistence on a restored system, such as the attacker's Group Policy task in the Incident Command worked exampleIsolate the system and rescope
A restored system goes silentCheck for tampering before calling it a fault
New facts from the investigation, a partner or law enforcementRescope
Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.