Operational technology
An attacker can reach the industrial control systems, or operational technology (OT), that run a physical process. Protect people and control of the process first. Every response action runs past engineering, and the Safety Officer can halt it.
- Assign a Safety Officer at the first briefing, with authority to halt any response action.Incident Commander
- Review the current process state with the control room: stable, degraded or unsafe.Operations
- Confirm safety instrumented systems and emergency shutdown are available.Safety Officer
- Verify the event with engineering: is it real, is it active, can it reach control systems.Intelligence/Investigations
- Turn off automatic isolation and blocking on OT hosts, and route OT alerts to engineering for triage.Operations
- Collect packet capture, engineering workstation logs and project files, and a historian export before any disruption.Intelligence/Investigations
Then work the page: Before touching anything, Scope, Contain, Eradicate, Recover.
In operational technology, response actions move valves, breakers, pumps and drives. The first priority is people and control of the process, with control logic integrity, safety functions and stable operations close behind. Standard IT moves such as isolating a host, blocking traffic or reimaging can do more damage than the attacker.
Every phase below runs with engineering and operations at the table, and the Safety Officer can halt any action that puts people or the process at risk.
Chapter 19, pp. 589 to 590 and 593.
What is different
| IT incident impact potential | OT incident impact potential |
|---|---|
| Business applications unavailable, local to the organization | Critical infrastructure unavailable, possible wide-region disruption or outages |
| Digital data corruption | Loss of control or manipulation of the physical process |
| Digital data loss | Personnel safety, loss of life |
Table 57, pp. 594 to 595.
Most controllers, relays and drives run no endpoint detection and response (EDR) agent and keep little or no log. Evidence lives in controller logic, engineering project files, historian trends, human-machine interface (HMI) command history and industrial network traffic. Many OT attacks use only valid credentials, approved engineering software and native protocols.
| Evidence source | Where to collect | What it shows |
|---|---|---|
| Engineering workstation | Engineering application logs, programmable logic controller (PLC) tools, configuration logs, project files | Logic downloads, configuration and firmware changes |
| PLC | Controller memory, ladder logic, firmware | Unauthorized logic, altered setpoints, modified parameters |
| Industrial network | SPAN or TAP packet capture, protocol-aware monitoring | Lateral movement, write operations, remote engineering sessions |
| HMI | Application logs, operator commands, alarm acknowledgements, setpoint changes | Operator or attacker actions on the process |
| Historian | Time-series data, trends, production metrics | Process anomalies and their timing against cyber activity |
| Remote access | VPN logs, jump hosts, vendor access platforms | Entry points into OT |
| Authentication | OT Active Directory logs, identity providers | Credential use and movement between IT and OT |
Table 59, pp. 603 to 604. Packet capture is a primary source for forensics and early detection, p. 603. Collection steps are on the evidence page.
Before touching anything
Verify with engineering before any restrictive action. Malware on a Windows HMI in a segmented zone may be unable to reach its command-and-control (C2) server, spread, or touch a controller.
In the refinery case in Chapter 19, an IT technician unplugged such an HMI. The malware had caused no process impact, and the disconnect sent operators onto the plant floor in personal protective equipment (PPE) to regain view and manual control.
Unauthorized changes to logic or setpoints make the incident a verified operational incident. Until controller logic is trusted, scope and impact stay uncertain.
Chapter 19, pp. 593 to 594, 601 and 604.
The book does not name Incident Command System positions. The Safety Officer owns the safety checks here because the National Incident Management System (NIMS) gives that seat authority to stop or prevent unsafe acts. Engineering sits under Operations in these checklists.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Assign and announce a Safety Officer at the first briefing, with authority to halt any response action | Incident Commander |
| 2 | Review the current process state with the control room: stable, degraded or unsafe | Operations |
| 3 | Confirm safety instrumented systems and emergency shutdown are available | Safety Officer |
| 4 | Verify the event with engineering: is it real, is it active, can it reach control systems | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 5 | Assess each proposed action for loss of operator view, loss of control and effect on protective functions | Operations |
| 6 | Record engineering and operations sign-off in T3 before any containment or eradication step | Incident Commander |
| 7 | Collect packet capture, engineering workstation logs and project files, and a historian export for the event window before any disruption | Intelligence/Investigations |
Scope
The scoping question is whether activity reached systems that can change control logic, safety functions or engineering workflows. A single engineering workstation may program several lines, so its reach defines the blast radius. Network traffic is often the only reliable source for the control layer.
