PIVTR-D
RScenario

Business email compromise

An attacker uses a mailbox, or a cloned voice or face, to redirect payments or impersonate staff. Stop the money first. Call the bank and pause changed payments in the first hour, then remove the attacker's mail footholds.

First moves
  1. Pause pending payments to recently changed bank details until a call to a number already on file confirms them.Finance/Admin
  2. Call the originating bank and request a recall for each fraudulent payment.Finance/Admin
  3. Export every inbox rule, forwarding setting and OAuth grant as evidence before deleting any of them.Operations
  4. Reset the password and revoke all sessions and refresh tokens in one change.Operations
  5. File the complaint at ic3.gov and log it in T13.Liaison
  6. Export the Entra sign-in logs and the unified audit log for each affected account.Intelligence/Investigations

Then work the page: Scope, Contain, Recover the money, Victim by proxy, Deepfake voice and video.

Business email compromise runs on legitimate credentials and built-in mail features: forwarding rules, OAuth grants, mailbox delegation, legacy protocols, and token reuse. There is usually no malware on a server to isolate, and the most useful evidence lives in the identity and email platforms.

The loss is usually money, so finance and the bank join the response in the first hour. The credentials often came from an infostealer, keylogger, or cookie grabber on the user's own device, so the endpoint is still in scope.

This page adds to the phase playbooks for scope, contain, eradicate and recover.

Chapter 12, p. 259. Chapter 13, p. 309.

What is different

Each of these survives a password reset and needs its own removal. Enumerate them on every affected account.

Chapter 13, pp. 309 to 313.

Attacker footholdWhat it doesMicrosoft 365 check
Inbox rulesForward mail externally, delete replies from fraud targets and security alerts, move messages to folders the user never opensRead ForwardTo, ForwardAsAttachmentTo, RedirectTo, DeleteMessage and MoveToFolder: Get-InboxRule -Mailbox <upn> -IncludeHidden
Mailbox forwardingCopies every message to an outside addressGet-Mailbox <upn> | fl ForwardingAddress,ForwardingSmtpAddress,DeliverToMailboxAndForward
Transport (mail flow) rulesRedirect messages tenant-wide, block security notices, let attacker domains bypass filtering. Needs admin access.Get-TransportRule
OAuth consent grantsRead, send, and manage mail through the API with no passwordGet-MgOauth2PermissionGrant -All for delegated grants, and Get-MgServicePrincipalAppRoleAssignment on each suspect service principal for application permissions. The book's Get-AzureADPSPermissions.ps1 (p. 311) needs the AzureAD PowerShell module, which Microsoft has retired. Flag Mail.ReadWrite, Mail.Send, MailboxSettings.ReadWrite, offline_access granted in the compromise window.
Mailbox delegationFull Access or Send As on other mailboxesGet-MailboxPermission, Get-RecipientPermission
Sessions and refresh tokensKeep the attacker signed in after the resetRevoke at the identity provider

Scope

Chapter 12, p. 259. Chapter 13, pp. 309 to 314.

#ItemOwner
1Export the Entra sign-in logs for each affected account, and check them for impossible travel, new IP addresses, and one IP address used against several accountsIntelligence/Investigations
2Search the unified audit log for inbox rule, mailbox forwarding, delegation and application consent changes in the compromise windowIntelligence/Investigations
3Enumerate every foothold in the table above on every affected account, and review transport rules where the attacker had admin accessOperations
4Pull the messages sent from the compromised account in the window, and list every external recipientIntelligence/Investigations
5Review endpoint detection and response (EDR) data on the user's devices for infostealers, keyloggers and session cookie theftIntelligence/Investigations
6List wire transfers, invoice payments and vendor bank-detail changes in the window with finance and accountingFinance/Admin

Attackers often read mail for weeks and strike at payment runs or quarter end. Set the transaction window from the first attacker sign-in, and move it back if the logs show earlier access.

Contain

Run the identity containment checklist, then add these. Export every rule and grant as evidence before deleting it.

Chapter 12, pp. 251 to 252, 259. Chapter 13, pp. 311 to 313, 345.

#ItemOwner
1Reset the password and revoke all sessions and refresh tokens in one changeOperations
2Export malicious inbox rules, mailbox forwarding and transport rules, then remove themOperations
3Check OAuth grants and delegated mailbox permissions against the authorized application inventory, and revoke the unauthorized onesOperations
4Block the attacker's locations, noncompliant devices and legacy authentication with conditional accessOperations
5Add a mail flow rule that quarantines outbound mail from the compromised account while the investigation runsOperations
6Block lookalike domains of the organization and its suppliers at the mail gatewayOperations

Recover the money

Recovery rates drop sharply after the first 72 hours as attackers move funds through layered transfers. A formal request to freeze or reverse a wire often needs legal authority the organization does not have, so bring in the bank and law enforcement promptly. Start this in parallel with containment.

