Financial services: banks, fintech and payments
- Confirm which rows apply to each entity; record in T1 who decided each clock started.Legal advisor
- Put the notification incident question to the named decider at the first triage brief.Incident Commander
- Record the decision, the decider and each trigger time in T1; open T17, one per regime.Planning
- Tell the acquirer at once of suspected card data compromise.Liaison
- Brief the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) officer if transactions may be affected; keep suspicious activity report (SAR) work out of incident records.Legal advisor
- Isolate the card environment at the network; leave compromised hosts running for the PCI Forensic Investigator (PFI).Operations
Then work the page: Reporting obligations, Terms, Roles, What changes in each phase, Records, Who you work with.
This page is for responders at banks, credit unions, broker-dealers, investment advisers, insurers, fintechs, payment processors, card-accepting merchants and money transmitters, and at the service providers that run their systems. One firm often sits in several groups. Take a public bank holding company with a broker-dealer and a New York branch. One incident there goes to the banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS).
The clocks are short and start at different events. A bank has 36 hours after it determines a notification incident occurred; the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA) and NYDFS allow 72 hours. Visa allows three calendar days, and a public company has four business days after it determines materiality.
A SAR runs on a 30-day clock and stays confidential. Examiners review the response afterward.
This page adds to the phase playbooks for scope, contain, eradicate and recover. Incident Command seats for this sector are on Command by incident type.
This sector page is an addition to the book. Primary sources checked: 12 CFR Part 53, 12 CFR 225 Subpart N, 12 CFR 304 Subpart C, 12 CFR Part 748, 12 CFR 364 Appendix B, Regulation S-P, 17 CFR 242.1002, SEC Release 33-11216, 16 CFR 314.4, 23 NYCRR 500.17, NAIC Model Law 668, 31 CFR 1020.320, Visa What To Do If Compromised. Federal and New York rule text checked October 2026. The NAIC model law, card brand and PCI items were last checked as dated in the sources below.
Reporting obligations
Counsel confirms which rows apply; a firm in several groups owes every row that fits. Record in T1 who decided that each clock started, and when. The notification deadlines table lists state breach laws, the EU Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) for firms with EU operations, and other regimes.
| Obligation | Who reports to whom | Clock | Starts when | What the report contains |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Notification incident: 12 CFR 53.3 (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC), 225.302 (Federal Reserve), 304.23 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC) | Bank or bank holding company to its primary federal regulator: OCC supervisory office or BankNet; incident@frb.gov or the Board's telephone line, and the Reserve Bank central point of contact; FDIC supervisory office | 36 hours, sooner if possible | The bank determines a notification incident occurred | No form. Email or telephone with the facts known |
| Bank service provider notice: 12 CFR 53.4, 225.303, 304.24 | Provider to each affected bank's designated contact, or its CEO and CIO | As soon as possible | The provider determines a computer-security incident has materially disrupted or degraded covered services, or is reasonably likely to, for four or more hours | The disruption. Maintenance, testing and updates announced in advance are excluded |
| NCUA, 12 CFR 748.1(c), effective September 1, 2023 | Federally insured credit union to NCUA: webform, voicemail line or cybercu@ncua.gov | 72 hours, sooner if possible | Reasonable belief that a reportable cyber incident occurred, or notice of one from a credit union service organization (CUSO) or other third party | Contact, charter number, when identified, services affected, whether sensitive data was compromised. No personally identifiable information (PII) or indicators of compromise in the first report |
| Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) response program: Interagency Guidance, 12 CFR 364 Appendix B, Supplement A, and parallel OCC, Federal Reserve and NCUA appendices | Bank or credit union to its primary federal regulator, and to affected customers | As soon as possible, for each | Regulator: awareness of unauthorized access to sensitive customer information. Customers: misuse has occurred or is reasonably possible | Customer notice: what happened, the information involved, what the institution did, a telephone number, and advice on vigilance, fraud alerts and credit reports |
| Regulation S-P, 17 CFR 248.30 (2024 amendments) | Broker-dealer, funding portal, fund, SEC-registered adviser or transfer agent to affected individuals | 30 days, sooner if practicable | Becoming aware that unauthorized access to sensitive customer information occurred or is reasonably likely | The incident, the data and what individuals can do. No notice if an investigation finds substantial harm or inconvenience unlikely. Delay only on the Attorney General's written notice to the SEC |
