PIVTR-D
RScenario

Operational technology

An attacker can reach the industrial control systems, or operational technology (OT), that run a physical process. Protect people and control of the process first. Every response action runs past engineering, and the Safety Officer can halt it.

First moves
  1. Assign a Safety Officer at the first briefing, with authority to halt any response action.Incident Commander
  2. Review the current process state with the control room: stable, degraded or unsafe.Operations
  3. Confirm safety instrumented systems and emergency shutdown are available.Safety Officer
  4. Verify the event with engineering: is it real, is it active, can it reach control systems.Intelligence/Investigations
  5. Turn off automatic isolation and blocking on OT hosts, and route OT alerts to engineering for triage.Operations
  6. Collect packet capture, engineering workstation logs and project files, and a historian export before any disruption.Intelligence/Investigations

Then work the page: Before touching anything, Scope, Contain, Eradicate, Recover.

In operational technology, response actions move valves, breakers, pumps and drives. The first priority is people and control of the process, with control logic integrity, safety functions and stable operations close behind. Standard IT moves such as isolating a host, blocking traffic or reimaging can do more damage than the attacker.

Every phase below runs with engineering and operations at the table, and the Safety Officer can halt any action that puts people or the process at risk.

Chapter 19, pp. 589 to 590 and 593.

What is different

IT incident impact potentialOT incident impact potential
Business applications unavailable, local to the organizationCritical infrastructure unavailable, possible wide-region disruption or outages
Digital data corruptionLoss of control or manipulation of the physical process
Digital data lossPersonnel safety, loss of life

Table 57, pp. 594 to 595.

Most controllers, relays and drives run no endpoint detection and response (EDR) agent and keep little or no log. Evidence lives in controller logic, engineering project files, historian trends, human-machine interface (HMI) command history and industrial network traffic. Many OT attacks use only valid credentials, approved engineering software and native protocols.

Evidence sourceWhere to collectWhat it shows
Engineering workstationEngineering application logs, programmable logic controller (PLC) tools, configuration logs, project filesLogic downloads, configuration and firmware changes
PLCController memory, ladder logic, firmwareUnauthorized logic, altered setpoints, modified parameters
Industrial networkSPAN or TAP packet capture, protocol-aware monitoringLateral movement, write operations, remote engineering sessions
HMIApplication logs, operator commands, alarm acknowledgements, setpoint changesOperator or attacker actions on the process
HistorianTime-series data, trends, production metricsProcess anomalies and their timing against cyber activity
Remote accessVPN logs, jump hosts, vendor access platformsEntry points into OT
AuthenticationOT Active Directory logs, identity providersCredential use and movement between IT and OT

Table 59, pp. 603 to 604. Packet capture is a primary source for forensics and early detection, p. 603. Collection steps are on the evidence page.

Before touching anything

Verify with engineering before any restrictive action. Malware on a Windows HMI in a segmented zone may be unable to reach its command-and-control (C2) server, spread, or touch a controller.

In the refinery case in Chapter 19, an IT technician unplugged such an HMI. The malware had caused no process impact, and the disconnect sent operators onto the plant floor in personal protective equipment (PPE) to regain view and manual control.

Unauthorized changes to logic or setpoints make the incident a verified operational incident. Until controller logic is trusted, scope and impact stay uncertain.

Chapter 19, pp. 593 to 594, 601 and 604.

The book does not name Incident Command System positions. The Safety Officer owns the safety checks here because the National Incident Management System (NIMS) gives that seat authority to stop or prevent unsafe acts. Engineering sits under Operations in these checklists.

#ItemOwner
1Assign and announce a Safety Officer at the first briefing, with authority to halt any response actionIncident Commander
2Review the current process state with the control room: stable, degraded or unsafeOperations
3Confirm safety instrumented systems and emergency shutdown are availableSafety Officer
4Verify the event with engineering: is it real, is it active, can it reach control systemsIntelligence/Investigations
5Assess each proposed action for loss of operator view, loss of control and effect on protective functionsOperations
6Record engineering and operations sign-off in T3 before any containment or eradication stepIncident Commander
7Collect packet capture, engineering workstation logs and project files, and a historian export for the event window before any disruptionIntelligence/Investigations

Scope

The scoping question is whether activity reached systems that can change control logic, safety functions or engineering workflows. A single engineering workstation may program several lines, so its reach defines the blast radius. Network traffic is often the only reliable source for the control layer.

