PIVTR-D
DPhase playbook

Debrief

STARTS WHENLoop exited, technical closure and risk acceptance both signed.
DONE WHENImprovement plan issued with named owners and milestone dates.
RECORDST9 After-action review agenda, T10 Executive debrief, T14 Improvement register, T15 Incident report and the metrics.

Other traditions call this phase lessons learned, the postmortem, or root cause analysis.

Closing the incident and turning it into changes are one activity. The chance to fund improvements is greatest right after closure, so arrive with the improvement plan already costed, with an owner and a date on every line.

Close

#ItemOwner
1Set the debrief scope and the documentation requirementsIncident Commander
2Keep, modify or decommission each temporary asset: isolated systems, forensic images, temporary accounts, extra monitoring. The demobilization check-out covers people and access.Operations
3Consolidate tickets, chat, shared documents and personal notes into one authoritative recordPlanning
4Calculate the metrics in the standard format, from the T1 key timesPlanning
5Close out every regulator and individual notice: file follow-up and final reports from T17, and send and log T16 noticesLegal advisor
6Tell the insurer, law enforcement, partners and customers the incident is closed, and update claim and case numbers in T13Liaison
7Set retention for each item in the evidence register. Keep or release each legal hold in writing, including preservation requests sent to vendors in T19.Legal advisor

Learn

#ItemOwner
8Run the after-action review within one to two weeks of closure, using T9Incident Commander
9Invite every team that took partPlanning
10Prepare the timeline and findings summary before the meetingPlanning
11Set blameless ground rules: discuss controls, procedures and resources, and handle individual performance separatelyIncident Commander
12Run the detection gap review on the attack timeline, and send each gap back to Identification as a rule or huntIntelligence/Investigations
13Find contributing causes with a named method, such as five whys or a causal factors chartPlanning
14Where an incident report is required, develop it in T15Planning
15Present the findings and the funding request to stakeholders, using T10Incident Commander
16Issue the improvement register in T14, with owners and milestone datesIncident Commander
17Reopen the Preparation checklist, the scenario page for the incident type and Decide these before the incident against the findingsPlanning

Follow up

#ItemOwner
18Day 30: confirm every T14 line has started and its owner has accepted it, and raise overdue lines to the CISOIncident Commander
19Day 60: have someone other than the owner check each line marked done, then mark it verifiedIncident Commander
20Day 90: re-date open lines with a reason or accept them as risk in T6, add the closure rate to the program metrics, and hand the register to the program ownerCISO

Decisions and records

  • Decide what happens to each temporary asset, and record each legal hold kept or released on the Legal advisor's written decision.
  • Fill in T9 for the review, T10 for executives, T14 for the improvement register and T15 where a report is required.
  • Take every duration from the T1 key times, as Metrics defines them.
Watch out
  • Release a legal hold only on the Legal advisor's written decision, after confirming that every insurance claim, regulator inquiry and law enforcement request that could need the evidence is closed.

Detection gap review

This section and the next are additions to the book. The example rows come from the fictional FRIDAY RENAME incident in the Incident Command worked example.

Walk the attack timeline one step at a time. For each step, name the rule or signal that should have fired, whether it fired, and how long the alert waited for a person. Each miss becomes a T14 line. Record a slow response to an alert that did fire as a finding about the queue, the routing or the staffing.

StepShould have firedFiredT14 line
Tue 21:14, virtual private network (VPN) sign-in with a contractor's password and no second factorVPN sign-in without multifactor authentication (MFA)No ruleMFA on every VPN account, and an alert on any sign-in without it
Thu 23:05 to Fri 01:40, 41 GB copied to an outside storage serviceEgress volume to a file-sharing serviceNo ruleAlert on upload volume by destination category
Fri 01:52, domain admin sign-in from an unmanaged hostPrivileged sign-in from a host outside the admin workstation listNo ruleAlert on it, then block it
Fri 02:10, mass file renamesEndpoint detection and response (EDR) ransomware behaviorYes, verified at 02:14None

Contributing causes

The root cause is the condition that let the attacker in. Contributing causes are the conditions that let the incident start, spread or last. Name the method in T15, and give each cause a T14 line.

MethodUse forHow
Five whysOne chain of eventsAsk why the last event happened, answer with a fact from the timeline, and repeat until the answer is a condition the organization controls
Causal factors chartSeveral conditions that combinedLay the timeline events left to right, list under each event the conditions that allowed it, and mark each condition that appears under more than one event

Five whys on the FRIDAY RENAME entry point: the contractor's password worked on the VPN because the account had no second factor. It had none because contractor accounts were requested by email to the service desk, outside the onboarding workflow that enrolls MFA. The condition to fix is the missing contractor path in the access request workflow.

Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.