| Regulation S-P, service providers | Service provider to the covered institution, under contract | 72 hours, sooner if possible | Awareness of a breach giving unauthorized access to a customer information system the provider maintains | What the contract requires |
| Regulation SCI, 17 CFR 242.1002(b) | SCI entity (exchanges, clearing agencies, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), certain alternative trading systems) to the SEC | Immediately; Form SCI within 24 hours; interim report at 30 days if unresolved; final report 5 business days after resolution and closure of the investigation | Responsible SCI personnel have a reasonable basis to conclude an SCI event occurred | The event and systems affected, then participants, market impact and corrective steps. Regular updates. Events with no or de minimis impact go in a log and a quarterly summary |
| Form 8-K, Item 1.05 | Public company (registrant) to the SEC | 4 business days | The company determines the incident is material, which it must do without unreasonable delay after discovery | Material aspects of nature, scope and timing, and material or reasonably likely material impact. Amend when new facts arrive. The Attorney General can delay filing for national security or public safety |
| Safeguards Rule, 16 CFR 314.4(j), effective May 13, 2024 | Financial institution under Federal Trade Commission (FTC) jurisdiction (mortgage brokers, finance companies, check cashers, wire transferors, tax preparers and others) to the FTC online form | 30 days, sooner if possible | Discovery of unauthorized acquisition of unencrypted customer information of 500 or more consumers. Data counts as unencrypted if the key was accessed. Unauthorized access to unencrypted data is presumed to be acquisition without reliable evidence otherwise | Contact, information types, dates, consumer count, a description, and any law enforcement delay (up to 30 days, then up to 60 more) |
| 23 NYCRR 500.17(a) | NYDFS covered entity (licensed or chartered under the Banking, Insurance or Financial Services Law) to the Superintendent through the DFS Portal | 72 hours, sooner if possible | Determining that a cybersecurity incident occurred at the entity, an affiliate or a third-party service provider | Entity, contact, dates, location, description and impact. Updates on material changes |
| 23 NYCRR 500.17(c) | NYDFS covered entity to the Superintendent | 24 hours, then 30 days | Making an extortion payment | Notice of payment; then why it was necessary, alternatives and diligence considered, and sanctions diligence |
| State law based on National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Model Law 668, Section 6 | Insurance licensee to its home state commissioner, and to any state with 250 or more affected residents where notice to a government body is required or material harm is likely | 72 hours, sooner if possible | Determining that a cybersecurity event occurred, including at a service provider | Dates, how it happened, information and consumers involved, notices made, control lapses and remediation. Consumer notice follows state breach law |
| Visa What To Do If Compromised, version 10.0, June 25, 2026 | Any entity handling Visa cardholder data to Visa, and immediately to its acquirer or issuer. Visa clients answer for their merchants and agents | 3 calendar days; incident report 3 calendar days later | Evidence raising a reasonable suspicion of, or confirming, a compromise event | Environment, scope, card data at risk, exposure, containment and dated steps. If Visa requires a PFI: contract within 5 business days, preliminary report 5 business days later, final report 10 business days after the investigation |
| Mastercard account data compromise rules, Security Rules and Procedures, Chapter 10 | Mastercard customer (acquirer or issuer) to Mastercard | 24 hours | Becoming aware of an account data compromise (ADC) event or potential ADC event. The customer's contracts must make its agents notify Mastercard on the same clock | Known facts within 24 hours, then updates. Affected account numbers within 72 hours. If Mastercard requires a PFI: engage one within 72 hours, name it to Mastercard within 2 business days, preliminary report within 5 business days of the investigation's start, final report within 10 business days of its end (section 10.3.1) |
| State money transmission laws and license conditions | Money transmitter to each state that licensed it | No uniform clock | Set by each state | Set by each state |
| Suspicious activity report: 31 CFR 1020.320 (banks), 1022.320 (money services businesses), 1023.320 (broker-dealers) | Institution to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). Violations needing immediate attention, such as ongoing money laundering, go to law enforcement by telephone at once | 30 calendar days; banks and broker-dealers get 30 more to identify a suspect, 60 at most | Initial detection of facts. FIN-2016-A005: a cyber-event meant to conduct or affect transactions of $5,000 or more ($2,000 for money services businesses) | The activity and cyber indicators: IP addresses with times, device identifiers, wallet addresses, hashes, domains. Ransomware: key term CYBER-FIN-2021-A004 |
The Regulation S-P compliance dates, December 3, 2025 for larger entities and June 3, 2026 for smaller ones, have passed. On May 21, 2024 the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance said incidents not determined material can be disclosed under Item 8.01. A later materiality determination starts four business days for Item 1.05.
