Business email compromise
An attacker uses a mailbox, or a cloned voice or face, to redirect payments or impersonate staff. Stop the money first. Call the bank and pause changed payments in the first hour, then remove the attacker's mail footholds.
- Pause pending payments to recently changed bank details until a call to a number already on file confirms them.Finance/Admin
- Call the originating bank and request a recall for each fraudulent payment.Finance/Admin
- Export every inbox rule, forwarding setting and OAuth grant as evidence before deleting any of them.Operations
- Reset the password and revoke all sessions and refresh tokens in one change.Operations
- File the complaint at ic3.gov and log it in T13.Liaison
- Export the Entra sign-in logs and the unified audit log for each affected account.Intelligence/Investigations
Then work the page: Scope, Contain, Recover the money, Victim by proxy, Deepfake voice and video.
Business email compromise runs on legitimate credentials and built-in mail features: forwarding rules, OAuth grants, mailbox delegation, legacy protocols, and token reuse. There is usually no malware on a server to isolate, and the most useful evidence lives in the identity and email platforms.
The loss is usually money, so finance and the bank join the response in the first hour. The credentials often came from an infostealer, keylogger, or cookie grabber on the user's own device, so the endpoint is still in scope.
This page adds to the phase playbooks for scope, contain, eradicate and recover.
Chapter 12, p. 259. Chapter 13, p. 309.
What is different
Each of these survives a password reset and needs its own removal. Enumerate them on every affected account.
Chapter 13, pp. 309 to 313.
| Attacker foothold | What it does | Microsoft 365 check |
|---|---|---|
| Inbox rules | Forward mail externally, delete replies from fraud targets and security alerts, move messages to folders the user never opens | Read ForwardTo, ForwardAsAttachmentTo, RedirectTo, DeleteMessage and MoveToFolder: Get-InboxRule -Mailbox <upn> -IncludeHidden |
| Mailbox forwarding | Copies every message to an outside address | Get-Mailbox <upn> | fl ForwardingAddress,ForwardingSmtpAddress,DeliverToMailboxAndForward |
| Transport (mail flow) rules | Redirect messages tenant-wide, block security notices, let attacker domains bypass filtering. Needs admin access. | Get-TransportRule |
| OAuth consent grants | Read, send, and manage mail through the API with no password | Get-MgOauth2PermissionGrant -All for delegated grants, and Get-MgServicePrincipalAppRoleAssignment on each suspect service principal for application permissions. The book's Get-AzureADPSPermissions.ps1 (p. 311) needs the AzureAD PowerShell module, which Microsoft has retired. Flag Mail.ReadWrite, Mail.Send, MailboxSettings.ReadWrite, offline_access granted in the compromise window. |
| Mailbox delegation | Full Access or Send As on other mailboxes | Get-MailboxPermission, Get-RecipientPermission |
| Sessions and refresh tokens | Keep the attacker signed in after the reset | Revoke at the identity provider |
Scope
Chapter 12, p. 259. Chapter 13, pp. 309 to 314.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Export the Entra sign-in logs for each affected account, and check them for impossible travel, new IP addresses, and one IP address used against several accounts | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 2 | Search the unified audit log for inbox rule, mailbox forwarding, delegation and application consent changes in the compromise window | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 3 | Enumerate every foothold in the table above on every affected account, and review transport rules where the attacker had admin access | Operations |
| 4 | Pull the messages sent from the compromised account in the window, and list every external recipient | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 5 | Review endpoint detection and response (EDR) data on the user's devices for infostealers, keyloggers and session cookie theft | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 6 | List wire transfers, invoice payments and vendor bank-detail changes in the window with finance and accounting | Finance/Admin |
Attackers often read mail for weeks and strike at payment runs or quarter end. Set the transaction window from the first attacker sign-in, and move it back if the logs show earlier access.
Contain
Run the identity containment checklist, then add these. Export every rule and grant as evidence before deleting it.
Chapter 12, pp. 251 to 252, 259. Chapter 13, pp. 311 to 313, 345.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Reset the password and revoke all sessions and refresh tokens in one change | Operations |
| 2 | Export malicious inbox rules, mailbox forwarding and transport rules, then remove them | Operations |
| 3 | Check OAuth grants and delegated mailbox permissions against the authorized application inventory, and revoke the unauthorized ones | Operations |
| 4 | Block the attacker's locations, noncompliant devices and legacy authentication with conditional access | Operations |
| 5 | Add a mail flow rule that quarantines outbound mail from the compromised account while the investigation runs | Operations |
| 6 | Block lookalike domains of the organization and its suppliers at the mail gateway | Operations |
Recover the money
Recovery rates drop sharply after the first 72 hours as attackers move funds through layered transfers. A formal request to freeze or reverse a wire often needs legal authority the organization does not have, so bring in the bank and law enforcement promptly. Start this in parallel with containment.
