An attacker signs in as one of your users with a phished password or a stolen session token, then registers a multifactor authentication (MFA) method of their own. With an admin account, the attacker adds roles, consents to applications, or elevates to User Access Administrator over every subscription. Cut off the account's sessions and the attacker's MFA method first, then check what the account changed.
Look here
Log
Search for
SigninLogs
New IP addresses, countries and user agents for the user: SigninLogs | where UserPrincipalName == "<upn>" | project TimeGenerated, IPAddress, Location, AppDisplayName, ResultType, RiskLevelDuringSignIn, AuthenticationRequirement, UserAgent, SessionId
AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs
Token refreshes from attacker addresses after the first sign-in: AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs | where UserPrincipalName == "<upn>" | summarize count() by IPAddress, AppDisplayName
AADUserRiskEvents
Risk detections for the user, in RiskEventType, RiskLevel and RiskState
AuditLogs, methods and passwords
MFA methods and password changes: User registered security info, Admin registered security info, User deleted security info, Reset password, Change user password, Admin started password reset, Update user
AuditLogs, roles and consent
Roles and app consents the account added: Add member to role, Add eligible member to role, Add scoped member to role, Consent to application
AuditLogs, elevated access
Elevation to User Access Administrator at root scope, under the service Azure RBAC (Elevated Access). The entry reads: User has elevated their access to User Access Administrator for their Azure Resources
AzureActivity
Everything the account did in Azure: AzureActivity | where Caller == "<upn>" | project TimeGenerated, CallerIpAddress, OperationNameValue, _ResourceId
Contain
#
Item
1
Disable the account. For a synced hybrid account, also disable it in on-premises Active Directory: Update-MgUser -UserId <upn> -AccountEnabled:$false
2
Revoke the user's refresh tokens and session cookies: Revoke-MgUserSignInSession -UserId <upn>
3
Reset the password. For a hybrid account, reset it twice in on-premises Active Directory
4
List the user's authentication methods: Get-MgUserAuthenticationMethod -UserId <upn>
5
Remove each method the attacker registered. For an Authenticator app method, run: Remove-MgUserAuthenticationMicrosoftAuthenticatorMethod -UserId <upn> -MicrosoftAuthenticatorAuthenticationMethodId <id>
6
Mark the user compromised so ID Protection sets the user risk to high: Confirm-MgRiskyUserCompromised -UserIds <user-object-id>
7
List the user's registered devices: Get-MgUserRegisteredDevice -UserId <user-object-id> -All
8
Disable each of those devices: Update-MgDevice -DeviceId <id> -AccountEnabled:$false
List the delegated consents on each app the account consented to: Get-MgServicePrincipalOauth2PermissionGrant -ServicePrincipalId <sp-object-id>
3
Remove the attacker's delegated consents: Remove-MgOauth2PermissionGrant -OAuth2PermissionGrantId <id>
4
Check for elevated access, and remove User Access Administrator at root scope / if the attacker took it, as in the tenant compromise playbook
5
Issue a Temporary Access Pass so the user registers MFA again, then re-enable the account
6
Protect the Register security information user action with a Conditional Access policy that requires MFA or an authentication strength
7
Require the Phishing-resistant MFA strength for admin roles
8
Watch AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs for the attacker's addresses after recovery
Watch out
Revocation can take a few minutes, and access tokens already issued keep working until they expire. The default lifetime is a random value from 60 to 90 minutes, and 2 hours for clients such as Teams and Microsoft 365 in tenants without Conditional Access.
Clients that support continuous access evaluation (CAE) get tokens that last up to 28 hours. CAE revokes them in near real time on critical events such as account disable and password change.
Disabling the account alone leaves the attacker's MFA method in place for the day you re-enable it.
Microsoft Learn: revoke user access in an emergency; access token lifetime; configurable token lifetimes; continuous access evaluation; Entra audit log activity reference; elevate access for a Global Administrator; remediate risks and confirm compromised users; authentication strengths; Conditional Access user actions; Microsoft Graph PowerShell reference for the cmdlets used. Checked October 2026.