PIVTR-D
RAWS playbook · Network and edge

DDoS or application-layer attack

The attacker floods a public endpoint with packets or with HTTP requests until it fails or the bill climbs. A typical application-layer run sends many valid-looking requests to an expensive URL through CloudFront or an Application Load Balancer (ALB), from thousands of addresses, and sometimes hits the origin directly to skip the edge. Turn on AWS WAF logging and, with Shield Advanced, engage the Shield Response Team (SRT) before you change rules.

Look here

LogSearch for
Shield Advanced events (Shield Advanced only)Attacks detected in the window: aws shield list-attacks --start-time FromInclusive=<unix>,ToExclusive=<unix>
Shield Advanced attack detailVectors and resources of one attack: aws shield describe-attack --attack-id <id>
CloudWatch, AWS/DDoSProtectionAttack metrics for Shield Advanced protected resources, published every minute during an event: DDoSDetected, DDoSAttackBitsPerSecond, DDoSAttackPacketsPerSecond, DDoSAttackRequestsPerSecond
WAF sampled requestsA sample of requests that matched a rule, from the previous 3 hours only. Use --scope CLOUDFRONT --region us-east-1 for CloudFront: aws wafv2 get-sampled-requests --web-acl-arn <arn> --rule-metric-name <metric> --scope REGIONAL --time-window StartTime=<utc-start>,EndTime=<utc-end> --max-items 500
WAF logs (off until configured)Top clients, paths and countries. S3 delivery runs at 5-minute intervals. Group by httpRequest.clientIp, httpRequest.uri, httpRequest.country, ja4Fingerprint, terminatingRuleId and action
WAF rate-based rulesAddresses a rate-based rule limits now: aws wafv2 get-rate-based-statement-managed-keys --scope REGIONAL --web-acl-name <acl> --web-acl-id <id> --rule-name <rule>
ALB access logs and CloudFront standard logsTraffic that bypasses CloudFront, found by comparing origin requests with edge requests. Both logs are off until you configure them, and CloudFront delivers on a best-effort basis
Route 53 public query logsQuery floods and random subdomain names per hosted zone. Needs a query logging configuration and a CloudWatch Logs group in us-east-1. Resolvers answer cached names without asking Route 53
CloudTrail, wafv2.amazonaws.com and shield.amazonaws.comProtection removed before the flood: UpdateWebACL, DisassociateWebACL, DeleteLoggingConfiguration, DeleteProtection

Contain

#Item
1Open a case in Support Center as a Shield Advanced customer: case type Technical support, service Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), category Inbound to AWS. SRT help needs Business or Enterprise Support
2Grant the SRT access if you have not. The role trusts drt.shield.amazonaws.com and has AWSShieldDRTAccessPolicy: aws shield associate-drt-role --role-arn <role-arn>
3Give the SRT access to your WAF log bucket: aws shield associate-drt-log-bucket --log-bucket <bucket>
4Turn on WAF logging. The destination name must start with aws-waf-logs-: aws wafv2 put-logging-configuration --logging-configuration ResourceArn=<web-acl-arn>,LogDestinationConfigs=<destination-arn>
5Read the web ACL, called a protection pack in the new AWS WAF console, and its LockToken: aws wafv2 get-web-acl --name <acl> --scope REGIONAL --id <id>
6Add a rate-based rule scoped to the attacked path and set to Count. Send every existing rule plus the new one, with the lock token: aws wafv2 update-web-acl --name <acl> --scope REGIONAL --id <id> --default-action Allow={} --visibility-config file://visibility.json --rules file://rules.json --lock-token <token>
7On CloudFront or an ALB under Shield Advanced, turn on automatic mitigation in Count mode: aws shield enable-application-layer-automatic-response --resource-arn <arn> --action Count={}
8Move automatic mitigation to Block once the rules look right: aws shield update-application-layer-automatic-response --resource-arn <arn> --action Block={}
9Close the origin to direct traffic destructive for direct clients. Remove the other internet rules from the ALB security group, and allow inbound only from this managed prefix list: com.amazonaws.global.cloudfront.origin-facing

Eradicate and recover

#Item
1Move each counting rule to Block once WAF logs show legitimate clients stay under the limit
2Add Shield Advanced protection to each public resource. Protection covers only resources you name: aws shield create-protection --name <name> --resource-arn <arn>
3Associate a Route 53 health check with each protected resource for health-based detection, and set up proactive engagement with up to 10 contacts
4Put ALBs and APIs behind CloudFront and serve DNS from Route 53, where Shield Standard gives the widest layer 3 and 4 coverage
5Alarm on DDoSDetected, keep WAF, ALB and CloudFront logging on, and pre-approve the SRT role
6Request cost protection: a billing case with "DDoS Concession" in the subject, the event times and resources, within 15 days after the billing month of the attack
Watch out
  • Shield Standard defends against common network and transport layer attacks. It gives no SRT, no attack metrics and no layer 7 mitigation, so an HTTP flood needs WAF rules you write.
  • update-web-acl replaces the whole web ACL. A rules file that contains only the new rule deletes the others. Changes take seconds to several minutes to reach every edge location.
  • One rate-based rule blocks at most 10,000 addresses, the highest rates first, and limits near the set rate without an exact match.
  • The SRT cannot read logs in a bucket encrypted with SSE-KMS. Cost protection covers only resources that had Shield Advanced before the attack, and CloudFront and ALB also need a rate-based rule in Block mode.

AWS documentation: Shield Standard and Advanced capabilities and protected resources; SRT access, proactive engagement and contacting support; Shield Advanced metrics and cost protection requests; WAF rate-based rules, logging and log fields; CLI reference for wafv2 and shield; ALB access logs; CloudFront logging and origin-facing prefix list; Route 53 query logging. SRT support requirements, cost protection requests, rate-based rule limits and listing rate-limited addresses checked October 2026; other topics checked September 2026.

Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.