PIVTR-D
RAWS playbook · Identity and access

Console or IAM Identity Center account takeover

The attacker signs in to the console as a person, with a phished password, a stolen session or a takeover at the identity provider. Many then register their own multi-factor authentication (MFA) device or change the password to keep access. Cut off the person's sessions and roles first, and keep the user and its CloudTrail record as evidence.

Look here

LogSearch for
CloudTrail, signin.amazonaws.comConsole sign-ins and whether MFA was used: ConsoleLogin with responseElements.ConsoleLogin and additionalEventData.MFAUsed. Search every Region where sign-ins land. Root sign-ins land in us-east-1, us-east-2 or us-west-2. IAM user sign-ins land in us-east-1, us-east-2, eu-north-1, ap-southeast-2 or the Region of a regional endpoint
CloudTrail LakeSign-ins without MFA since the start time: SELECT eventTime, userIdentity.arn, sourceIPAddress, userAgent, awsRegion FROM <event-data-store-id> WHERE eventName = 'ConsoleLogin' AND element_at(additionalEventData, 'MFAUsed') = 'No' AND eventTime > '<utc>'
CloudTrail, IAM Identity CenterIdentity Center sign-ins and MFA registrations: CredentialChallenge, CredentialVerification and UserAuthentication, joined on AuthWorkflowID. DeviceEnrollmentRequired in UserAuthentication marks an MFA registration at sign-in
CloudTrail, IAM eventsChanges to MFA devices, passwords and keys: CreateVirtualMFADevice, EnableMFADevice, DeactivateMFADevice, DeleteVirtualMFADevice, ResyncMFADevice, ChangePassword, UpdateLoginProfile, CreateAccessKey
CloudTrail, STSSign-ins of users federated from an external identity provider: AssumeRoleWithSAML
GuardDutyFindings for unusual or suspicious sign-ins: UnauthorizedAccess:IAMUser/ConsoleLoginSuccess.B, InitialAccess:IAMUser/AnomalousBehavior, Policy:IAMUser/RootCredentialUsage

Contain

#Item
1Block the IAM user and keep it for evidence. The inline policy denies all actions: aws iam put-user-policy --user-name <user> --policy-name ir-deny-all --policy-document file://deny-all.json
2Remove the IAM user's console password destructive: aws iam delete-login-profile --user-name <user>
3Deactivate each access key of the IAM user: aws iam update-access-key --user-name <user> --access-key-id <access-key-id> --status Inactive
4Deny an Identity Center user in every member account with a service control policy (SCP) that denies * on the user's identitystore:UserId. Keep the SCP in place for at least 12 hours. SCPs do not apply to the management account
5Remove the Identity Center user's permission set assignments, group memberships and IAM role assignments in account access manager. A user with an open access portal session can assume new roles until that access is gone
6Delete the Identity Center user's active sessions in the console, and only then choose Disable user access
7Disable the user and revoke sessions at an external identity provider. See By identity provider
8Revoke sessions on every role the user reached. The policy file denies * when aws:TokenIssueTime is before now: aws iam put-role-policy --role-name <role> --policy-name AWSRevokeOlderSessions --policy-document file://revoke.json

Eradicate and recover

#Item
1Deactivate each MFA device the attacker registered: aws iam deactivate-mfa-device --user-name <user> --serial-number <mfa-arn>
2Delete each attacker virtual MFA device from the account destructive: aws iam delete-virtual-mfa-device --serial-number <mfa-arn>
3Remove access keys, users and roles created during the session, after the evidence is exported
4Remove permission set assignments the attacker added in Identity Center
5Re-enroll the owner with a new password and a phishing-resistant MFA device before you lift the deny
6Check the root user in every account for a password change, new MFA or new access keys
Watch out
  • The aws:TokenIssueTime deny has no effect on requests signed with the user's long-term access keys. Deactivate those keys as well.
  • Disabling an Identity Center user before deleting its sessions blocks session deletion in the console. Re-enable the user, delete the sessions, then disable the user again.
  • Removing the SCP before 12 hours pass gives an open role session its permissions back.

AWS documentation: IAM Identity Center, revoke active IAM role sessions created by permission sets; IAM account access manager; CloudTrail console sign-in events. Checked October 2026.

Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.