With a stolen administrator credential, the attacker suspends bucket versioning or changes lifecycle policies, then deletes or overwrites objects, block volume backups and database backups and the resources they protected. Some attackers schedule deletion of the Vault keys that encrypt the data, which makes it unreadable at once. Cancel pending key deletions and block the deleting identity first, because deleted volumes, deleted backups and destroyed keys cannot come back.
Look here
Log
Search for
Audit, Object Storage
Versioning, retention, lifecycle and replication changes, and bucket deletes: UpdateBucket (versioning set to Suspended), DeleteBucket, DeleteRetentionRule, PutObjectLifecyclePolicy, DeleteReplicationPolicy
Object Storage write log, if enabled
Deletes by principal and bucket. Bursts of PUT over existing names show objects overwritten with encrypted copies: search "<compartment-ocid>/<log-group-ocid>/<log-ocid>" | where data.requestAction = 'DELETE' | summarize count() as cnt by data.principalId, data.bucketName
Scheduled key, vault and secret deletions, and disabled keys: ScheduleKeyDeletion, ScheduleKeyVersionDeletion, DisableKey, ScheduleVaultDeletion, ScheduleSecretDeletion
Audit, backup platform
Changes to backup schedules and protection: UpdateVolumeBackupPolicy, DeleteVolumeBackupPolicy, DeleteVolumeBackupPolicyAssignment, UpdateProtectionPolicy, DeleteProtectedDatabase, ScheduleProtectedDatabaseDeletion. These are API operation names, so confirm the event names in your export. For third-party backup software, search for sign-ins to its management server and for CreateCustomerSecretKey or UploadApiKey on its service user. Then search the Object Storage write log for DELETE by that principal
Current state, keys
Keys in PENDING_DELETION or DISABLED: oci kms management key list -c <compartment-ocid> --endpoint <management-endpoint> --all
Current state, objects
Delete markers in each affected bucket: oci os object list-object-versions -bn <bucket> --all
Turn versioning back on for every affected bucket: oci os bucket update -bn <bucket> --versioning Enabled
7
Save and restore the lifecycle policy, and remove rules that delete objects or previous versions
8
Undelete a terminated Autonomous AI Database from the Console: filter on Terminated databases, then choose Undelete. The window is 72 hours or the backup retention period, whichever is shorter
9
Enable indefinite retention on surviving block volume backups. It needs the RETENTION_RULE_INDEFINITE_HOLD permission: oci bv backup update --volume-backup-id <ocid> --is-indefinite-retention-enabled true
Eradicate and recover
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Item
1
Restore deleted objects by deleting their delete markers. The previous version becomes the latest: oci os object delete -bn <bucket> --object-name <name> --version-id <delete-marker-version-id>
2
Restore volumes from surviving backups, including cross-region copies, and databases from backups or the Recovery Service. Follow Recover
3
Record what OCI cannot recover: deleted volumes, deleted backups, deleted object versions, and keys past their waiting period
4
Add retention rules to backup buckets that have versioning suspended: oci os retention-rule create -bn <bucket> --time-amount 30 --time-unit DAYS --time-rule-locked <utc-at-least-14-days-out>
5
Enable retention lock on block volume backup policies and on the Recovery Service protection policy for Base Database Service databases
6
Rebuild the backup management server from a known-good image, and rotate its service user's API keys and customer secret keys. Grant it OBJECT_CREATE on backup buckets without OBJECT_DELETE, OBJECT_VERSION_DELETE or OBJECT_OVERWRITE where the software allows. Put the server and its credentials in a compartment the workload administrators cannot manage
7
Grant KEY_DELETE, VAULT_DELETE, OBJECT_VERSION_DELETE and DB_BACKUP_DELETE only to a break-glass group. See ransomware
Watch out
A key in PENDING_DELETION makes everything it encrypts unreadable at once. The waiting period is 7 to 30 days and defaults to 30. After it ends, OCI destroys the key material and cannot restore it. A secret can be scheduled for deletion as little as 1 day out.
Canceling a vault deletion restores the keys to their state before the vault deletion. Keys scheduled for deletion before that stay pending, so cancel each one.
A retention rule lock takes effect after a mandatory 14-day delay and is then permanent, even for Oracle Support. Retention rules cannot coexist with enabled versioning, so choose one per bucket.
Deleted boot volumes, block volumes and backups cannot be undone. Terminating a DB system can delete its automatic backups, and the operation needs DB_BACKUP_DELETE when they are on.
Oracle documentation: Object Storage retention rules, Object Storage object versioning, details for Object Storage logs, deleting a boot volume, Block Volume backups, creating a manual backup for a block volume, Block Storage retention lock release note, Recovery Service retention lock, Block Storage ransomware-resilient backup protection release note, policy-based backups, Recovery Service scheduled deletion of a protected database, deleting a Vault key, canceling a key deletion, deleting a vault, deleting a secret, canceling secret deletion, Vault and Base Database Service IAM policy details, Object Storage IAM policy details, undelete a terminated Autonomous AI Database, OCI CLI reference for os bucket update, os retention-rule create, os object delete, os object list-object-versions, kms management key schedule-deletion and kms management vault cancel-deletion. Checked September 2026. Rechecked October 2026: every command, and the 7 to 30 day key deletion window, against OCI CLI 3.94.2; deleting a secret (1 to 30 days); creating a retention rule (mandatory 14-day delay before the lock, then no deletion even by Oracle Support); undelete a terminated Autonomous AI Database (72 hours or the backup retention period). Retention rules with versioning: checked September 2026.