Glossary
The terms this manual uses, in plain language, each with the page where it matters most. Incident command terms are in the Incident Command glossary.
| Term | Meaning | Where |
|---|---|---|
| Active containment | Decisive action to stop the attacker, accepting that they may notice and speed up. | Decide |
| Adaptive containment | Containment that combines passive and active measures, tightening restrictions as the attacker's behavior and the scope become clear. | Decide |
| ATT&CK | MITRE's public knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques. Mapping detection logic to it keeps rules meaningful after a change of tooling. | Identification |
| Attack timeline | The ordered record of attacker activity, with a time and evidence for each step. Scope owns it, eradication annotates it, and the debrief finalizes it. | Scope |
| Break-glass account | An emergency account kept in reserve for when normal access fails, with every use logged and reviewed. | Preparation |
| C2 | Command and control: the channel an attacker uses to send instructions to compromised systems and receive data from them. | Contain |
| Chain of custody | The record of who had each evidence item, from collection to disposal, with every transfer signed and timed. | Evidence |
| DAIR | The Dynamic Approach to Incident Response, the model in Joshua Wright's Dynamic Incident Response that PIVTR-D adapts. | The lifecycle |
| Deceptive containment | Containment that leaves the attacker believing they still have access while they operate in a controlled environment, such as honeypots or decoy systems. | Decide |
| Decision makers | The people who approve containment, disclosure and spending for an incident, named in the delegation and in the decision table. | Decide |
| Dwell time | The time from an attacker's first access to the moment defenders detect them. Measured from the KEY TIMES in T1. | Metrics |
| EDR | Endpoint detection and response: software on hosts that records activity, detects threats and can isolate a machine from the network. | Scope |
| Enumeration | Listing what is present on a system, such as accounts, services and scheduled tasks, to find what the attacker changed. Rerunning it verifies eradication. | Eradicate |
| Event of interest | An alert, hunt finding or report raised with evidence references. It starts verification and triage. | Identification |
| Evidence by volatility | Collecting the evidence that disappears fastest first, memory before disk, following the order of volatility in RFC 3227. | Evidence |
| Evidence register | The list of every evidence item collected, with its hash, location and custody history. | Evidence |
| Golden ticket | A Kerberos ticket-granting ticket forged with the stolen KRBTGT key. It works across the domain until the key is reset twice. | Eradicate |
| Hunting | Searching for attacker activity that alerting and detection have missed, starting from a hypothesis and a named data source. | Identification |
| Indicator | An observable sign of attacker activity, such as a file hash, IP address, domain, registry key or process name. Also called an indicator of compromise, or IOC. | Scope |
| KRBTGT | The Active Directory account whose key encrypts and signs the domain's Kerberos ticket-granting tickets. Each read-only domain controller has its own. | Eradicate |
| Lateral movement | An attacker moving from one compromised system to others inside the network. | Scope |
| Long-form investigation | The complete analysis that runs alongside the response and establishes the full TTPs, for regulatory reporting and anything that ends up in court. | Eradicate |
| Operational period | The fixed stretch of time, often twelve hours, that one set of objectives and one plan covers. | Planning cycle |
| OT | Operational technology: systems that monitor and control physical processes, such as controllers in plants, rail and utilities. | Scope |
| Out of band | A communication channel the attacker cannot see, used when email, chat or identity may be compromised. | Incident running now |
| Passive containment | Limiting damage without alerting the attacker, so the team can watch and learn while the risk stays acceptable. | Decide |
| Persistence | Whatever lets an attacker regain access after a reboot or password change, such as scheduled tasks, services, run keys or added accounts. | Eradicate |
| PICERL | The six-step incident handling cycle taught by SANS: preparation, identification, containment, eradication, recovery, lessons learned. | The lifecycle |
| Posture | The overall containment approach for an incident: active, adaptive, passive or deceptive. It can change as understanding improves. | Decide |
| Pyramid of Pain | David Bianco's 2013 ranking of indicators by how much it costs an attacker to change them, from hashes at the bottom to TTPs at the top. | Identification |
| Residual risk | The risk that remains when the response ends, accepted in writing by the risk owner. | T6 |
| Response loop | Scope, contain, eradicate and recover, repeated until scoping produces nothing new and the exit is signed. | Running the loop |
| Risk level | The Low to Critical rating that sets how fast and how high an incident is reported. | Decide |
| Scenario page | A page for one kind of incident, such as ransomware, listing what it adds to each phase playbook. | Scenarios |
| Scope | The breadth of the incident, the systems involved and the potential impact on the organization. | Scope |
| Sector page | A page for one kind of organization, such as a hospital or a bank, listing its reporting clocks, terms and roles. It combines with any scenario. | Sectors |
| Service account | An account that an application or automated process uses to run. Resets break whatever depends on it, so each needs a named owner. | Eradicate |
| Short-form investigation | The fast track that establishes enough to act: what the attacker did, how they got in, where else they might be and what has to go. | Eradicate |
| SIEM | Security information and event management: the platform that collects, correlates and searches logs. | Scope |
| Sinkhole | A DNS or network control that sends traffic meant for attacker infrastructure to a destination the defenders control. | Contain |
| Technical closure | The signed point where scoping finds nothing new, monitoring is clean and eradication is verified. | T5 |
| Tier 0, 1, 2 | The Active Directory tiering model. Tier 0 controls identity for the whole environment, such as domain controllers and domain administrators. Tier 1 covers servers and applications, and tier 2 covers workstations and user devices. | Eradicate |
| Triage | Ranking a verified incident against organizational objectives so the team works the most important incident first. | Verification and triage |
| TTPs | Tactics, techniques and procedures: how an attacker operates. They cost an attacker more to change than individual indicators. | Scope |
| Verification | Establishing that an observed event is an incident, and one that requires a response. | Verification and triage |
| Visibility gap | A part of the environment where the team cannot see activity, such as systems without logging or agents. Name each one in the scope findings. | Scope |
| Watchdog process | Attacker code that watches for its own removal and restarts or reinstalls the malware, or triggers a destructive payload. | Eradicate |