PIVTR-D
RScenario

Customer account takeover

Attackers sign in to your customers' accounts on your own product at scale, with reused passwords, relayed one-time codes, swapped SIM cards, stolen session cookies or abused account recovery. Stop money leaving and contact details changing first, then cut the attack traffic without locking out real customers.

First moves
  1. Freeze payouts, stored value transfers and new payout destinations on accounts that signed in from attack sources.Finance/Admin
  2. Put a rate limit and a bot challenge on the login, password reset and one-time code endpoints.Operations
  3. Export authentication, WAF and bot manager logs for the window into the evidence register.Intelligence/Investigations
  4. List accounts with a successful login from attack sources followed by a change to email, phone, password, MFA or payment details.Intelligence/Investigations
  5. Revoke sessions and refresh tokens and force a password reset on each confirmed takeover.Operations
  6. Give support agents a script and route takeover reports to one queue.Public Information Officer

Then work the page: Scope, Contain and eradicate, Fraud and chargebacks, Recover, Coordinate and report.

Credential stuffing (OWASP OAT-008) tests username and password pairs stolen from other sites. Credential cracking (OAT-007) guesses by brute force or word list, and password spraying tries a few common passwords across many accounts.

The evidence sits in your product's logs, your edge and bot defenses, your fraud records and your support desk. Customers lose money, loyalty points and personal data.

The UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) found that credential stuffing against 23andMe began in April 2023. 23andMe found about 14,601 successful and 273,465 failed attacker logins between May 1 and September 18, 2023. The ICO fined the company £2.31 million on June 17, 2025.

This page adds to the phase playbooks for scope, contain, eradicate and recover. Workforce accounts are in the identity scenario. Floods that take the login page down are in the DDoS scenario, and data under contract or residency terms is in restricted data.

This scenario is an addition to the book. Sources checked November 2026: NIST SP 800-63B-4 (published July 31, 2025), sections 3.1.1.2, 3.1.3.3, 3.2.2, 4.2.3 and 4.6, in the web edition; OWASP OAT-008, OAT-007 and the Credential Stuffing Prevention Cheat Sheet; New York Attorney General, Business guide for credential-stuffing attacks; ICO announcement and penalty notice on 23andMe; FBI I-112525-PSA; AWS WAF ATP rule group, Cognito threat protection and admin-user-global-sign-out; Auth0 delete sessions and delete refresh tokens; Cloudflare leaked credentials detection; Pwned Passwords API; 16 CFR 314.2 and 314.4(j); 12 CFR 1005.11; California Civil Code 1798.82 as reproduced by public.law.

What is different

RouteSigns in your logsWhat the response has to cover
Credential stuffingOne or two attempts per account across many accounts, a high failure rate, and many addresses sharing one user agent or TLS fingerprintBot defense, leaked credential checks, and resets for every account whose credentials tested valid
Password sprayingA few common passwords tried across many accounts, paced to stay under per-account lockoutBlocklist of common passwords, and counting failures per password as well as per account
Phishing kit that relays MFALogins with a valid password and one-time code from a new device. The FBI reports criminals buying search ads to rank fake login pages.Takedown of the phishing site, session revocation, and phishing-resistant authenticators
SIM swapSMS codes or SMS recovery used from a new device while the customer reports that the phone lost serviceRemoving SMS as the only recovery route, and step-up checks on factor changes
Session token theftActivity on a session with no matching login, from a new address or device. Infostealers on the customer's computer take browser cookies.Revoking sessions and refresh tokens. A password reset alone leaves the stolen session working.
Account recovery abuseA change of email or phone followed by a password reset, or a reset an agent made on a support callFreezing contact detail changes, notice to the old address, and a written check for agents

Scope

Generic steps are on Scope. Compare each measure with the same hours on the same weekday before the attack.