Regulation S-K Item 106 adds annual 10-K disclosure of cyber risk management, strategy and board oversight. Industry groups petitioned on May 22, 2025 to rescind Item 1.05, which remained in force when this page was checked in October 2026.
NCUA proposed on December 11, 2025 to remove Appendix B to Part 748 and reissue it as a Letter to Credit Unions, with no change to what credit unions must do. Comments closed February 9, 2026. Appendix B was still in the eCFR on October 22, 2026, and NCUA's Deregulation Project page listed the proposal with no final rule when checked on November 10, 2026.
NAIC's state implementation report counts 28 jurisdictions that adopted the model as of March 9, 2026, and state versions differ. New York insurers and money transmitters report under Part 500, whose last phase-in took effect November 1, 2025: multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all access to information systems (500.12) and the asset inventory (500.13(a)).
The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) v4.0.1 sets no clock. Requirement 12.10.1 requires a plan that covers notifying payment brands and acquirers, the legal reporting analysis and the brands' procedures; 12.10.3 requires responders available 24/7.
The Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) counted 31 states in September 2026 that enacted the Money Transmission Modernization Act in full or in part. Its Section 7.04 event reports cover bankruptcy, receivership, license actions and felony charges, and list no cyber event. The FTC Safeguards Rule reaches wire transferors.
A SAR is confidential. No one at the institution may disclose a SAR or information revealing that one exists, except to FinCEN, law enforcement, examining regulators, and within the corporate structure for BSA purposes. The underlying facts, transactions and documents may go to the insurer, forensic firm and law enforcement as other law allows, with no mention of the SAR.
The September 21, 2021 advisory of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) governs ransom payment decisions; see the ransomware scenario.
Two cases show a provider's incident becoming the firm's. On February 2, 2023 the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) said a cyber incident at ION Cleared Derivatives would delay registrants' required reports. It told firms to file best estimates, and later postponed its Commitments of Traders report.
On December 1, 2023 NCUA said about 60 credit unions had outages from ransomware at the provider Ongoing Operations. NCUA counted 1,072 credit union cyber incident reports in the rule's first year, 742 involving a third-party vendor.
Sources: interagency rule effective April 1, 2022 (SR 22-4; OCC Bulletin 2022-8); NCUA final rule and reporting guide; SEC Regulation S-P guide, disclosure guide, Gerding statement and petition 4-856; FTC; NYDFS instructions; NAIC State Implementation Report, as of March 9, 2026 (checked October 2026); Visa What To Do If Compromised, version 10.0 (checked October 2026); Mastercard Security Rules and Procedures, Merchant Edition (August 4, 2026), section 10.3.1 (checked November 2026); PCI DSS v4.0.1 (June 2024), requirements 12.10.1 and 12.10.3, read in the PCI Security Standards Council PDF as copied by Middlebury College (checked November 2026); CSBS MTMA page, September 3, 2026 (checked October 2026); FinCEN FIN-2016-A005 and FIN-2021-A004; OFAC advisory; CFTC statement and release 8662-23; The Record; NCUA October 24, 2024 briefing; NCUA, proposed removal of Appendix B to Part 748, 90 FR 57397, December 11, 2025, eCFR Appendix B to Part 748, current to October 22, 2026, and NCUA's Deregulation Project page (checked November 2026); 23 NYCRR 500.22 (transitional periods); 17 CFR 248.30; 31 CFR 1023.320.