AssetResponse consideration
HMI (Windows)Loss of view or manipulation can steer operator decisions; activity may look legitimate
Engineering workstationCompromise enables legitimate-looking logic changes through approved tools
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) serverHigh-value pivot; evidence in application logs and command history
HistorianShows deviations, operator actions and timing; common IT/OT bridge
PLCLogic integrity and runtime values define operational impact
Remote terminal unit (RTU)Tied to remote access; command sequences reveal misuse
Protection relayMisconfiguration affects protection; vendor tools may be required
Variable frequency drive (VFD)Changes affect process stability and equipment behavior
Safety instrumented system (SIS)Safety-critical; preserve required functions throughout

Adapted from Table 58, pp. 598 to 599. Scoping techniques pp. 604 to 605. Generic steps on Scope.

#ItemOwner
1Place the affected assets on Purdue levels, and mark any crossing of the Level 3.5 industrial demilitarized zone (DMZ)Planning
2Search firewall logs for compromised hosts connecting into control zones over EtherNet/IP, Modbus or PROFINETIntelligence/Investigations
3Inspect packet captures for write function codes, program downloads and configuration changes sent to controllersIntelligence/Investigations
4List every controller, cell and facility the compromised engineering workstation can programOperations
5Compare critical PLC logic against known-good baseline project files from a trusted workstationOperations
6Review VPN, jump host, vendor platform and OT Active Directory logs for IT-to-OT movementIntelligence/Investigations
7Align historian trends with the attack timeline to find process deviationsOperations

Contain

Cut the attacker's access path upstream and keep the operator's view. At a hydroelectric plant, responders disconnected the Level 3.5 industrial DMZ. The attacker's remote session to the HMI dropped, and operators kept control through embedded HMI panels while the compromised HMI was investigated.

Island mode, also called manual operations or the OT cyber-safe state, isolates the OT network from corporate IT, the internet and vendor remote access. The process runs under local control for hours, days or weeks depending on the sector, and a controlled safe shutdown remains available. Island mode is safe only if the procedure was planned and exercised before the incident.

pp. 600 and 606. Posture choices on Decide; generic steps on Contain.

#ItemOwner
1Set the containment point at the industrial DMZ or remote access gateway before touching any HMIOperations
2Confirm operator view and control after each containment actionOperations
3Decide on island mode with operations and the Safety Officer, using the tested runbookIncident Commander
4Confirm staffing, PPE and radio communications before operators move to local or manual controlSafety Officer
5Disable vendor remote access, or route it through a jump host with approval for each sessionOperations
6Agree the trigger conditions and sequence for a controlled safe shutdownSafety Officer
7For malware that cannot reach the process, sinkhole its C2 and increase monitoring until the next maintenance windowOperations

Eradicate

Remove the attacker while plant operations stay stable. Some assets cannot be patched, rebooted or replaced during the incident. Leaving one monitored and contained until a maintenance window is often safer than forcing a disruption.

pp. 591, 606 to 607. Generic steps on Eradicate.

#ItemOwner
1Time credential resets on engineering workstations, jump hosts, historians and OT domain services around historian collection and HMI functionsOperations
2Replace modified controller logic with the validated baselineOperations
3Remove unauthorized engineering software accessOperations
4Close retained remote access pathways and vendor accountsOperations
5Reduce trust relationships between IT and OT zonesPlanning
6Review each step that touches SIS or protection relays before executionSafety Officer
7Schedule deferred removals for a maintenance window, with monitoring in place until thenPlanning

Recover

Engineering validation sets the recovery timeline. A controller brought online with unverified logic is a greater risk than a delayed, validated restoration.

pp. 607 to 608. Generic steps on Recover.

#ItemOwner
1Rebuild Windows OT systems from trusted media or images in the OT backup repositoryOperations
2Reinstall vendor engineering software, restore project files, and reactivate licensesOperations
3Validate USB license dongles, communication adapters and programming cablesLogistics
4Reload controller logic from the validated repository, and confirm firmware versions, checksums and I/O mappingsOperations
5Verify communications between controllers, HMIs and the historianOperations
6Complete a plant walkthrough: pumps, valves, drives, sensors, pressure boundaries and emergency shutdown systems ready for restartSafety Officer
7Follow the documented startup sequence under engineering supervisionOperations
8Validate firmware and proprietary logic with the vendor or system integrator where neededLiaison
Watch out
  • An EDR alert cannot see process state, controller logic or operational dependencies. Turn off automatic isolation and blocking on OT hosts, and route OT alerts to engineering for triage (pp. 592 to 593, 601).
  • In the book's account of Oldsmar, Florida, in 2021, someone used TeamViewer with a shared password to raise the sodium hydroxide setpoint from 100 to 11,100 ppm, with no malware involved (pp. 602 to 603). In March 2023 the former city manager called it a nonevent caused by employee error, and no official findings were released. Either way, hunt for misuse of valid credentials and approved tools.
  • Moving to island mode under pressure without a tested procedure adds its own operational risk (p. 606).

The former city manager's 2023 remark on Oldsmar is an addition to the book, from the Tampa Bay Times (April 11, 2023), checked October 2026.

Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.