Eradicate
Eradication removes what the attacker left and closes the way they came in. Keep collecting and registering evidence as you go, following Evidence collection, because removed artifacts cannot be collected later.
Act on the short-form investigation: what the attacker did, how they got in, where else they might be, and what has to go so they cannot come back the same way. The scenario page for the incident type lists the persistence to hunt for.
Removal, in order
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Remove persistence. First inventory every mechanism with its type, system, file or registry path, and associated process. Document each one before deleting it. | Operations |
| 2 | Remediate processes and accounts. Terminate attacker sessions and remove the accounts they created. | Operations |
| 3 | Rotate credentials. Rotate everything stolen, including KRBTGT and trust passwords, in the reset waves. | Operations |
| 4 | Restore systems. Rebuild where targeted cleanup cannot produce enough confidence (restore or rebuild). | Operations |
| 5 | Remediate vulnerabilities. Fix the entry point, and anything else exploited during lateral movement. | Operations |
| 6 | Add defense in depth. Add control layers against a repeat. | Operations |
Also
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 7 | Complete the root cause analysis, and remove the cause along with its symptoms | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 8 | Remove watchdog processes before the components they protect | Operations |
| 9 | Verify removal by rerunning the original enumeration technique | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 10 | Feed new indicators found during eradication back into scoping | Planning |
Credential reset waves
Structure from Table 31, p. 369. The windows come from the book's worked example and need replacing with yours.
| Wave | Scope | Window in the example |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | KRBTGT, reset twice, then Tier 0 accounts | Friday 11 PM to Saturday 3 AM, scheduled maintenance |
| 2 | Tier 1 accounts and critical service accounts | Saturday 6 AM to noon, reduced trading hours |
| 3 | Tier 2 accounts and remaining service accounts | Saturday 2 PM to Sunday 6 PM |
Decisions and records
- Agree the scope of the short-form and long-form tracks with decision makers, in writing (Figure 92).
- Book the reset windows with the system owners. A production outage needs the approval named in who authorizes what.
- Keep the eradication log: each artifact, where it was, who removed it and when. Record the root cause, and carry the verification method, analyst and date into T5.
- The double KRBTGT reset depends on the interval between resets. Reset once, confirm replication across all domain controllers, then wait longer than the maximum ticket lifetime, 10 hours by default, so legitimate tickets issued under the old key expire.
- The second reset removes the old key, which invalidates any golden ticket forged with it. The example allows 10 hours, which puts the second reset on Saturday morning, after the wave 1 window closes.
- Track every service account with its dependent applications and owner, and have the application team test the credential update in staging before the window.
- Keep emergency access available. Issue short-validity temporary accounts to on-call staff whose credentials are being reset.
KRBTGT reset interval: Microsoft Learn, AD forest recovery guide, Perform the initial recovery; CISA Eviction Strategies Tool, CM0050. Checked October 2026.
Two investigation tracks
Contained systems cost money every hour they stay down, and reading disk and memory properly takes days or weeks. So the investigation runs on two tracks at once.
Short-form work answers enough to act on. Its output is rough by design, and the source book's tech editor calls it a dirty kebab. Long-form work carries on for the full tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), regulatory reporting, and anything that ends up in front of a court.