Terms
| Term | Meaning | PIVTR-D equivalent |
|---|---|---|
| Primary federal regulator | OCC for national banks and federal savings associations; Federal Reserve for state member banks and bank holding companies; FDIC for state nonmember banks and state savings associations; NCUA for federally insured credit unions | none |
| Computer-security incident | An occurrence causing actual harm to the confidentiality, integrity or availability of a system or its information | Incident |
| Notification incident | A computer-security incident that materially disrupts or degrades, or is reasonably likely to, banking operations, a major business line, or operations whose failure threatens US financial stability | A clock start recorded in T1 |
| Bank service provider | A company performing services subject to the Bank Service Company Act, such as a core processor | Vendor; see the supply chain scenario |
| MRA / MRIA | Matters requiring attention, and requiring immediate attention: examination findings the institution must fix | T14 Improvement register entries |
| FFIEC | Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, which sets uniform examination standards for the banking agencies | none |
| CAT | FFIEC Cybersecurity Assessment Tool, sunset August 31, 2025 | none |
| CRI Profile | The Cyber Risk Institute's industry profile, one of the CAT replacements the FFIEC named with NIST CSF 2.0 and CISA's performance goals | Preparation |
| SAR | Suspicious activity report to FinCEN, confidential by law | none |
| BSA/AML | Bank Secrecy Act and anti-money laundering program | none |
| FinCEN | Treasury bureau that administers the BSA and receives SARs | none |
| OFAC | Treasury's sanctions office. Civil penalties for paying a sanctioned person apply on strict liability | none |
| GLBA | Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the source of the financial privacy and safeguards rules | none |
| NPI | Nonpublic personal information: personally identifiable financial information about a consumer | Restricted data scenario |
| Customer information | Any record of NPI about a customer, kept by or for the institution. Sensitive customer information adds identifiers that permit account access or identity theft | Restricted data |
| Reg S-P | SEC privacy and safeguards rule, amended in 2024 to require an incident response program and customer notice | none |
| Reg SCI | SEC rule for market infrastructure systems. An SCI event is a systems disruption, compliance issue or intrusion | Incident |
| 8-K Item 1.05 | The Form 8-K item for a cybersecurity incident the registrant determines is material | none |
| Materiality | A substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider the incident important | none; the T1 risk level is a separate rating |
| NYDFS CISO certification | Filed by April 15 each year and signed by the highest-ranking executive and the CISO: compliance, or acknowledged noncompliance with a remediation plan | none |
| PCI DSS | Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard, now v4.0.1 | none |
| PFI | PCI Forensic Investigator, approved and listed by the PCI Security Standards Council | Outside forensic firm |
| QSA | Qualified Security Assessor, which assesses PCI DSS compliance | none |
| ADC | Account data compromise, Mastercard's term. Visa says compromise event | Restricted data |
| Acquirer | The bank that contracts with a merchant to accept cards | none |
| Issuer | The bank that issues cards; it monitors and reissues after a compromise | none |
| BIN | Bank identification number: the leading card digits that identify the issuer | none |
| Nacha | ACH network rulemaker. Large non-bank originators and processors must make stored account numbers unreadable | none |
| Swift CSP | Swift Customer Security Programme: controls framework with annual attestation | none |
| Sheltered Harbor | Subsidiary of the Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC) whose standard vaults customer account data nightly offline, with a plan to restore customer access to funds | Restore source in Recover |
| Core processor | Vendor running the bank's system of record for deposits and loans | Critical system in the containment triggers |
| BaaS | Banking as a service: a bank's accounts or payments offered through a fintech's product | none |
