PIVTR-D
RScenario

Ransomware

An attacker has encrypted systems, stolen data, or both, and demands payment. Protect the backups and the identity systems first, because operators destroy recovery before the note appears.

First moves
  1. Isolate hosts with active encryption at once and log the trigger in T3.Operations
  2. Confirm immutable, offline and snapshot backups are out of reach of production credentials and networks.Operations
  3. Open T1 and classify the incident: encryption only, theft with encryption, or extortion with no encrypted files.Planning
  4. Retrieve the ransom and attacker-communication policy and confirm decision authority.Incident Commander
  5. Call the insurer before hiring forensics, outside counsel or remediation.Finance/Admin
  6. Tell staff to report ransom notes internally and never photograph or post them.Public Information Officer

Then work the page: Scope, Contain, Eradicate, Recover, Extortion and payment decisions.

What is different

Ransomware is extortion. Encryption is one lever, and some groups extort with stolen data alone. Operators hit backups, hypervisors and lights-out management first, so recovery is often damaged before the ransom note appears.

Classify early: encryption only, theft with encryption (long dwell, large egress, staging), or extortion with no encrypted files. Apparent ransomware can be a wiper with no recovery path.

Chapter 17, pp. 525, 526, 539.

LeverWhat the attacker doesLead
EncryptionDisrupts operations and demands payment for decryption keysOperations
Data theftExfiltrates sensitive data, with or without encryption, and threatens exposureIntelligence/Investigations, Legal advisor
Data leaksPublishes data on leak sites or sends it to customers, partners or regulatorsPublic Information Officer, Legal advisor
Distributed denial of service (DDoS)Floods public-facing services and threatens a longer outageOperations, Liaison
HarassmentCalls, emails or posts to executives, employees, customers or regulatorsPublic Information Officer, Liaison

Adapted from Table 50, Ransomware Extortion Strategies. Chapter 17, p. 528.

Scope

Operators take whatever is reachable, so scope the whole estate on top of the generic scope playbook. Dwell time bounds the exfiltration window and the trustworthy restore points. When the trail ends at a valid VPN login, record initial access as undetermined; credentials are often stolen off-network months earlier.

Chapter 17, pp. 524, 540 to 542.

TechniqueWhat to look for
Archival artifactsWinRAR history at NTUSER.DAT\Software\WinRAR\ArcHistory; 7-Zip history at NTUSER.DAT\Software\7-Zip\; password-protected archives split into 1 to 2 GB segments
Staging locationsC:\Users\Public, C:\Perflogs, %TEMP%, hidden shares and publicly accessible folders
Exfiltration toolsWinRAR, 7-Zip, FileZilla, WinSCP, rclone, the Mega sync client, Dropbox, cURL, Wget, FTP
Deleted artifacts$UsnJrnl entries and file system timelines showing archives created and then deleted
Network and behaviorEgress spikes to hosting or file-sharing services; archivers run by unexpected accounts; new cloud storage connections

Adapted from Table 53, Exfiltration Hunting Techniques. Chapter 17, pp. 543 to 544.

#ItemOwner
1Count every Windows, Linux, macOS and ESXi host and every virtualization platformPlanning
2Check backup servers, storage and hypervisor consoles for deleted jobs, encrypted repositories and attacker loginsOperations
3List every system each compromised account authenticated to, encrypted or notIntelligence/Investigations
4Map each touched file server, database and repository to its data classesIntelligence/Investigations
5Run the staging and exfiltration hunt across every row of the table aboveIntelligence/Investigations
6Record the initial access date and dwell time in T4Planning
7Rate exfiltration confidence as high, medium, low or unknown, and pass the rating to the Legal advisorIntelligence/Investigations

Chapter 17, pp. 541, 542, 551.

Contain

Encryption spreading across file shares is an immediate trigger. Isolate without waiting for scope. Otherwise move quietly and all at once, on top of the generic contain playbook.

Human-operated groups have accelerated encryption after spotting defenders. Cutting part of their access mid-negotiation can prompt encryption or a higher demand.

They deploy everywhere through domain controllers, identity providers, remote monitoring and management (RMM) platforms, virtualization consoles and backup servers. Domain admin that reaches backups can destroy them.

Chapter 12, pp. 221, 223, 227. Chapter 17, pp. 533 to 535.

#ItemOwner
1Isolate hosts with active encryption at once, and log the trigger in T3Operations
2Confirm immutable, offline and snapshot copies are out of reach of production credentials and networksOperations
3Rotate backup, hypervisor and lights-out admin credentials, and move them off the production identity providerOperations
4Test the break-glass accounts, then reset domain admin and other tier-0 accounts in one windowOperations
5Inventory RMM tools such as ScreenConnect, AnyDesk and TeamViewer, and block unapproved instancesOperations
6Turn on alerts for unexpected vssadmin, wbadmin and bcdedit executionIntelligence/Investigations
7Tell staff to report ransom notes internally and never photograph or post themPublic Information Officer

Chapter 17, pp. 524, 532, 534, 535, 538.

