PIVTR-D
ROracle Cloud playbook · Identity and access

Console or SSO account takeover

The attacker signs in to the Console as a human user with a phished password or through the federated identity provider. The attacker then enrolls a new multi-factor authentication (MFA) factor, creates bypass codes or changes the password to keep the account. Deactivate the user and remove the attacker's factors first.

Look here

LogSearch for
Audit, identity domain events, compartment that contains the domainSign-ins, failed sign-ins, factor enrollment, bypass codes and password changes, by data.additionalDetails.eventId: sso.session.create.success, sso.authentication.failure, sso.auth.factor.initiated, sso.bypasscode.create.success, admin.me.password.change.success, admin.user.password.reset.success
Logging Search, last 14 daysSuccessful sign-ins by the user: search "<compartment-ocid>/_Audit" | where data.additionalDetails.eventId = 'sso.session.create.success' and data.additionalDetails.actorName = '<user>'
Audit, API calls made from the sessionCalls by the user in the window, grouped by data.identity.consoleSessionId to separate the attacker's session from the owner's. Filter on data.identity.principalName
Federated identity providerSign-in and MFA records for the same user and time, in the provider's own logs

Contain

#Item
1Deactivate the user: oci identity-domains user-status-changer put --endpoint <domain-url> --user-status-changer-id <user-id> --schemas '["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:oracle:idcs:UserStatusChanger"]' --active false --force
2Remove the user's MFA factors and account recovery factors: oci identity-domains authentication-factors-remover create --endpoint <domain-url> --schemas '["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:oracle:idcs:AuthenticationFactorsRemover"]' --user '{"value":"<user-id>"}' --type ALL
3Remove the user's Keep Me Signed In sessions. In the Console, Clear all signed-in sessions does the same: oci identity-domains authentication-factors-remover create --endpoint <domain-url> --schemas '["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:oracle:idcs:AuthenticationFactorsRemover"]' --user '{"value":"<user-id>"}' --type KMSI
4For a federated user, disable the account and end its sessions at the identity provider
5Remove API keys, auth tokens and customer secret keys created in the session, as in credential leak
6Reset the password before reactivation

Eradicate and recover

#Item
1Review every change made under the attacker's Console session and reverse it
2Find access the attacker granted to other accounts or apps in admin.group.add.member.success, admin.grant.create.success and admin.app.create.success
3Find federation changes in CreateIdentityProvider and UpdateIdentityProvider. Identity domains manage their identity providers through the domain API, so check the identity domain events in the domain's compartment as well
4Reactivate the user once the owner has re-enrolled MFA in person or through a verified channel
5Require MFA in the identity domain sign-on policy for every Console user
Watch out
  • A user deactivated mid-session keeps that session with limited capabilities until it signs out. Watch the account's Audit trail after deactivation.
  • Old runbooks point to the identity domain AuditEvents API. It returns no events after December 15, 2024. Use the Audit service.

Oracle documentation: contents of an Audit log event, viewing Audit log events. OCI CLI 3.94.2 help for identity-domains user-status-changer put and authentication-factors-remover create. Checked October 2026.

Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.