Metrics
Every duration on this page comes from the six key times in T1. Record each with date, time and zone. Revise it as scoping learns more. T10 and T15 take their durations from the same times.
Key times
The key time definitions, the program table and the worked example are additions to the book.
| Key time | Definition | Recorded in |
|---|---|---|
| Compromise start | The earliest evidence of attacker activity in your environment, such as a malicious sign-in, a successful exploit or the first run of attacker code. Move it earlier whenever scoping finds older evidence, and log each revision with its evidence reference. | The attack timeline |
| Detected | When the first alert, hunt finding or report belonging to this incident was generated or received, whether or not anyone acted on it then | The alert or ticket; KEY TIMES, detected, in T1 |
| Verified | When the verification decision was recorded as continue | DECIDED BY / AT in T1 |
| Contained | When network, process and log checks all show attacker activity stopped across the known scope. If a later pass finds activity after this time, move it to when that activity was contained. | VALIDATED BY / AT in the last T3 |
| Eradicated | When rerunning the enumeration that found each problem comes back clean across the final scope | Eradication verified, in T5 |
| Recovered | When the last affected system is back in production with owner acceptance signed | The last T8 |
Per incident
Definitions from p. 444, with the wording matched to the T1 key times. Time to verify and iteration count are mine.
| Metric | Measured from | This incident |
|---|---|---|
| Time to detect | Compromise start to detected. T10 calls it dwell time. | |
| Time to verify | Detected to verified | |
| Time to respond | Detected to technical closure signed in T5 | |
| Time to containment | Detected to contained. T10: to contain. | |
| Time to eradication | Contained to eradicated | |
| Time to full recovery | Detected to recovered. T10: to recover. | |
| Total lifecycle | Compromise start to technical closure signed in T5 | |
| Systems affected | Servers, workstations, cloud resources | |
| Accounts affected | Compromised or requiring reset | |
| Data exposure | Record count, classification, regulatory categories | |
| Business impact | Disruption duration, revenue effect | |
| Effort and cost | Personnel hours, external services, tooling, any ransom paid | |
| Iterations | Passes through the response actions loop |
Record these the same way every time. Comparing them across incidents shows whether the team is improving, and the numbers justify the improvement plan's budget. Iteration count is included because it shows whether scoping caught things early or late.
Across incidents
Report the median and the worst case for each severity every month. Incident management measures, such as time to declare and updates sent on time, are in Incident Command's program metrics.
| Metric | Measured as | Tells you |
|---|---|---|
| Time to detect, trend | Compromise start to detected, by severity, month on month | Whether intrusions are found sooner |
| Time to contain, trend | Detected to contained, by severity, month on month | Whether containment authority and tools work |
| Detection source mix | Share of incidents whose REPORT SOURCE is alert, hunt or user (internal), against partner, customer, researcher, law enforcement or vendor (external) | How often outsiders find your incidents first. M-Trends 2026 puts internal detection at 52% of Mandiant's 2025 investigations. |
| False positive rate | Events of interest raised from alerts and stopped at verification as not real, as a share of all events of interest raised from alerts | Whether rules need tuning. A rate near zero can mean analysts raise only certainties. |
| Deferrals on time | Defer decisions re-decided by their DEFER REVIEW BY time, as a share of all deferrals | Whether deferred events get their second look |
| Exercise cadence met | Exercises run on schedule, as a share of those planned: monthly tabletop, quarterly technical drill, annual full-scale | Whether the team practices |
| Improvement register closure | T14 lines verified by their due date, as a share of lines due, at the 30, 60 and 90-day reviews | Whether fixes happen |
Detection source benchmark from Mandiant, M-Trends 2026, checked October 2026. Exercise cadence from item 28 of the preparation checklist.
Worked example
IR-2026-0142, the fictional FRIDAY RENAME ransomware incident in the Incident Command worked example. Times are Central, in 2026. Times after Sunday, October 4, are added for this page.
| Key time | Recorded | Note |
|---|---|---|
| Compromise start | September 29, 21:14 | VPN sign-in with a contractor's password. First recorded as October 2, 01:52, the domain admin sign-in, and moved back as scoping found older evidence. |
| Detected | October 2, 02:10 | EDR alert on mass file renames |
| Verified | October 2, 02:14 | Incident opened by the on-call analyst |
| Contained | October 4, 09:20 | First recorded as October 3, 06:30, after the Tier 0 rotation. Moved when a scoping pass found the attacker's domain policy on two restored servers, isolated at 09:20. |
| Eradicated | October 5, 18:00 | Every domain policy, scheduled task and account rechecked clean |
| Recovered | October 7, 16:45 | Last business system accepted by its owner |
| Technical closure | October 9, 17:00 | T5 signed |
| Metric | From, to | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Time to detect (dwell time) | Compromise start, detected | 2 d 4 h 56 min. The first recorded start gave 18 min. |
| Time to verify | Detected, verified | 4 min |
| Time to containment | Detected, contained | 2 d 7 h 10 min. Before the revision, 1 d 4 h 20 min. |
| Time to eradication | Contained, eradicated | 1 d 8 h 40 min |
| Time to full recovery | Detected, recovered | 5 d 14 h 35 min |
| Time to respond | Detected, technical closure | 7 d 14 h 50 min |
| Total lifecycle | Compromise start, technical closure | 9 d 19 h 46 min |
| Detection source | REPORT SOURCE | Internal: alert |