Tell an attack from normal failed logins

MeasureWhat points to an attack
Login failure rateA sharp rise over baseline. In the 23andMe logins above, about 95% of attempts failed.
Distinct accounts per sourceOne address or fingerprint trying many accounts, or, with proxy rotation, many addresses with one or two accounts each
Failures for unknown usernamesA rising share, because the lists come from other sites
ASN and address typeHosting providers, or residential and mobile addresses in networks where you have few customers. OWASP notes that proxy networks defeat address blocklists.
User agents and fingerprintsOne user agent or JA3 or JA4 fingerprint across thousands of addresses, and outdated browser versions
Changes after loginA successful login followed within minutes by a change to email, phone, MFA, shipping address or payout details
Leaked credential matchesA rising share of attempts carrying credentials found in breach data
LogSearch for
Authentication logs of the product or customer identity serviceSuccess and failure per account with source address, ASN, user agent and device ID. Amazon Cognito threat protection exports user authentication events with risk ratings to S3, CloudWatch Logs or Data Firehose.
WAF and bot manager logsRequests to login, reset and one-time code endpoints. AWS WAF ATP label awswaf:managed:aws:atp:signal:credential_compromised. Cloudflare field cf.waf.credential_check.username_and_password_leaked
Password reset and recovery eventsResets requested and completed, where the reset link or code went, and whether the customer or an agent started it
MFA and factor eventsFactors added or removed, phone numbers changed, and codes sent to numbers new to the account
Profile changesEmail, phone and shipping address changes
Payment and payout recordsNew cards, bank accounts and payout destinations, gift card redemptions, loyalty point and stored value transfers
Session and token recordsSessions and refresh tokens issued per account, and sessions used from addresses with no login
#ItemOwner
1Set the window from the first rise in the failure rate, earlier if older logins match the attack sourcesPlanning
2Export authentication, WAF, bot manager and support logs before retention expiresIntelligence/Investigations
3List the attack sources: addresses, ASNs, fingerprints and user agentsIntelligence/Investigations
4Mark an account as a confirmed takeover where a login from an attack source led to a change, a purchase or a customer reportIntelligence/Investigations
5List accounts where the attacker's login succeeded with no later change, because those credentials are known to workIntelligence/Investigations
6Match every recovery and factor change an agent made in the window to a verified customer requestIntelligence/Investigations
7List the personal data each taken-over account shows, such as address, order history and stored payment detailsIntelligence/Investigations
8If logins carried valid one-time codes, search for lookalike domains and search ads that copy your login pageIntelligence/Investigations

Contain and eradicate

Generic steps are on Contain and Eradicate. Record each decision in T3. Blocking a proxy network locks out real customers on it, so challenge first. AWS WAF logging and rate-based rules are in AWS DDoS or application-layer attack.

#ItemOwner
1Rate limit the login, password reset and one-time code endpoints per address, per account and per device fingerprintOperations
2Challenge login requests from attack ASNs, fingerprints and address types with the bot managerOperations
3Turn on leaked credential checks and challenge matches: AWS WAF AWSManagedRulesATPRuleSet (extra fees, no Cognito user pools), Cloudflare leaked credentials detection, or Cognito compromised credentials detection on the Plus planOperations
4If the product runs on Cognito, revoke each confirmed takeover's tokens, then send the browser to the logout endpoint to clear the managed login cookie: aws cognito-idp admin-user-global-sign-out --user-pool-id <pool-id> --username <user>Operations
5If the product runs on Auth0, delete the user's sessions and refresh tokens with the Management API: DELETE /api/v2/users/{user_id}/sessions and DELETE /api/v2/users/{user_id}/refresh-tokensOperations
6Force a password change on every confirmed takeover and every account whose credentials worked for the attacker. SP 800-63B-4 section 3.1.1.2 requires a forced change on evidence of compromise.Operations
7Remove the factors, phone numbers, email addresses and payout destinations the attacker addedOperations
8Freeze changes to email, phone and payout destinations on affected accounts until the owner passes verificationFinance/Admin
9Require step-up authentication before changes to contact details, factors, payment methods and payoutsOperations
10Send a notice to every email address and phone on file for each password, factor, contact detail or recovery change. SP 800-63B-4 requires notice of account recovery (section 4.2.3), sent to all notification addresses except postal ones (section 4.6).Operations
11Report phishing sites and ads that copy your login page to the registrar, the hosting provider and the ad network for takedownLiaison