| Asset | Response consideration |
|---|---|
| HMI (Windows) | Loss of view or manipulation can steer operator decisions; activity may look legitimate |
| Engineering workstation | Compromise enables legitimate-looking logic changes through approved tools |
| Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) server | High-value pivot; evidence in application logs and command history |
| Historian | Shows deviations, operator actions and timing; common IT/OT bridge |
| PLC | Logic integrity and runtime values define operational impact |
| Remote terminal unit (RTU) | Tied to remote access; command sequences reveal misuse |
| Protection relay | Misconfiguration affects protection; vendor tools may be required |
| Variable frequency drive (VFD) | Changes affect process stability and equipment behavior |
| Safety instrumented system (SIS) | Safety-critical; preserve required functions throughout |
Adapted from Table 58, pp. 598 to 599. Scoping techniques pp. 604 to 605. Generic steps on Scope.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Place the affected assets on Purdue levels, and mark any crossing of the Level 3.5 industrial demilitarized zone (DMZ) | Planning |
| 2 | Search firewall logs for compromised hosts connecting into control zones over EtherNet/IP, Modbus or PROFINET | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 3 | Inspect packet captures for write function codes, program downloads and configuration changes sent to controllers | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 4 | List every controller, cell and facility the compromised engineering workstation can program | Operations |
| 5 | Compare critical PLC logic against known-good baseline project files from a trusted workstation | Operations |
| 6 | Review VPN, jump host, vendor platform and OT Active Directory logs for IT-to-OT movement | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 7 | Align historian trends with the attack timeline to find process deviations | Operations |
Contain
Cut the attacker's access path upstream and keep the operator's view. At a hydroelectric plant, responders disconnected the Level 3.5 industrial DMZ. The attacker's remote session to the HMI dropped, and operators kept control through embedded HMI panels while the compromised HMI was investigated.
Island mode, also called manual operations or the OT cyber-safe state, isolates the OT network from corporate IT, the internet and vendor remote access. The process runs under local control for hours, days or weeks depending on the sector, and a controlled safe shutdown remains available. Island mode is safe only if the procedure was planned and exercised before the incident.
pp. 600 and 606. Posture choices on Decide; generic steps on Contain.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Set the containment point at the industrial DMZ or remote access gateway before touching any HMI | Operations |
| 2 | Confirm operator view and control after each containment action | Operations |
| 3 | Decide on island mode with operations and the Safety Officer, using the tested runbook | Incident Commander |
| 4 | Confirm staffing, PPE and radio communications before operators move to local or manual control | Safety Officer |
| 5 | Disable vendor remote access, or route it through a jump host with approval for each session | Operations |
| 6 | Agree the trigger conditions and sequence for a controlled safe shutdown | Safety Officer |
| 7 | For malware that cannot reach the process, sinkhole its C2 and increase monitoring until the next maintenance window | Operations |
Eradicate
Remove the attacker while plant operations stay stable. Some assets cannot be patched, rebooted or replaced during the incident. Leaving one monitored and contained until a maintenance window is often safer than forcing a disruption.
pp. 591, 606 to 607. Generic steps on Eradicate.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Time credential resets on engineering workstations, jump hosts, historians and OT domain services around historian collection and HMI functions | Operations |
| 2 | Replace modified controller logic with the validated baseline | Operations |
| 3 | Remove unauthorized engineering software access | Operations |
| 4 | Close retained remote access pathways and vendor accounts | Operations |
| 5 | Reduce trust relationships between IT and OT zones | Planning |
| 6 | Review each step that touches SIS or protection relays before execution | Safety Officer |
| 7 | Schedule deferred removals for a maintenance window, with monitoring in place until then | Planning |
Recover
Engineering validation sets the recovery timeline. A controller brought online with unverified logic is a greater risk than a delayed, validated restoration.
pp. 607 to 608. Generic steps on Recover.
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Rebuild Windows OT systems from trusted media or images in the OT backup repository | Operations |
| 2 | Reinstall vendor engineering software, restore project files, and reactivate licenses | Operations |
| 3 | Validate USB license dongles, communication adapters and programming cables | Logistics |
| 4 | Reload controller logic from the validated repository, and confirm firmware versions, checksums and I/O mappings | Operations |
| 5 | Verify communications between controllers, HMIs and the historian | Operations |
| 6 | Complete a plant walkthrough: pumps, valves, drives, sensors, pressure boundaries and emergency shutdown systems ready for restart | Safety Officer |
| 7 | Follow the documented startup sequence under engineering supervision | Operations |
| 8 | Validate firmware and proprietary logic with the vendor or system integrator where needed | Liaison |
- An EDR alert cannot see process state, controller logic or operational dependencies. Turn off automatic isolation and blocking on OT hosts, and route OT alerts to engineering for triage (pp. 592 to 593, 601).
- In the book's account of Oldsmar, Florida, in 2021, someone used TeamViewer with a shared password to raise the sodium hydroxide setpoint from 100 to 11,100 ppm, with no malware involved (pp. 602 to 603). In March 2023 the former city manager called it a nonevent caused by employee error, and no official findings were released. Either way, hunt for misuse of valid credentials and approved tools.
- Moving to island mode under pressure without a tested procedure adds its own operational risk (p. 606).
The former city manager's 2023 remark on Oldsmar is an addition to the book, from the Tampa Bay Times (April 11, 2023), checked October 2026.