Distributed denial of service
Traffic floods an internet-facing service until it slows or fails, or a note threatens a flood unless the organization pays. Confirm the attack, get the upstream and mitigation providers working on it, and keep watching the rest of the network.
- Confirm an attack against the traffic graphs, recent changes and provider status pages.Operations
- Open an attack case with the DDoS mitigation or CDN provider and with the ISP.Liaison
- Start provider mitigation: on-demand diversion, rate limits and WAF rules, each logged in T3.Operations
- Save flow records, provider attack reports and sample requests before they age out.Intelligence/Investigations
- Assign a second analyst to watch identity, endpoint and outbound alerts for the length of the attack.Intelligence/Investigations
- Post a status update for customers and set its next time.Public Information Officer
Then work the page: Scope, Contain and eradicate, Extortion notes, Recover, Coordinate and report.
The attacker seldom touches a host, so the work runs through providers, traffic filters and customer messages. Most filtering happens in the ISP, CDN or mitigation provider network.
The attacker can change vectors within minutes, and a flood can hide a second intrusion. Keep an analyst on the rest of the estate while the network team fights the traffic.
This page adds to the phase playbooks for scope, contain, eradicate and recover. Provider commands are in the DDoS playbooks for AWS, Azure, Google Cloud and OCI. A ransom note tied to encrypted files belongs on the ransomware scenario.
This scenario is an addition to the book. Sources checked November 2026: CISA, FBI and MS-ISAC, Understanding and Responding to Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks, version 2.0, March 21, 2024; FBI IC3 complaint page and PSA I-073115-PSA on DDoS extortion email; CISA reporting page; OFAC ransomware advisory, September 21, 2021; CIS MS-ISAC membership FAQ; Cloudflare Magic Transit, on-demand, BYOIP, origin protection and Under Attack mode; eCFR 12 CFR Part 53; 47 CFR 4.9 at LII. Checked November 2026.
What is different
The joint CISA guide sorts attacks into three types: volumetric, protocol and application layer. Each is stopped at a different place.
| Case | What it looks like | What the response has to cover |
|---|---|---|
| Volumetric | Floods that use up the target's bandwidth or system resources. Reflection traffic often comes from legitimate public servers. | Filtering upstream of your link, at the ISP or a mitigation provider. |
| Protocol | Floods aimed at weaknesses in layer 3 and 4 protocols, such as SYN floods, that exhaust firewalls, load balancers and servers. | Provider scrubbing, and connection limits on the devices in the path. |
| Application layer (HTTP flood) | Valid-looking requests at an expensive page or API from many addresses. Bandwidth looks normal while the application fails. | WAF rules and rate limits at the edge. Network-layer protection alone does not stop it. |
| Extortion DDoS | An email demands payment, often in cryptocurrency, and threatens an attack. FBI PSA I-073115-PSA (July 31, 2015) describes the pattern, with higher demands after each refusal. | Preparation before the deadline, a report to law enforcement, and no contact with the sender. |
| Cover for an intrusion | A flood draws attention while another attack runs. The CISA guide notes DDoS can be combined with other attacks, such as spam campaigns. | A separate watch on identity, endpoint, email and payment activity through the attack. |
Scope
Generic steps are on Scope. Rule out a legitimate spike first: a launch, a sale, a news story, a broken deploy, a retry storm from your own clients or a provider outage.
| Log | Search for |
|---|---|
| Flow records (NetFlow, IPFIX, sFlow) from edge routers | Bits and packets per second by protocol, source port and destination. A spike from UDP source ports such as 53, 123 or 389 points to reflection |
| Provider attack reports and alerts | Start time, vectors, peak rate and targeted addresses. On AWS, describe-attack under Shield Advanced. On Azure, the DDoS mitigation reports. See the cloud playbooks for each |
| WAF, CDN and load balancer logs | Top client addresses, paths, user agents, countries and TLS fingerprints, and the share of requests each rule matched |
| Origin web server logs | Requests that reached the origin without passing through the CDN, which means the origin address is known |
| Email gateway | Any extortion note, and spam or phishing surges in the same window |
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Compare the spike with change records, marketing calendars and provider status pages, and record the result in T1 | Operations |
| 2 | Record start time, targeted addresses and hostnames, peak rate and vector for each wave | Operations |
| 3 | Classify each wave as volumetric, protocol or application layer, and pick the control from the table above | Operations |
| 4 | List every service that shares the attacked link, address range, DNS provider or load balancer | Planning |
| 5 | Export flow records, packet captures, WAF sampled requests and provider reports into evidence. AWS WAF sampled requests cover the previous 3 hours only | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 6 | Check origin logs for direct hits, and search DNS history and DNS-only records for the origin address | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 7 | Assign one analyst to identity, EDR, email and outbound traffic alerts for the whole attack | Intelligence/Investigations |
Contain and eradicate
Generic steps are on Contain and Eradicate. Record each rule and diversion in T3 with its time.