Fraud and chargebacks

#ItemOwner
12List unauthorized orders, transfers, redemptions and payouts from taken-over accounts, with amounts and destinationsFinance/Admin
13Cancel unshipped orders to addresses the attacker added, and void unredeemed gift cards bought with taken-over accountsFinance/Admin
14Refund or restore customer losses under a written policyFinance/Admin
15Tell the payment processor, and match incoming chargebacks to the list of taken-over accountsFinance/Admin
16If money went to outside bank accounts, ask the sending bank for a recall at once, as in Recover the moneyFinance/Admin

Recover

Run the pre-restoration verification into T7, then add these.

#ItemOwner
1Check every new and changed password against a blocklist that includes breached passwords, and tell the customer the reason for a rejection, per SP 800-63B-4 section 3.1.1.2. The Pwned Passwords range API takes a SHA-1 hash prefix and needs no key: curl -H "Add-Padding: true" https://api.pwnedpasswords.com/range/<first-5-hash-chars>Operations
2Offer passkeys or other phishing-resistant authenticators. If SMS codes stay, offer every customer another authenticator type, because section 3.1.3.3 restricts SMS and voice.Operations
3Cap consecutive failed attempts on one authenticator at 100 or fewer per account, as section 3.2.2 requires, and add bot challenges, growing delays or risk-based checksOperations
4Move challenge rules to block once logs and support tickets show real customers pass. For Cognito, AWS recommends two weeks or more in audit-only mode before full-function mode.Operations
5Lift each freeze after the owner passes verificationFinance/Admin
6Alert on failure rate over baseline, accounts per source and changes soon after a new-device loginIntelligence/Investigations

Coordinate and report

Customer notice and support scripts

#ItemOwner
1Write the agent script: never ask for a password or one-time code, reset through the product's own flow, and explain freezes and refundsPublic Information Officer
2Verify callers who report a takeover against details from before the attack window, because the attacker may have changed the email and phoneOperations
3Send notices to confirmed takeovers with T16, to contact details on file before the attack, and tell customers to change any reused password elsewherePublic Information Officer

Notification, law enforcement and insurer

A taken-over account exposes what the account shows. Weigh that data against the notification deadlines, and use the restricted data scenario where a contract or residency commitment covers it.

#ItemOwner
4Assess state breach laws. California Civil Code 1798.82(h)(2) counts a username or email with a password or security answer as personal information, and (j)(4) allows electronic notice telling the customer to change it. Confirm against leginfo.legislature.ca.gov.Legal advisor
5If the organization is a financial institution under the FTC Safeguards Rule, notify the FTC within 30 days of discovering unauthorized acquisition of unencrypted customer information of 500 or more consumers (16 CFR 314.4(j))Legal advisor
6If customers' bank or wallet accounts at your institution lost money, apply Regulation E error resolution: decide within 10 business days, or credit provisionally and take up to 45 days (12 CFR 1005.11). See financial institution.Legal advisor
7File at ic3.gov with attack sources, phishing domains and receiving accounts, describe it as account takeover, and log it in T13Liaison
8Notify the cyber insurer within the policy's reporting periodFinance/Admin

Seats for this incident type are on the Incident Command by-type page. To rehearse it, run the extortion and account takeover tabletop.

Watch out
  • A password reset leaves stolen sessions and refresh tokens working. Revoke both in the same change.
  • The New York Attorney General's guide warns that low fraud reports do not rule out an attack.
  • In August 2023 a 23andMe ticket about a claimed leak was closed as a likely hoax, although its analysis matched the leaked image to real pages. Treat a sale listing of customer data as real until disproved.
  • An attacker who changes the email first receives every later reset link. Freeze contact changes before forcing resets.
Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.