| Sponsor bank | The chartered bank behind a BaaS program or a fintech's network access | none |
Roles
| Sector role | What they do in an incident | PIVTR-D or Incident Command seat |
|---|---|---|
| CISO | Leads the response, briefs examiners, signs the NYDFS certification | CISO |
| General counsel | Decides which rows apply, advises on materiality, approves every notice | Legal advisor |
| Chief compliance officer | Files regulator notices and answers examiners | Liaison |
| BSA officer | Decides SAR filing and keeps SAR material confidential | Liaison for FinCEN, beside the Legal advisor |
| Chief risk officer | Rates business and customer impact for notification and materiality decisions | Executive group |
| Treasury and payments operations | Pauses, reroutes or recalls wires, ACH and settlement; runs manual payments | Operations, payments branch, with Finance/Admin |
| Fraud operations | Watches accounts and cards for misuse, blocks and reissues cards | Intelligence/Investigations |
| Investor relations | Keeps the 8-K and market statements consistent | Public Information Officer |
| Vendor management | Keeps service provider contracts, notice terms and contacts | Liaison |
| Board risk committee | Oversees cyber risk and receives briefings; the disclosure committee decides materiality | Executive group |
What changes in each phase
Preparation
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Keep a register of the rows that apply to each legal entity, with channel and decision owner | Legal advisor |
| 2 | Test regulator channels, including DFS Portal accounts with MFA | Liaison |
| 3 | Give every bank service provider a designated contact | Liaison |
| 4 | Require 72-hour breach notice in broker-dealer and adviser vendor contracts | Legal advisor |
| 5 | Write the criteria and name the deciders for notification incident, NYDFS incident and disclosure committee escalation | CISO |
| 6 | Put the BSA officer on the call tree | Legal advisor |
| 7 | Set the rule that SAR material stays out of incident records | Legal advisor |
| 8 | Name brand and acquirer notice and a PFI shortlist in the PCI incident response plan | CISO |
| 9 | Test the vaulted account data restore and manual payment procedures | Operations |
Identification and verification
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Put the notification incident question to the named decider at the first triage brief, and at each brief after until it is decided | Incident Commander |
| 2 | Record the decision, the time and the decider in T1 | Planning |
| 3 | Record the time of each trigger: NCUA belief, NYDFS determination, card compromise suspicion, materiality determination | Planning |
| 4 | Tell the acquirer at once of suspected card data compromise | Liaison |
| 5 | Send the facts to the disclosure committee without delay | Legal advisor |
| 6 | Brief the BSA officer when transactions may be affected | Legal advisor |
| 7 | If a provider outage is involved, ask the provider in writing for the expected duration | Liaison |
| 8 | Search accounts and cards for misuse | Intelligence/Investigations |
Response loop
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | File each notice with unknowns marked and counsel's approval, one T17 per regime | Liaison |
| 2 | Send updates as each rule requires: NYDFS material changes, Reg SCI updates, amended 8-K | Liaison |
| 3 | Isolate the card environment at the network, leave compromised hosts running, and allow no administrator logins | Operations |
| 4 | If a web skimmer is found, copy it with its logs, then remove it | Operations |
| 5 | Sign a PFI contract within 5 business days of Visa's notice | Legal advisor |
| 6 | Because the PFI report goes to the brands and acquirer, decide whether counsel runs a separate privileged investigation | Legal advisor |
| 7 | Before any ransom payment, complete OFAC screening and the SAR decision | Legal advisor |
| 8 | After any extortion payment, file the NYDFS notice within 24 hours and the explanation within 30 days | Legal advisor |
| 9 | Pause, reroute or recall payments as the executive group decides | Finance/Admin |
| 10 | Send compromised card numbers to the brands through the acquirer | Liaison |
| 11 | If the core is untrusted, restore customer access from vaulted data | Operations |
