PIVTR-D
RScenario

Supply chain

The compromise came through a supplier's software, hardware or service. Protect your environment first by pausing the supplier's updates and access. Then find every system and secret the supplier touched.

First moves
  1. Pause automatic updates from the vendor and block the compromised version by hash in endpoint detection and response (EDR) or application control.Operations
  2. List every system that installed the compromised version from deployment logs, package manager histories and endpoint management.Operations
  3. List the credentials and tokens stored at the vendor, including secrets kept inside records on its platform.Operations
  4. Name a security contact at the supplier and log every statement about scope with date and time.Liaison
  5. Request the compromise timeline and version-specific indicators of compromise (IOCs) in writing with T19.Intelligence/Investigations
  6. Stop distribution if your own pipeline shipped the payload.Operations

Then work the page: Scope, Contain and eradicate, Coordinate with the supplier, Notify customers.

The attacker arrives through a trusted channel: a signed update, an open-source package, a vendor's staff account, or a vendor platform that stores your data and tokens. Controls that trust the vendor stay quiet, and when the compromise sits in the vendor's environment there may be no system of yours to isolate.

Much of the response is coordination with the supplier and, when your own pipeline shipped the payload, with your customers.

This page adds to the phase playbooks for scope, contain, eradicate and recover.

Chapter 12, pp. 260 to 261. Chapter 13, p. 317.

What is different

Chapter 12, p. 260. Chapter 13, pp. 317 to 318, 320 to 321, 323.

CategoryExamplesFirst move
Software, boundaryFirewalls, VPN concentrators, remote access gatewaysAssume the internal network is exposed. The device may be the same one you rely on for detection. Open the edge device scenario.
Software, internalLibraries, data center appliances, internal applications, developer toolchainsList every system running the compromised version
SaaS vendorVendor runs the software and stores your data, OAuth tokens, and API keysList the data and credentials stored at the vendor
Managed service or staff accessIT outsourcing, consultants with admin credentialsList every access point: VPN, API integrations, federation, shared infrastructure
HardwareDevices modified in manufacturing, shipping, or maintenanceRecord serial numbers, procurement source, and shipping chain. Plan replacement.
Your own build pipelineMalicious code injected into artifacts you publishedStop distribution and prepare a customer advisory

Scope

Chapter 7, pp. 108 to 109. Chapter 13, pp. 318 to 319, 321, 323.

#ItemOwner
1List every system that installed the compromised version from deployment logs, package manager histories and endpoint managementOperations
2Query the software bill of materials (SBOM) and software inventory for the component as a transitive dependencyPlanning
3Load vendor IOCs and community-published IOCs for the compromised version into huntsIntelligence/Investigations
4Check affected systems for lateral movement, credential dumping and additional toolingIntelligence/Investigations
5List the credentials and tokens stored at the vendor, including secrets kept inside records on the vendor's platformOperations
6Review authentication logs for vendor accounts across the vendor's known compromise windowIntelligence/Investigations

Contain and eradicate

Chapter 12, p. 260. Chapter 13, pp. 320, 322 to 323.

#ItemOwner
1Pause automatic updates from the vendor, and block the compromised version by hash in EDR or application controlOperations
2Suspend vendor VPN, federation and API access, or restrict it to what operations needOperations
3Rotate the credentials stored at the vendor, and revoke the vendor's OAuth grantsOperations
4Before declaring eradication complete, re-provision vendor accounts, reissue tokens and re-establish federation trustOperations
5Replace modified hardware, since software changes cannot remedy itLogistics
6Agree with the vendor on removing your data from its compromised environmentLiaison

When your pipeline shipped it

#ItemOwner
7Revoke the code-signing certificates used for the malicious buildsOperations
8Ask each package repository to take down the affected versionsLiaison
9Secure build systems, code repositories and deployment pipelines before the next releaseOperations

Coordinate with the supplier

The supplier has IOCs, the compromise timeline, and knowledge of the attacker you cannot get elsewhere. Its first statement of scope can be wrong.

In 2025 SonicWall first said 5% of customers were affected by the theft of firewall configuration backups. It then said every customer that used the cloud backup service was affected, and its customer Marquis later sued over the delayed disclosure.

Chapter 13, pp. 319 to 320, 322 to 323.

#ItemOwner
1Name a security contact at the supplier, and log every statement about scope and impact with date and timeLiaison
2Request the compromise timeline and version-specific IOCs in writing with T19Intelligence/Investigations
3Use a non-disclosure agreement to obtain detail on exposed dataLegal advisor
4Check the contract for notification requirements, indemnification and accountability for security failuresLegal advisor
5Share your investigation findings back with the supplierLiaison

Notify customers

If you shipped malicious versions, publish a coordinated advisory that names them, and agree it with repository maintainers, platform providers, and coordination centers.

If a vendor exposed your customers' data, the response may be all external coordination. When Clop exploited MOVEit Transfer at First National Bank of Omaha's pension administrator in 2023, FNBO's own network was untouched. Its response was assessing exposure with the vendor, notifying customers, arranging credit monitoring, and regulatory reporting.

Notices to individuals use T16, and regulator notices T17.

Chapter 12, pp. 260 to 261.

#ItemOwner
1Write the advisory with the affected versions, the fixed version, IOCs and the actions customers must takePublic Information Officer
2Agree the advisory timing with repository maintainers, platform providers and coordination centersLiaison
3Enumerate affected customer records from what the vendor disclosedPlanning
4Track regulatory and contractual notification deadlines from discoveryLegal advisor
5Arrange credit monitoring where Social Security or bank account numbers were exposedFinance/Admin
Watch out
  • Uninstalling the compromised version leaves any persistence the attacker built with it. Hunt the affected systems before calling eradication done.
  • SaaS integrations cascade. In the 2025 Salesloft Drift compromise, stolen OAuth tokens exposed Salesforce data that contained AWS keys, VPN credentials, and Snowflake tokens. Rotate secrets stored inside connected platforms as well as the integration's own tokens.
  • A compromised boundary device is also a compromised security control. Validate what it reports against network flow and host telemetry.
Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.