Supply chain
The compromise came through a supplier's software, hardware or service. Protect your environment first by pausing the supplier's updates and access. Then find every system and secret the supplier touched.
- Pause automatic updates from the vendor and block the compromised version by hash in endpoint detection and response (EDR) or application control.Operations
- List every system that installed the compromised version from deployment logs, package manager histories and endpoint management.Operations
- List the credentials and tokens stored at the vendor, including secrets kept inside records on its platform.Operations
- Name a security contact at the supplier and log every statement about scope with date and time.Liaison
- Request the compromise timeline and version-specific indicators of compromise (IOCs) in writing with T19.Intelligence/Investigations
- Stop distribution if your own pipeline shipped the payload.Operations
Then work the page: Scope, Contain and eradicate, Coordinate with the supplier, Notify customers.
The attacker arrives through a trusted channel: a signed update, an open-source package, a vendor's staff account, or a vendor platform that stores your data and tokens. Controls that trust the vendor stay quiet, and when the compromise sits in the vendor's environment there may be no system of yours to isolate.
Much of the response is coordination with the supplier and, when your own pipeline shipped the payload, with your customers.
This page adds to the phase playbooks for scope, contain, eradicate and recover.
Chapter 12, pp. 260 to 261. Chapter 13, p. 317.
What is different
Chapter 12, p. 260. Chapter 13, pp. 317 to 318, 320 to 321, 323.
| Category | Examples | First move |
|---|---|---|
| Software, boundary | Firewalls, VPN concentrators, remote access gateways | Assume the internal network is exposed. The device may be the same one you rely on for detection. Open the edge device scenario. |
| Software, internal | Libraries, data center appliances, internal applications, developer toolchains | List every system running the compromised version |
| SaaS vendor | Vendor runs the software and stores your data, OAuth tokens, and API keys | List the data and credentials stored at the vendor |
| Managed service or staff access | IT outsourcing, consultants with admin credentials | List every access point: VPN, API integrations, federation, shared infrastructure |
| Hardware | Devices modified in manufacturing, shipping, or maintenance | Record serial numbers, procurement source, and shipping chain. Plan replacement. |
| Your own build pipeline | Malicious code injected into artifacts you published | Stop distribution and prepare a customer advisory |
Scope
Chapter 7, pp. 108 to 109. Chapter 13, pp. 318 to 319, 321, 323.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | List every system that installed the compromised version from deployment logs, package manager histories and endpoint management | Operations |
| 2 | Query the software bill of materials (SBOM) and software inventory for the component as a transitive dependency | Planning |
| 3 | Load vendor IOCs and community-published IOCs for the compromised version into hunts | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 4 | Check affected systems for lateral movement, credential dumping and additional tooling | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 5 | List the credentials and tokens stored at the vendor, including secrets kept inside records on the vendor's platform | Operations |
| 6 | Review authentication logs for vendor accounts across the vendor's known compromise window | Intelligence/Investigations |
Contain and eradicate
Chapter 12, p. 260. Chapter 13, pp. 320, 322 to 323.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pause automatic updates from the vendor, and block the compromised version by hash in EDR or application control | Operations |
| 2 | Suspend vendor VPN, federation and API access, or restrict it to what operations need | Operations |
| 3 | Rotate the credentials stored at the vendor, and revoke the vendor's OAuth grants | Operations |
| 4 | Before declaring eradication complete, re-provision vendor accounts, reissue tokens and re-establish federation trust | Operations |
| 5 | Replace modified hardware, since software changes cannot remedy it | Logistics |
| 6 | Agree with the vendor on removing your data from its compromised environment | Liaison |
When your pipeline shipped it
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 7 | Revoke the code-signing certificates used for the malicious builds | Operations |
| 8 | Ask each package repository to take down the affected versions | Liaison |
| 9 | Secure build systems, code repositories and deployment pipelines before the next release | Operations |
Coordinate with the supplier
The supplier has IOCs, the compromise timeline, and knowledge of the attacker you cannot get elsewhere. Its first statement of scope can be wrong.
In 2025 SonicWall first said 5% of customers were affected by the theft of firewall configuration backups. It then said every customer that used the cloud backup service was affected, and its customer Marquis later sued over the delayed disclosure.
Chapter 13, pp. 319 to 320, 322 to 323.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Name a security contact at the supplier, and log every statement about scope and impact with date and time | Liaison |
| 2 | Request the compromise timeline and version-specific IOCs in writing with T19 | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 3 | Use a non-disclosure agreement to obtain detail on exposed data | Legal advisor |
| 4 | Check the contract for notification requirements, indemnification and accountability for security failures | Legal advisor |
| 5 | Share your investigation findings back with the supplier | Liaison |
Notify customers
If you shipped malicious versions, publish a coordinated advisory that names them, and agree it with repository maintainers, platform providers, and coordination centers.
If a vendor exposed your customers' data, the response may be all external coordination. When Clop exploited MOVEit Transfer at First National Bank of Omaha's pension administrator in 2023, FNBO's own network was untouched. Its response was assessing exposure with the vendor, notifying customers, arranging credit monitoring, and regulatory reporting.
Notices to individuals use T16, and regulator notices T17.
Chapter 12, pp. 260 to 261.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Write the advisory with the affected versions, the fixed version, IOCs and the actions customers must take | Public Information Officer |
| 2 | Agree the advisory timing with repository maintainers, platform providers and coordination centers | Liaison |
| 3 | Enumerate affected customer records from what the vendor disclosed | Planning |
| 4 | Track regulatory and contractual notification deadlines from discovery | Legal advisor |
| 5 | Arrange credit monitoring where Social Security or bank account numbers were exposed | Finance/Admin |
- Uninstalling the compromised version leaves any persistence the attacker built with it. Hunt the affected systems before calling eradication done.
- SaaS integrations cascade. In the 2025 Salesloft Drift compromise, stolen OAuth tokens exposed Salesforce data that contained AWS keys, VPN credentials, and Snowflake tokens. Rotate secrets stored inside connected platforms as well as the integration's own tokens.
- A compromised boundary device is also a compromised security control. Validate what it reports against network flow and host telemetry.