PIVTR-D

Metrics

Every duration on this page comes from the six key times in T1. Record each with date, time and zone. Revise it as scoping learns more. T10 and T15 take their durations from the same times.

Key times

The key time definitions, the program table and the worked example are additions to the book.

Key timeDefinitionRecorded in
Compromise startThe earliest evidence of attacker activity in your environment, such as a malicious sign-in, a successful exploit or the first run of attacker code. Move it earlier whenever scoping finds older evidence, and log each revision with its evidence reference.The attack timeline
DetectedWhen the first alert, hunt finding or report belonging to this incident was generated or received, whether or not anyone acted on it thenThe alert or ticket; KEY TIMES, detected, in T1
VerifiedWhen the verification decision was recorded as continueDECIDED BY / AT in T1
ContainedWhen network, process and log checks all show attacker activity stopped across the known scope. If a later pass finds activity after this time, move it to when that activity was contained.VALIDATED BY / AT in the last T3
EradicatedWhen rerunning the enumeration that found each problem comes back clean across the final scopeEradication verified, in T5
RecoveredWhen the last affected system is back in production with owner acceptance signedThe last T8

Per incident

Definitions from p. 444, with the wording matched to the T1 key times. Time to verify and iteration count are mine.

MetricMeasured fromThis incident
Time to detectCompromise start to detected. T10 calls it dwell time.
Time to verifyDetected to verified
Time to respondDetected to technical closure signed in T5
Time to containmentDetected to contained. T10: to contain.
Time to eradicationContained to eradicated
Time to full recoveryDetected to recovered. T10: to recover.
Total lifecycleCompromise start to technical closure signed in T5
Systems affectedServers, workstations, cloud resources
Accounts affectedCompromised or requiring reset
Data exposureRecord count, classification, regulatory categories
Business impactDisruption duration, revenue effect
Effort and costPersonnel hours, external services, tooling, any ransom paid
IterationsPasses through the response actions loop

Record these the same way every time. Comparing them across incidents shows whether the team is improving, and the numbers justify the improvement plan's budget. Iteration count is included because it shows whether scoping caught things early or late.

Across incidents

Report the median and the worst case for each severity every month. Incident management measures, such as time to declare and updates sent on time, are in Incident Command's program metrics.

MetricMeasured asTells you
Time to detect, trendCompromise start to detected, by severity, month on monthWhether intrusions are found sooner
Time to contain, trendDetected to contained, by severity, month on monthWhether containment authority and tools work
Detection source mixShare of incidents whose REPORT SOURCE is alert, hunt or user (internal), against partner, customer, researcher, law enforcement or vendor (external)How often outsiders find your incidents first. M-Trends 2026 puts internal detection at 52% of Mandiant's 2025 investigations.
False positive rateEvents of interest raised from alerts and stopped at verification as not real, as a share of all events of interest raised from alertsWhether rules need tuning. A rate near zero can mean analysts raise only certainties.
Deferrals on timeDefer decisions re-decided by their DEFER REVIEW BY time, as a share of all deferralsWhether deferred events get their second look
Exercise cadence metExercises run on schedule, as a share of those planned: monthly tabletop, quarterly technical drill, annual full-scaleWhether the team practices
Improvement register closureT14 lines verified by their due date, as a share of lines due, at the 30, 60 and 90-day reviewsWhether fixes happen

Detection source benchmark from Mandiant, M-Trends 2026, checked October 2026. Exercise cadence from item 28 of the preparation checklist.

Worked example

IR-2026-0142, the fictional FRIDAY RENAME ransomware incident in the Incident Command worked example. Times are Central, in 2026. Times after Sunday, October 4, are added for this page.

Key timeRecordedNote
Compromise startSeptember 29, 21:14VPN sign-in with a contractor's password. First recorded as October 2, 01:52, the domain admin sign-in, and moved back as scoping found older evidence.
DetectedOctober 2, 02:10EDR alert on mass file renames
VerifiedOctober 2, 02:14Incident opened by the on-call analyst
ContainedOctober 4, 09:20First recorded as October 3, 06:30, after the Tier 0 rotation. Moved when a scoping pass found the attacker's domain policy on two restored servers, isolated at 09:20.
EradicatedOctober 5, 18:00Every domain policy, scheduled task and account rechecked clean
RecoveredOctober 7, 16:45Last business system accepted by its owner
Technical closureOctober 9, 17:00T5 signed
MetricFrom, toResult
Time to detect (dwell time)Compromise start, detected2 d 4 h 56 min. The first recorded start gave 18 min.
Time to verifyDetected, verified4 min
Time to containmentDetected, contained2 d 7 h 10 min. Before the revision, 1 d 4 h 20 min.
Time to eradicationContained, eradicated1 d 8 h 40 min
Time to full recoveryDetected, recovered5 d 14 h 35 min
Time to respondDetected, technical closure7 d 14 h 50 min
Total lifecycleCompromise start, technical closure9 d 19 h 46 min
Detection sourceREPORT SOURCEInternal: alert
Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.