The attacker reads secrets from OCI Vault, such as database passwords and API tokens, uses master encryption keys to decrypt data, or schedules a key or secret for deletion. The access usually comes from a policy that gives a user or dynamic group read secret-family or use keys across a wide compartment. Cancel scheduled deletions first, because data under a key pending deletion is unreadable, then cut off the principal and change each stolen credential at its target.
Look here
Log
Search for
Audit, