Debrief
Other traditions call this phase lessons learned, the postmortem, or root cause analysis.
Closing the incident and turning it into changes are one activity. The chance to fund improvements is greatest right after closure, so arrive with the improvement plan already costed, with an owner and a date on every line.
Close
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Set the debrief scope and the documentation requirements | Incident Commander |
| 2 | Keep, modify or decommission each temporary asset: isolated systems, forensic images, temporary accounts, extra monitoring. The demobilization check-out covers people and access. | Operations |
| 3 | Consolidate tickets, chat, shared documents and personal notes into one authoritative record | Planning |
| 4 | Calculate the metrics in the standard format, from the T1 key times | Planning |
| 5 | Close out every regulator and individual notice: file follow-up and final reports from T17, and send and log T16 notices | Legal advisor |
| 6 | Tell the insurer, law enforcement, partners and customers the incident is closed, and update claim and case numbers in T13 | Liaison |
| 7 | Set retention for each item in the evidence register. Keep or release each legal hold in writing, including preservation requests sent to vendors in T19. | Legal advisor |
Learn
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 8 | Run the after-action review within one to two weeks of closure, using T9 | Incident Commander |
| 9 | Invite every team that took part | Planning |
| 10 | Prepare the timeline and findings summary before the meeting | Planning |
| 11 | Set blameless ground rules: discuss controls, procedures and resources, and handle individual performance separately | Incident Commander |
| 12 | Run the detection gap review on the attack timeline, and send each gap back to Identification as a rule or hunt | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 13 | Find contributing causes with a named method, such as five whys or a causal factors chart | Planning |
| 14 | Where an incident report is required, develop it in T15 | Planning |
| 15 | Present the findings and the funding request to stakeholders, using T10 | Incident Commander |
| 16 | Issue the improvement register in T14, with owners and milestone dates | Incident Commander |
| 17 | Reopen the Preparation checklist, the scenario page for the incident type and Decide these before the incident against the findings | Planning |
Follow up
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 18 | Day 30: confirm every T14 line has started and its owner has accepted it, and raise overdue lines to the CISO | Incident Commander |
| 19 | Day 60: have someone other than the owner check each line marked done, then mark it verified | Incident Commander |
| 20 | Day 90: re-date open lines with a reason or accept them as risk in T6, add the closure rate to the program metrics, and hand the register to the program owner | CISO |
Decisions and records
- Decide what happens to each temporary asset, and record each legal hold kept or released on the Legal advisor's written decision.
- Fill in T9 for the review, T10 for executives, T14 for the improvement register and T15 where a report is required.
- Take every duration from the T1 key times, as Metrics defines them.
- Release a legal hold only on the Legal advisor's written decision, after confirming that every insurance claim, regulator inquiry and law enforcement request that could need the evidence is closed.
Detection gap review
This section and the next are additions to the book. The example rows come from the fictional FRIDAY RENAME incident in the Incident Command worked example.
Walk the attack timeline one step at a time. For each step, name the rule or signal that should have fired, whether it fired, and how long the alert waited for a person. Each miss becomes a T14 line. Record a slow response to an alert that did fire as a finding about the queue, the routing or the staffing.
| Step | Should have fired | Fired | T14 line |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tue 21:14, virtual private network (VPN) sign-in with a contractor's password and no second factor | VPN sign-in without multifactor authentication (MFA) | No rule | MFA on every VPN account, and an alert on any sign-in without it |
| Thu 23:05 to Fri 01:40, 41 GB copied to an outside storage service | Egress volume to a file-sharing service | No rule | Alert on upload volume by destination category |
| Fri 01:52, domain admin sign-in from an unmanaged host | Privileged sign-in from a host outside the admin workstation list | No rule | Alert on it, then block it |
| Fri 02:10, mass file renames | Endpoint detection and response (EDR) ransomware behavior | Yes, verified at 02:14 | None |
Contributing causes
The root cause is the condition that let the attacker in. Contributing causes are the conditions that let the incident start, spread or last. Name the method in T15, and give each cause a T14 line.
| Method | Use for | How |
|---|---|---|
| Five whys | One chain of events | Ask why the last event happened, answer with a fact from the timeline, and repeat until the answer is a condition the organization controls |
| Causal factors chart | Several conditions that combined | Lay the timeline events left to right, list under each event the conditions that allowed it, and mark each condition that appears under more than one event |
Five whys on the FRIDAY RENAME entry point: the contractor's password worked on the VPN because the account had no second factor. It had none because contractor accounts were requested by email to the service desk, outside the onboarding workflow that enrolls MFA. The condition to fix is the missing contractor path in the access request workflow.