Verification and triage
Verification establishes that the event is an incident and that it requires a response. Triage ranks it against organizational objectives, so the team works the most important incident first.
Verify before engaging the wider team. A declared incident pulls people off other work and slows the systems under investigation, and that cost is worth paying only for real incidents. The lifecycle explains why the two run together.
Verify and triage
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Open the incident record with identifier, title, handler, summary, classification by scenario, and evidence references | Operations |
| 2 | Enrich the indicators with threat intelligence before rating the risk | Intelligence/Investigations |
| 3 | Rate the initial risk on the four-level scale | Incident Commander |
| 4 | Run the verification tests that apply, then record the decision with rationale, name and time | Incident Commander |
| 5 | Deliver the triage brief, naming the single authorization required | Incident Commander |
| 6 | Agree the resource allocation against everything else the team could be doing | Incident Commander |
The introduction, this checklist, the outcomes table, the caution and Figure 58 are adapted from the book. Verification tests, Questions for the reporter, Triage factors, Ranking concurrent incidents and Worked examples are additions to the book.
Verification tests
Run each test that applies before recording continue, stop or defer. When a containment trigger applies, take its approved action first.
| Test | How | Settles |
|---|---|---|
| A second, independent source | Data from another sensor: authentication or flow logs behind an endpoint detection and response (EDR) alert, mail gateway or proxy logs behind a user report. Two rules on the same log are one source. | Whether it happened |
| Planned activity | Change tickets, deployments, the administrator on call, scheduled penetration tests, vendor maintenance. Confirm with the person named, on a number you already have. | Whether someone authorized it |
| The reporter | The questions below, asked while memory is fresh. For a report from outside the organization, the first-call questions in Identification. | What came before and after |
Questions for the reporter
| # | Item | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Ask what they saw, where and when, in their own words, and keep the original message or a screenshot | Operations |
| 2 | Ask what they did next: clicked, typed a password, approved a multifactor authentication (MFA) prompt, opened a file, forwarded it | Operations |
| 3 | Ask whether anyone else received or saw the same thing, and whether it is still happening | Operations |
| 4 | Ask how to reach them over the next day, and whom else they told | Operations |
Decisions and records
| Outcome | Use when | Then |
|---|---|---|
| Continue | Real, and it warrants a response | Escalate, engage the team and decision makers, triage |
| Stop | Not real | Close it and document why, for the next analyst who sees the same thing |
| Defer | Available information cannot settle it | Request more from the reporter or other sources, then decide again by the DEFER REVIEW BY time in T1 |
- Look up what the risk level triggers in Risk levels, and mark each of the four containment triggers yes or no.
- Record the decision, RISK RATIONALE and CONTAINMENT TRIGGERS in T1. Send T2 to the decision makers within the reporting deadline for the level.
- When several verified incidents compete for the same people, rank them by the ranking rule.
- Documentation written after the fact is unreliable, and exact commands and timestamps are the first things to go. Open the record at verification and add to it as the response proceeds.
Triage factors
NIST SP 800-61 Revision 2 (2012) prioritized incidents on three factors: functional impact, information impact and recoverability. Revision 3 (April 2025) superseded it.
Revision 3 asks for a preliminary review that verifies an incident occurred and estimates severity and urgency (RS.MA-02). It then asks for prioritization by scope, likely impact, time-critical nature and resource availability (RS.MA-03). Its six example risk evaluation factors keep functional impact and recoverability, name data impact where Revision 2 had information impact, and add three more. Record the deciding ones in RISK RATIONALE.
| Factor | Establish | Raises the level when |
|---|---|---|
| Asset criticality | Whether it is on the critical asset list | Tier 0 identity, safety or revenue systems are involved |
| Functional impact | Which business functions are degraded | Customers or operations feel it, or it is growing |
| Data impact | Which data was read, changed or taken | Regulated, personal or restricted data is involved |
| Stage of observed activity | How far the attack has progressed | Privilege escalation, lateral movement, exfiltration or impact |
| Threat actor characterization | Commodity malware or a human operator | Hands-on-keyboard activity, or an actor known for extortion or destruction |
| Recoverability | Whether the team can restore it within the recovery time objective | Outside help is needed, or the data is unrecoverable |
Time-critical nature means the containment triggers in T1.