| 12 | Send customer notices from T16, within 30 days for Regulation S-P | Legal advisor |
| 13 | File the FTC Safeguards Rule notice within 30 days of discovery | Legal advisor |
Debrief
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Enter examiner findings and MRAs in T14 | CISO |
| 2 | Weigh the incident in the next NYDFS April 15 filing | CISO |
| 3 | Check the Item 106 text against what the incident showed | Legal advisor |
| 4 | File an amended SAR when new facts emerge | Legal advisor |
| 5 | Map PFI findings to PCI DSS gaps for the QSA | CISO |
| 6 | Fix provider notice and evidence terms in contracts | Liaison |
Records
| Record | What changes |
|---|---|
| T1 Incident record | Add legal entities, regulators and each trigger time. Record that the BSA officer was briefed, and leave out whether a SAR was filed |
| T2 Triage brief | Time left on each clock, card data involvement, provider outage hours |
| T13 Law enforcement and insurer contact | FBI and Secret Service contacts, with nothing that reveals a SAR |
| T16 Notice to affected individuals or customers | One version per rule: banking guidance, Regulation S-P, each state |
| T17 Regulator notification worksheet | One per regulator and card brand. Attach the DFS email receipt, which DFS sends only once |
| T19 Vendor evidence and preservation request | To the core processor or payment processor, citing the contract's notice clause |
| Filed 8-K, Form SCI, FTC, NYDFS, Visa and PFI reports | Supplement T15 Incident report. Keep each as filed |
| SAR and supporting documents | Kept by the BSA officer, apart from incident records, five years from filing |
Who you work with
| Body | What they do for you | How to reach them |
|---|---|---|
| Primary federal regulator, NCUA | Receive notices, follow the response, review it at examination | Supervisory office; channels in the reporting table |
| SEC, NYDFS, state regulators | Receive filings and notices; CSBS coordinates state supervision | EDGAR; DFS Portal; each licensing agency |
| FinCEN, OFAC | SAR filing; sanctions guidance on payments | BSA E-Filing; contacts in FIN-2021-A004 and the OFAC advisory |
| FS-ISAC | Member intelligence sharing and crisis coordination | Membership |
| Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council (FSSCC) | Industry council, founded 2002, coordinating sector resilience with Treasury, DHS and regulators | Through member associations |
| Treasury Office of Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection (OCCIP) | Coordinates Treasury's sector resilience work and shares threat information | Through FS-ISAC, or your regulator as a member of the Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee (FBIIC) |
| FBI, US Secret Service | Criminal investigation. Secret Service Cyber Fraud Task Forces cover BEC, ransomware and stolen financial data | Field offices; ic3.gov |
| CISA | Technical help and voluntary reporting | cisa.gov/report |
| Acquirer and card brands | Carry card notices, require PFI work | Through the acquiring bank |
| Sheltered Harbor | Vaulting standard and certification for restoring customer accounts | shelteredharbor.org |
Sources: FFIEC CAT sunset statement; Nacha; Swift CSP; PCI SSC on PFIs; FS-ISAC on Sheltered Harbor; FSSCC; Treasury OIG OIG-25-007 on OCCIP; Secret Service Cyber Fraud Task Forces.
- A SAR mentioned in T1, a ticket, a status update or a note to the insurer can reveal that it exists. Keep SAR work with the BSA officer.
- Clocks start at a determination (banking agencies, NYDFS, SEC), a reasonable belief (NCUA), a reasonable suspicion (Visa), discovery (FTC) or awareness (Regulation S-P). Record each event and who decided it.
- A provider's four-hour notice starts no bank clock; the bank decides whether the outage is its own notification incident. A credit union's 72 hours can start when a CUSO or other third party notifies it of a compromise that disrupts its operations or exposes member information.
- Visa's procedures say to leave compromised systems running, with no logins or password changes. Automatic endpoint detection and response (EDR) remediation and fast rebuilds break that. Isolate at the network and preserve for the PFI.
- A ransom payment starts NYDFS's 24-hour notice and needs OFAC screening and a SAR decision. Settle all three before anyone pays.