ROracle Cloud playbook · Identity and access
Console or SSO account takeover
The attacker signs in to the Console as a human user with a phished password or through the federated identity provider. The attacker then enrolls a new multi-factor authentication (MFA) factor, creates bypass codes or changes the password to keep the account. Deactivate the user and remove the attacker's factors first.
Look here
| Log | Search for |
|---|---|
| Audit, identity domain events, compartment that contains the domain | Sign-ins, failed sign-ins, factor enrollment, bypass codes and password changes, by data.additionalDetails.eventId: sso.session.create.success, sso.authentication.failure, sso.auth.factor.initiated, sso.bypasscode.create.success, admin.me.password.change.success, admin.user.password.reset.success |
| Logging Search, last 14 days | Successful sign-ins by the user: search "<compartment-ocid>/_Audit" | where data.additionalDetails.eventId = 'sso.session.create.success' and data.additionalDetails.actorName = '<user>' |
| Audit, API calls made from the session | Calls by the user in the window, grouped by data.identity.consoleSessionId to separate the attacker's session from the owner's. Filter on data.identity.principalName |
| Federated identity provider | Sign-in and MFA records for the same user and time, in the provider's own logs |
Contain
| # | Item |
|---|---|
| 1 | Deactivate the user: oci identity-domains user-status-changer put --endpoint <domain-url> --user-status-changer-id <user-id> --schemas '["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:oracle:idcs:UserStatusChanger"]' --active false --force |
| 2 | Remove the user's MFA factors and account recovery factors: oci identity-domains authentication-factors-remover create --endpoint <domain-url> --schemas '["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:oracle:idcs:AuthenticationFactorsRemover"]' --user '{"value":"<user-id>"}' --type ALL |
| 3 | Remove the user's Keep Me Signed In sessions. In the Console, Clear all signed-in sessions does the same: oci identity-domains authentication-factors-remover create --endpoint <domain-url> --schemas '["urn:ietf:params:scim:schemas:oracle:idcs:AuthenticationFactorsRemover"]' --user '{"value":"<user-id>"}' --type KMSI |
| 4 | For a federated user, disable the account and end its sessions at the identity provider |
| 5 | Remove API keys, auth tokens and customer secret keys created in the session, as in credential leak |
| 6 | Reset the password before reactivation |
Eradicate and recover
| # | Item |
|---|---|
| 1 | Review every change made under the attacker's Console session and reverse it |
| 2 | Find access the attacker granted to other accounts or apps in admin.group.add.member.success, admin.grant.create.success and admin.app.create.success |
| 3 | Find federation changes in CreateIdentityProvider and UpdateIdentityProvider. Identity domains manage their identity providers through the domain API, so check the identity domain events in the domain's compartment as well |
| 4 | Reactivate the user once the owner has re-enrolled MFA in person or through a verified channel |
| 5 | Require MFA in the identity domain sign-on policy for every Console user |
Watch out
- A user deactivated mid-session keeps that session with limited capabilities until it signs out. Watch the account's Audit trail after deactivation.
- Old runbooks point to the identity domain AuditEvents API. It returns no events after December 15, 2024. Use the Audit service.
Oracle documentation: contents of an Audit log event, viewing Audit log events. OCI CLI 3.94.2 help for identity-domains user-status-changer put and authentication-factors-remover create. Checked October 2026.