NIST SP 800-61r3, RS.MA-02, RS.MA-03 and the RS.MA considerations; SP 800-61r2, section 3.2.6. Checked October 2026.
Ranking concurrent incidents
When verified incidents compete for the same people, the Incident Commander ranks them by this rule. Record the rank in each T1, report it in the next T2, and re-rank each operational period.
| Rank | Work first |
|---|---|
| 1 | The higher risk level |
| 2 | At the same level, the one with a containment trigger marked yes |
| 3 | The earlier deadline: a regulatory clock, a contract notice term or an extortion countdown |
| 4 | The one still growing |
| 5 | The later stage of activity |
Every incident keeps a named handler. Two at High or Critical get separate Incident Commanders.
Worked examples
T1 entries at the end of verification.
One user clicked a phishing link
The mail gateway shows the message in 40 mailboxes and the proxy shows one click. The user says she typed her password. A sign-in to her account from a hosting provider failed at MFA 12 minutes later.
| T1 field | Entry |
|---|---|
| REPORT SOURCE | user |
| CLASSIFICATION | other: credential phishing |
| INITIAL RISK | medium (SEV 3) |
| RISK RATIONALE | Password stolen and tried; MFA blocked the sign-in; one account |
| VERIFY DECISION | continue: reset, revoke sessions, check MFA methods and mail rules, purge all 40 copies |
| CONTAINMENT TRIGGERS | no to all four |
Had the proxy blocked the page first, the decision would be continue at low (SEV 4), and the analyst would purge all 40 copies.
An EDR alert on a domain controller
At 03:12 EDR on a domain controller flags a process running as a domain administrator reading memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). The server's security log shows that account signing in from a host outside the admin workstation list. No change ticket covers it, and the administrator on call, reached on the roster number, did no overnight work.
| T1 field | Entry |
|---|---|
| REPORT SOURCE | alert |
| CLASSIFICATION | other (Active Directory; open ransomware if encryption or mass changes follow) |
| INITIAL RISK | critical (SEV 1) |
| RISK RATIONALE | Tier 0; credential theft by a human operator; the whole domain in reach |
| VERIFY DECISION | continue |
| CONTAINMENT TRIGGERS | no to all four; rechecked at the first briefing |
| COUNSEL NOTIFIED | on-call counsel, 03:35 |
Had an approved red team test covered the server, confirmed with its lead on a known number, the decision would be stop, citing the test.
A leak-site post naming the organization
At 10:05 a threat intelligence provider reports the organization on a ransomware leak site, with a five-day countdown and a folder listing. No folder name matches a share in the file server inventory, and no alert in 90 days involves the file servers. Two vendors store finance data.
| T1 field | Entry |
|---|---|
| REPORT SOURCE | vendor (threat intelligence) |
| CLASSIFICATION | ransomware, claimed |
| INITIAL RISK | high (SEV 2) |
| RISK RATIONALE | A public claim runs on the attacker's schedule, true or false; finance data would start clocks |
| VERIFY DECISION | defer: nothing internal confirms or rules out theft |
| DEFER REVIEW BY | same day, 16:00 local time |
| CONTAINMENT TRIGGERS | exfiltration unknown; the other three no |
| COUNSEL NOTIFIED | 10:30 |
Before the review, get the full listing (counsel decides before anyone downloads claimed data), ask both vendors, search egress from finance systems, and ready a T18 interim statement. Any match means continue.
A researcher email through security.txt
A researcher writes to the security.txt address. Changing the order number in a portal URL returns other customers' orders, and she attaches two. The application team reproduces it in test. Portal logs, kept 90 days, show her requests alone.
| T1 field | Entry |
|---|---|
| REPORT SOURCE | researcher |
| CLASSIFICATION | other: application flaw exposing customer data |
| INITIAL RISK | high (SEV 2) |
| RISK RATIONALE | Personal data open to any signed-in customer; logs show the researcher alone |
| VERIFY DECISION | continue: block the order lookup until the authorization fix ships |
| CONTAINMENT TRIGGERS | regulatory clock yes, for the Legal advisor to assess; the other three no |
| COUNSEL NOTIFIED | on-call counsel, within the first hour |
Thank her the same day, ask her to delete the two records, and give a fix date. Sequential access from other addresses would make it critical (SEV 1), with exfiltration yes.