Eradicate

Run two tracks on top of the generic eradicate playbook: remove every foothold, and finish the data-access assessment.

Check for a free decryptor before committing to restore or payment. No More Ransom, backed by Europol, covers over 150 families. Kaspersky, Avast, Emsisoft and Bitdefender publish others.

Law enforcement may have unreleased keys. Most current families have no exploitable flaw, so keep restore and rebuild moving in parallel.

Chapter 17, pp. 542, 544 to 546.

#ItemOwner
1Identify the family from the note, extension and sample, for example with ID RansomwareIntelligence/Investigations
2Check decryptor sources for the exact variant and versionIntelligence/Investigations
3Copy the encrypted files before any decryption attemptOperations
4Test the decryptor on sample files on a dedicated system, and measure the time and resources it takesOperations
5Remove backdoors, scheduled tasks, registry changes, rogue accounts and attacker RMM toolsOperations
6Review authentication, file access, share and database records to confirm the data reachedIntelligence/Investigations
7Payload hashes change per victim, so build detections on the observed tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)Intelligence/Investigations

Chapter 17, pp. 531, 537, 542, 545, 546, 548.

Recover

Recovery is the longest phase. Ireland's Health Service Executive (HSE) obtained a decryptor after the 2021 Conti attack and still took about four months to restore critical services. Layer this on the generic recover playbook.

Rebuild domain controllers after a domain admin compromise, because persistence hides in Active Directory objects, Group Policy and trusts. An access broker may have been inside for months before encryption.

Decryption leaves attacker tools in place. Paying raises the risk of repeat attack.

Chapter 17, pp. 545 to 548.

#ItemOwner
1Agree the restore order with leadership: identity, DNS and network, then business-critical systemsPlanning
2Verify backup servers, storage and control planes are untampered before useOperations
3Choose restore points dated before initial access, and state the resulting data loss to system owners in T7Planning
4Test each restore on an isolated system before productionOperations
5If domain admin was compromised or backup integrity is uncertain, rebuild the domain controllersOperations
6Validate or rebuild decrypted systems before they return to productionOperations
7After go-live, monitor privileged logons and the incident's command-and-control (C2) patternsIntelligence/Investigations

Chapter 17, pp. 546 to 548.

Extortion and payment decisions

Payment and attacker contact are policy, set during preparation. Facts for the decision:

  • In leaked LockBit data, affiliates decrypted sample files before discussing payment, and fewer than 10% of 208 negotiations ended in payment (p. 528).
  • Kadokawa paid about $2.98 million in 2024 and BlackSuit leaked anyway (pp. 557 to 558). Blackbaud paid about $250,000 for an unverifiable deletion; penalties later exceeded $59 million (p. 556).
  • Anyone with the note's victim identifier can enter the negotiation portal. Conti published JVCKenwood's data after negotiation screenshots reached the press (pp. 537 to 538).
  • Call the insurer before hiring forensics, outside counsel or remediation, or those costs may be denied. Never reveal coverage limits to the attacker (p. 549; Chapter 7, p. 91).
  • Sanctions call for counsel experienced in ransomware (p. 553). The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) advisory of September 21, 2021 says payments to sanctioned persons can violate US sanctions without the payer's knowledge, and treats prompt law enforcement reporting as mitigating.

Chapter 7, p. 74. Chapter 17, pp. 528, 537 to 538, 549, 553, 556 to 558. The OFAC point is an addition to the book, from the OFAC Updated Advisory on Potential Sanctions Risks for Facilitating Ransomware Payments (September 21, 2021), checked October 2026.

#ItemOwner
1Retrieve the ransom and attacker-communication policy, and confirm decision authority in who authorizes whatIncident Commander
2Notify the insurance carrier, and record its pre-approval and vendor requirements in T13Finance/Admin
3Assess sanctions exposure with counsel before any payment decisionLegal advisor
4Engage law enforcement, and record any disclosure limits it requestsLiaison
5Before sharing a ransom note, redact the victim ID, chat URL and file pathsIntelligence/Investigations
6Run leak-site and social media monitoring, and approve interim statements in T18Public Information Officer

Chapter 17, pp. 530, 538, 549.

Watch out
  • Scoping only the encrypted hosts misses persistence and exfiltration, and the attacker returns during recovery (p. 540).
  • A restore point from shortly before encryption can still carry the attacker. Date it from initial access (p. 547).
  • Notification deadlines run regardless of recovery status. Track them from day one against notification deadlines (p. 549).
  • Stolen data can resurface years later whether or not anyone paid. Keep templates and counsel ready after closure (p. 557).
Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.