Chapter 13, p. 315.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Call the originating bank and request a recall for each fraudulent payment, with amount, date, receiving bank and account number | Finance/Admin |
| 2 | File a complaint with the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center at ic3.gov, with the receiving account details, and log it in T13 | Liaison |
| 3 | Pause pending payments to recently changed bank details until a call to a number already on file confirms them | Finance/Admin |
| 4 | Tell every counterparty that received a fraudulent invoice or payment-change message from the compromised account, by phone and then in writing | Liaison |
| 5 | Assess the data the attacker could read in the mailbox against notification deadlines | Legal advisor |
| 6 | Notify the cyber insurer within the policy's reporting period | Finance/Admin |
Victim by proxy
In a common variant the supplier's mailbox is compromised. The attacker joins a real payment thread, the organization pays a fraudulent account, and nobody notices until the supplier chases the unpaid invoice.
The organization's own logs show no compromise. Work with the message, the accounts payable records, and what the supplier shares.
Chapter 13, pp. 314 to 315.
| Check | What points to fraud |
|---|---|
| Headers and sending domain | Lookalike domain substitution, or a Reply-To that differs from the From address |
| WHOIS registration date | Lookalike domain registered days or weeks before the first suspicious message. Check for a lookalike of your own domain too. |
| Information flow | The sender only replays details you already sent, and adds no new invoice numbers or confirmations |
If the messages came from the supplier's real mail server, they pass SPF and DKIM and match legitimate mail. That consistency is evidence the compromise sits on the supplier's side. Put it in writing to the supplier's security team, and start the bank recall without waiting for them to agree.
Deepfake voice and video
The payment request can arrive on a call or a video meeting with a cloned voice or face. In mid-January 2024 an employee in Arup's Hong Kong office received a message that appeared to come from the company's UK-based chief financial officer (CFO). On a video conference with digital recreations of the CFO and other colleagues, he was told to make 15 transfers totaling HK$200 million (about US$25.6 million) to five bank accounts.
The fraud came to light when he checked with head office. A Hong Kong police senior superintendent said he believed the fraudster had downloaded videos in advance and used AI to add fake voices. In May 2024 Arup confirmed that fake voices and images were used and that none of its internal systems were compromised.
FBI public service announcements describe the same methods. The February 2022 announcement covers a still picture of the CEO with no audio or deepfake audio on a virtual meeting platform. The December 2024 announcement covers real-time video chats with purported company executives.
The May 2025 announcement covers AI-generated voice messages claiming to come from senior US officials. The FBI advises hanging up and calling back a number you look up yourself. The December 19, 2025 announcement reports the same campaign continuing, with AI voice cloning.
The July 20, 2026 announcement warns of scammers posing as IC3 who promise to recover lost money. IC3 never charges a fee to recover funds. Type www.ic3.gov into the browser to file.
This section is an addition to the book. Sources checked October 2026: South China Morning Post and Global News on the Hong Kong police briefing; Arup's statement as reported by Dezeen; FBI IC3 announcements I-021622-PSA, I-120324-PSA, I-051525-PSA, I-121925-PSA and I-072026-PSA. Sources checked September 2026: The Register.
Mail and identity logs may show nothing when the request came by voice or video. Treat a familiar voice or face as unverified until the callback confirms it. If the meeting invitation or a follow-up email came from an internal mailbox, run the scope checklist above as well.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Pause the payment, and confirm the request by calling the number in the vendor master file or HR record. Never use a number, link or meeting invitation from the request. | Finance/Admin |
| 2 | Require a second person to approve payments and bank-detail changes, or a code word agreed in advance and kept out of email and chat | Finance/Admin |
| 3 | Preserve the meeting recording, voicemail audio and chat messages, with the device they arrived on | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 4 | Export the meeting platform records: invitation, organizer account, and each participant's display name, join time and guest or external status | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 5 | Pull call logs from the phone system and mobile accounts for the calling numbers and times | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 6 | Write down the employee's account the same day: who appeared, what they asked, and which numbers and accounts they gave | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 7 | Start the bank recall and IC3 complaint at once, as in Recover the money | Finance/Admin |
| 8 | Tell the impersonated executives, and warn finance staff with T12 Internal notice to staff | Liaison |
- A password reset leaves OAuth grants, delegation, forwarding rules, and refresh tokens working. The attacker keeps reading mail until each one is removed.
- Treating BEC as cloud-only leaves the infostealer on the user's laptop, and the attacker signs back in with the next password.
- Deleting a rule before exporting it destroys the record of what the attacker forwarded and to whom.
- Every hour spent waiting on the supplier or on internal approvals comes out of the 72-hour recovery window.