Engage the providers
| Service model | How traffic reaches the provider | During the attack |
|---|---|---|
| Always-on proxy or CDN | DNS points the hostname at the provider, which forwards clean requests to the origin | Tighten rules in the provider console. Diversion is already in place |
| DNS diversion, on demand | You change the record to the provider during the attack | Long time-to-live values delay the switch, and attackers who know the origin address keep hitting it |
| BGP diversion, on demand | The provider announces your prefixes over BGP and tunnels clean traffic back, as with Cloudflare Magic Transit over GRE | Start the announcement in the provider's dashboard or API, and stop it once the incident is resolved |
| ISP or upstream filtering | The ISP filters or blackholes traffic toward your addresses in its own network | Give the ISP the attacking addresses, ports and packet sizes. A blackhole drops legitimate traffic to that address too |
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Open an attack case with the mitigation provider through its emergency channel, with targets, start time and vectors. On AWS, the Shield Response Team needs Shield Advanced and Business or Enterprise Support | Liaison |
| 2 | Call the ISP's network operations center, and send it the attacking addresses, ports and packet sizes for filtering | Liaison |
| 3 | If the service is on demand, start the DNS change or BGP announcement, and confirm traffic arrives at the provider | Operations |
| 4 | If no provider contract exists, ask the ISP and the cloud provider for emergency onboarding, and have Finance/Admin approve the cost | Incident Commander |
| 5 | Send each provider a T19 request for its attack report, logs and sample requests | Liaison |
Lock the origin
Cloudflare notes that DNS records are public, history services keep pre-proxy addresses, and bounced mail can reveal a shared server. An attacker with the origin address bypasses the provider.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 6 | Allow inbound web traffic at the origin from the provider's published address ranges alone, such as the CloudFront origin-facing prefix list or the AzureFrontDoor.Backend service tag destructive for direct clients | Operations |
| 7 | If the origin address is exposed, move the origin to a new address, and keep DNS-only records, mail and SPF entries from pointing at it | Operations |
| 8 | Where the provider supports it, require proof of origin, such as authenticated origin pulls with your own certificate, a secret header, or an outbound-only tunnel | Operations |
Rate limits and WAF rules
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 9 | Add a rate limit scoped to the attacked path, in count or preview mode first, then block once legitimate clients stay under it | Operations |
| 10 | If a botnet with many addresses stays under per-address limits, add rules on path, header, user agent, TLS fingerprint or country | Operations |
| 11 | Turn on a browser challenge for the attacked paths, such as Cloudflare's I'm Under Attack mode, and exempt API and machine clients that cannot run JavaScript | Operations |
| 12 | Serve cached copies of expensive pages, and turn off costly features until the attack ends | Operations |
| 13 | Re-check vectors after each rule change, and adjust rules as the attacker shifts | Operations |
Extortion notes
FBI PSA I-073115-PSA says not to communicate with the sender, to contact the local FBI field office, and to file at ic3.gov with the email and its headers. OFAC's September 21, 2021 advisory says the US government strongly discourages paying ransom or extortion demands.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 14 | Preserve the note as received, with full headers, any payment address and the deadline | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 15 | Record the position not to pay or reply, with counsel's advice, in the decision register | Incident Commander |
| 16 | Confirm always-on protection, or an agreed on-demand activation plan, for every named target before the deadline | Operations |
| 17 | File the complaint at ic3.gov, call the local FBI field office, and log both in T13 | Liaison |
Recover
Run the pre-restoration verification into T7 for any system restarted or rebuilt, then add these.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Keep on-demand diversion and emergency rules in force for an agreed quiet period, then stop the announcement or revert DNS with the provider | Operations |
| 2 | Replace broad blocks such as country or range rules with narrow lasting rules, and check WAF logs for legitimate clients they blocked | Operations |
| 3 | Keep the origin locked to the provider's ranges, and alert on direct-to-origin traffic | Operations |
| 4 | Close the second-intrusion watch after the analyst reports, and record the result in T5 | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 5 | Request any cost concession the provider offers within its window. AWS requires a billing case within 15 days after the billing month of the attack | Finance/Admin |
| 6 | Before the next attack, complete prefix onboarding for on-demand BGP service, such as IRR records, RPKI ROAs and a Letter of Agency, and log gaps in T14 | Planning |
Coordinate and report
The CISA guide lists three contacts: the local FBI field office, CISA at report@cisa.gov or (888) 282-0870, and for state, local, tribal and territorial entities the MS-ISAC. MS-ISAC moved to paid membership on October 1, 2025, after federal funding ended.
An outage can start a clock with no data breach. Under 12 CFR Part 53, a bank's notification incident includes one that materially disrupted, or is reasonably likely to disrupt, its ability to serve a material portion of its customers. Form DOE-417 counts a cyber event that interrupts electrical system operations. Check the clocks table and the financial, energy, federal civilian and transportation sector pages.
Under 47 CFR 4.9, a wireline or wireless carrier notifies the FCC within 120 minutes of discovering a reportable outage, then files reports within 72 hours and 30 days.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Assess whether the outage, by length and customers affected, meets any sector threshold, and record who decided and when | Legal advisor |
| 2 | Report to CISA through cisa.gov/report or (888) 282-0870, and to law enforcement and the insurer with T13 | Liaison |
| 3 | Post status page updates on a fixed schedule with T11, stating what is affected and the next update time, and keep attacker claims out of them | Public Information Officer |
| 4 | Prepare an interim statement with T18 for media questions, and route every inquiry to the Public Information Officer | Public Information Officer |
Seats for this incident type are on the Incident Command by-type page. To rehearse it, run the extortion and account takeover tabletop.
- A flood can hide a second intrusion. Keep the separate watch running until the attack ends and the analyst reports.
- An origin allowlist drops direct HTTP requests, and a flood aimed at a known origin address still fills its link. Move the origin to a new address.
- Per-address rate limits miss large botnets. Pair them with rules on path, headers and fingerprints.
- A blackhole or a country block also stops customers. Record each one in T3 with an owner and an end time.