An attacker with a privileged identity adds access that survives the first clean-up: new users, extra API keys and auth tokens, membership in privileged groups, dynamic group rules that match their own resources, identity providers that let them sign in as anyone, and applications with OAuth client credentials. Each item works on its own after the original account is disabled. Save the full inventory first, and remove attacker federation before you reset passwords.
Look here
Log
Search for
Audit, home region, IAM operations
User, credential, group, policy, dynamic group and identity provider changes, which occur in the home region only: CreateUser, AddUserToGroup, UploadApiKey, CreateAuthToken, CreateCustomerSecretKey, CreateOAuthClientCredential, CreatePolicy, UpdatePolicy, CreateDynamicGroup, UpdateDynamicGroup, CreateIdentityProvider, UpdateIdentityProvider. Export them with: oci audit event list -c <tenancy-ocid> --region <home-region> --start-time <utc> --end-time <utc> --all
Audit, identity domain events
Users, group members, grants and apps created in the domain, by data.additionalDetails.eventId: admin.user.create.success, admin.group.add.member.success, admin.grant.create.success and admin.app.create.success. A grant is how an administrator role or an application role reaches a user or app
Keys and tokens in each domain
Credentials created in the window, sorted by creation time. A user can have three API keys, two auth tokens, two customer secret keys, two SMTP credentials and up to 10 OAuth 2.0 client credentials. Repeat the list with auth-tokens, customer-secret-keys, smtp-credentials, user-db-credentials and o-auth2-client-credentials: oci identity-domains api-keys list --endpoint <domain-url> --all
Keys per user
The API keys of one user in the Default domain: oci iam user api-key list --user-id <user-ocid>
Users
Users created in the window: oci iam user list -c <tenancy-ocid> --all
Group members
Members of Administrators and of any group with wide policies who are not on the approved list: oci iam group list-users --group-id <group-ocid>
Multi-factor authentication (MFA) devices
New second factors on a user the attacker controls, which keep the account usable after a password reset. Read sso.auth.factor.initiated and enrollment events in Audit, and check the user's record in the identity domain, since the two views can differ. List devices per user: oci iam mfa-totp-device list --user-id <user-ocid>
Dynamic groups
Matching rules that match by a tag or a compartment the attacker controls, which give their instance the group's policies. Read each matching-rule: oci iam dynamic-group list -c <tenancy-ocid>
Dynamic groups in each domain
The same rules on domain-level groups: oci identity-domains dynamic-resource-groups list --endpoint <domain-url>
Identity providers, Default domain
Providers the attacker controls. One can assert any user, including administrators, if the mapping lets it: oci iam identity-provider list --protocol SAML2 -c <tenancy-ocid>
Identity providers in each domain
The same check on each identity domain: oci identity-domains identity-providers list --endpoint <domain-url>
Applications
Confidential applications with client secrets that the attacker created: oci identity-domains apps list --endpoint <domain-url> --all
Application grants
The roles those applications have: oci identity-domains grants list --endpoint <domain-url>
Wide policies
New statements, and Admit statements for other tenancies, as in cross-tenancy policies: oci iam policy list -c <compartment-ocid> --all
Contain
#
Item
1
Save the user, group, policy and identity provider lists and every credential listing above as evidence. See Evidence
2
Block the attacker's users from using key-based credentials, and deactivate the users in the identity domain: oci iam user update-user-capabilities --user-id <user-ocid> --can-use-api-keys false --can-use-auth-tokens false --can-use-customer-secret-keys false --can-use-o-auth2-client-credentials false --can-use-smtp-credentials false --can-use-db-credentials false
3
Remove the users the attacker added from every group: oci iam group remove-user --user-id <user-ocid> --group-id <group-ocid>
4
Reset the matching rule of each tampered dynamic group: oci iam dynamic-group update --dynamic-group-id <ocid> --matching-rule '<known-good-rule>'
5
Deactivate the applications the attacker created, and remove their grants. In the CLI, pass the application ID in --app-status-changer-id with --active false to: oci identity-domains app-status-changer put
6
Restore each changed policy: oci iam policy update --policy-id <ocid> --statements file://known-good.json
7
Delete API keys created in the window, after saving their fingerprints destructive: oci iam user api-key delete --user-id <user-ocid> --fingerprint <fingerprint>
8
Delete auth tokens created in the window, after saving their IDs destructive: oci iam auth-token delete --user-id <user-ocid> --auth-token-id <ocid>
9
Delete customer secret keys created in the window, after saving their IDs destructive: oci iam customer-secret-key delete --user-id <user-ocid> --customer-secret-key-id <id>
10
Delete the OAuth client credentials of the attacker's applications destructive
11
Delete the identity providers the attacker added, after saving their configuration destructive. Federated sign-in cannot return once they are gone. See tenancy administrator compromised for sign-on policy checks
12
Delete policies the attacker created, after saving them destructive
Eradicate and recover
#
Item
1
Compare every user, API key fingerprint, auth token, customer secret key, dynamic group rule, identity provider and application with a known baseline. Anything with no owner is hostile until an owner claims it
2
Re-issue credentials to the legitimate users whose accounts the attacker used, and force a password reset and MFA re-enrollment through a verified channel
3
Trace what the added credentials did. Search Audit for each new principal and key, and follow the scope in Scope
4
Delete users the attacker created after their activity is documented destructive: oci iam user delete --user-id <user-ocid>
5
Move workloads that use user API keys to instance principals or resource principals, and set a review cycle for the API keys that remain
6
Require MFA in the identity domain sign-on policy for every Console user, and limit who can add identity providers and applications
7
Add Events rules that notify on the IAM operations in the first row of Look here, and on admin.grant.create.success, so the next backdoor raises an alert when it is created
Watch out
Auth tokens, customer secret keys and SMTP credentials do not expire. Check every slot for every user, including users the attacker did not create.
Domain-level objects live in the identity domain and appear in Audit by identity domain event ID. The oci iam commands do not list them, so run both sets of commands for every domain.
A federation provider can be a broader backdoor than any single user. Remove it before you reset passwords, or the attacker signs in again as a fresh identity.
Users, groups, policies and dynamic groups change only in the home region. Search Audit there.
Oracle documentation: IAM policy reference (API operations and permissions for users, groups and identity providers); managing user credentials; identity domain applications and grants; dynamic groups; OCI CLI reference for iam user, iam group, iam dynamic-group, iam identity-provider and identity-domains. Checked September 2026. Rechecked October 2026: every command against OCI CLI 3.94.2.