PIVTR-D
VTPhase playbook

Verification and triage

STARTS WHENAn event of interest with evidence references.
DONE WHENContinue, stop, or defer, with a name and a time against it.
RECORDST1 Incident record and T2 Triage brief.

Verification establishes that the event is an incident and that it requires a response. Triage ranks it against organizational objectives, so the team works the most important incident first.

Verify before engaging the wider team. A declared incident pulls people off other work and slows the systems under investigation, and that cost is worth paying only for real incidents. The lifecycle explains why the two run together.

Verify and triage

#ItemOwner
1Open the incident record with identifier, title, handler, summary, classification by scenario, and evidence referencesOperations
2Enrich the indicators with threat intelligence before rating the riskIntelligence/Investigations
3Rate the initial risk on the four-level scaleIncident Commander
4Run the verification tests that apply, then record the decision with rationale, name and timeIncident Commander
5Deliver the triage brief, naming the single authorization requiredIncident Commander
6Agree the resource allocation against everything else the team could be doingIncident Commander

The introduction, this checklist, the outcomes table, the caution and Figure 58 are adapted from the book. Verification tests, Questions for the reporter, Triage factors, Ranking concurrent incidents and Worked examples are additions to the book.

Verification tests

Run each test that applies before recording continue, stop or defer. When a containment trigger applies, take its approved action first.

TestHowSettles
A second, independent sourceData from another sensor: authentication or flow logs behind an endpoint detection and response (EDR) alert, mail gateway or proxy logs behind a user report. Two rules on the same log are one source.Whether it happened
Planned activityChange tickets, deployments, the administrator on call, scheduled penetration tests, vendor maintenance. Confirm with the person named, on a number you already have.Whether someone authorized it
The reporterThe questions below, asked while memory is fresh. For a report from outside the organization, the first-call questions in Identification.What came before and after

Questions for the reporter

#ItemOwner
1Ask what they saw, where and when, in their own words, and keep the original message or a screenshotOperations
2Ask what they did next: clicked, typed a password, approved a multifactor authentication (MFA) prompt, opened a file, forwarded itOperations
3Ask whether anyone else received or saw the same thing, and whether it is still happeningOperations
4Ask how to reach them over the next day, and whom else they toldOperations

Decisions and records

OutcomeUse whenThen
ContinueReal, and it warrants a responseEscalate, engage the team and decision makers, triage
StopNot realClose it and document why, for the next analyst who sees the same thing
DeferAvailable information cannot settle itRequest more from the reporter or other sources, then decide again by the DEFER REVIEW BY time in T1
  • Look up what the risk level triggers in Risk levels, and mark each of the four containment triggers yes or no.
  • Record the decision, RISK RATIONALE and CONTAINMENT TRIGGERS in T1. Send T2 to the decision makers within the reporting deadline for the level.
  • When several verified incidents compete for the same people, rank them by the ranking rule.
Watch out
  • Documentation written after the fact is unreliable, and exact commands and timestamps are the first things to go. Open the record at verification and add to it as the response proceeds.
Verification flowchart: identification to information to incident to a verified decision. No leads to document decision and stop. Yes leads to document and triage. Defer loops back to information.
Figure 58. Deferring is a legitimate outcome when it is recorded with a name and a review date.

Triage factors

NIST SP 800-61 Revision 2 (2012) prioritized incidents on three factors: functional impact, information impact and recoverability. Revision 3 (April 2025) superseded it.

Revision 3 asks for a preliminary review that verifies an incident occurred and estimates severity and urgency (RS.MA-02). It then asks for prioritization by scope, likely impact, time-critical nature and resource availability (RS.MA-03). Its six example risk evaluation factors keep functional impact and recoverability, name data impact where Revision 2 had information impact, and add three more. Record the deciding ones in RISK RATIONALE.

FactorEstablishRaises the level when
Asset criticalityWhether it is on the critical asset listTier 0 identity, safety or revenue systems are involved
Functional impactWhich business functions are degradedCustomers or operations feel it, or it is growing
Data impactWhich data was read, changed or takenRegulated, personal or restricted data is involved
Stage of observed activityHow far the attack has progressedPrivilege escalation, lateral movement, exfiltration or impact
Threat actor characterizationCommodity malware or a human operatorHands-on-keyboard activity, or an actor known for extortion or destruction
RecoverabilityWhether the team can restore it within the recovery time objectiveOutside help is needed, or the data is unrecoverable

Time-critical nature means the containment triggers in T1.