Chapter 13, p. 315.

#ItemOwner
1Call the originating bank and request a recall for each fraudulent payment, with amount, date, receiving bank and account numberFinance/Admin
2File a complaint with the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center at ic3.gov, with the receiving account details, and log it in T13Liaison
3Pause pending payments to recently changed bank details until a call to a number already on file confirms themFinance/Admin
4Tell every counterparty that received a fraudulent invoice or payment-change message from the compromised account, by phone and then in writingLiaison
5Assess the data the attacker could read in the mailbox against notification deadlinesLegal advisor
6Notify the cyber insurer within the policy's reporting periodFinance/Admin

Victim by proxy

In a common variant the supplier's mailbox is compromised. The attacker joins a real payment thread, the organization pays a fraudulent account, and nobody notices until the supplier chases the unpaid invoice.

The organization's own logs show no compromise. Work with the message, the accounts payable records, and what the supplier shares.

Chapter 13, pp. 314 to 315.

CheckWhat points to fraud
Headers and sending domainLookalike domain substitution, or a Reply-To that differs from the From address
WHOIS registration dateLookalike domain registered days or weeks before the first suspicious message. Check for a lookalike of your own domain too.
Information flowThe sender only replays details you already sent, and adds no new invoice numbers or confirmations

If the messages came from the supplier's real mail server, they pass SPF and DKIM and match legitimate mail. That consistency is evidence the compromise sits on the supplier's side. Put it in writing to the supplier's security team, and start the bank recall without waiting for them to agree.

Deepfake voice and video

The payment request can arrive on a call or a video meeting with a cloned voice or face. In mid-January 2024 an employee in Arup's Hong Kong office received a message that appeared to come from the company's UK-based chief financial officer (CFO). On a video conference with digital recreations of the CFO and other colleagues, he was told to make 15 transfers totaling HK$200 million (about US$25.6 million) to five bank accounts.

The fraud came to light when he checked with head office. A Hong Kong police senior superintendent said he believed the fraudster had downloaded videos in advance and used AI to add fake voices. In May 2024 Arup confirmed that fake voices and images were used and that none of its internal systems were compromised.

FBI public service announcements describe the same methods. The February 2022 announcement covers a still picture of the CEO with no audio or deepfake audio on a virtual meeting platform. The December 2024 announcement covers real-time video chats with purported company executives.

The May 2025 announcement covers AI-generated voice messages claiming to come from senior US officials. The FBI advises hanging up and calling back a number you look up yourself. The December 19, 2025 announcement reports the same campaign continuing, with AI voice cloning.

The July 20, 2026 announcement warns of scammers posing as IC3 who promise to recover lost money. IC3 never charges a fee to recover funds. Type www.ic3.gov into the browser to file.

This section is an addition to the book. Sources checked October 2026: South China Morning Post and Global News on the Hong Kong police briefing; Arup's statement as reported by Dezeen; FBI IC3 announcements I-021622-PSA, I-120324-PSA, I-051525-PSA, I-121925-PSA and I-072026-PSA. Sources checked September 2026: The Register.

Mail and identity logs may show nothing when the request came by voice or video. Treat a familiar voice or face as unverified until the callback confirms it. If the meeting invitation or a follow-up email came from an internal mailbox, run the scope checklist above as well.

#ItemOwner
1Pause the payment, and confirm the request by calling the number in the vendor master file or HR record. Never use a number, link or meeting invitation from the request.Finance/Admin
2Require a second person to approve payments and bank-detail changes, or a code word agreed in advance and kept out of email and chatFinance/Admin
3Preserve the meeting recording, voicemail audio and chat messages, with the device they arrived onIntelligence/Investigations
4Export the meeting platform records: invitation, organizer account, and each participant's display name, join time and guest or external statusIntelligence/Investigations
5Pull call logs from the phone system and mobile accounts for the calling numbers and timesIntelligence/Investigations
6Write down the employee's account the same day: who appeared, what they asked, and which numbers and accounts they gaveIntelligence/Investigations
7Start the bank recall and IC3 complaint at once, as in Recover the moneyFinance/Admin
8Tell the impersonated executives, and warn finance staff with T12 Internal notice to staffLiaison
Watch out
  • A password reset leaves OAuth grants, delegation, forwarding rules, and refresh tokens working. The attacker keeps reading mail until each one is removed.
  • Treating BEC as cloud-only leaves the infostealer on the user's laptop, and the attacker signs back in with the next password.
  • Deleting a rule before exporting it destroys the record of what the attacker forwarded and to whom.
  • Every hour spent waiting on the supplier or on internal approvals comes out of the 72-hour recovery window.
Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.