NIST SP 800-61r3, RS.MA-02, RS.MA-03 and the RS.MA considerations; SP 800-61r2, section 3.2.6. Checked October 2026.

Ranking concurrent incidents

When verified incidents compete for the same people, the Incident Commander ranks them by this rule. Record the rank in each T1, report it in the next T2, and re-rank each operational period.

RankWork first
1The higher risk level
2At the same level, the one with a containment trigger marked yes
3The earlier deadline: a regulatory clock, a contract notice term or an extortion countdown
4The one still growing
5The later stage of activity

Every incident keeps a named handler. Two at High or Critical get separate Incident Commanders.

Worked examples

T1 entries at the end of verification.

One user clicked a phishing link

The mail gateway shows the message in 40 mailboxes and the proxy shows one click. The user says she typed her password. A sign-in to her account from a hosting provider failed at MFA 12 minutes later.

T1 fieldEntry
REPORT SOURCEuser
CLASSIFICATIONother: credential phishing
INITIAL RISKmedium (SEV 3)
RISK RATIONALEPassword stolen and tried; MFA blocked the sign-in; one account
VERIFY DECISIONcontinue: reset, revoke sessions, check MFA methods and mail rules, purge all 40 copies
CONTAINMENT TRIGGERSno to all four

Had the proxy blocked the page first, the decision would be continue at low (SEV 4), and the analyst would purge all 40 copies.

An EDR alert on a domain controller

At 03:12 EDR on a domain controller flags a process running as a domain administrator reading memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). The server's security log shows that account signing in from a host outside the admin workstation list. No change ticket covers it, and the administrator on call, reached on the roster number, did no overnight work.

T1 fieldEntry
REPORT SOURCEalert
CLASSIFICATIONother (Active Directory; open ransomware if encryption or mass changes follow)
INITIAL RISKcritical (SEV 1)
RISK RATIONALETier 0; credential theft by a human operator; the whole domain in reach
VERIFY DECISIONcontinue
CONTAINMENT TRIGGERSno to all four; rechecked at the first briefing
COUNSEL NOTIFIEDon-call counsel, 03:35

Had an approved red team test covered the server, confirmed with its lead on a known number, the decision would be stop, citing the test.

A leak-site post naming the organization

At 10:05 a threat intelligence provider reports the organization on a ransomware leak site, with a five-day countdown and a folder listing. No folder name matches a share in the file server inventory, and no alert in 90 days involves the file servers. Two vendors store finance data.

T1 fieldEntry
REPORT SOURCEvendor (threat intelligence)
CLASSIFICATIONransomware, claimed
INITIAL RISKhigh (SEV 2)
RISK RATIONALEA public claim runs on the attacker's schedule, true or false; finance data would start clocks
VERIFY DECISIONdefer: nothing internal confirms or rules out theft
DEFER REVIEW BYsame day, 16:00 local time
CONTAINMENT TRIGGERSexfiltration unknown; the other three no
COUNSEL NOTIFIED10:30

Before the review, get the full listing (counsel decides before anyone downloads claimed data), ask both vendors, search egress from finance systems, and ready a T18 interim statement. Any match means continue.

A researcher email through security.txt

A researcher writes to the security.txt address. Changing the order number in a portal URL returns other customers' orders, and she attaches two. The application team reproduces it in test. Portal logs, kept 90 days, show her requests alone.

T1 fieldEntry
REPORT SOURCEresearcher
CLASSIFICATIONother: application flaw exposing customer data
INITIAL RISKhigh (SEV 2)
RISK RATIONALEPersonal data open to any signed-in customer; logs show the researcher alone
VERIFY DECISIONcontinue: block the order lookup until the authorization fix ships
CONTAINMENT TRIGGERSregulatory clock yes, for the Legal advisor to assess; the other three no
COUNSEL NOTIFIEDon-call counsel, within the first hour

Thank her the same day, ask her to delete the two records, and give a fix date. Sequential access from other addresses would make it critical (SEV 1), with exfiltration yes.

Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.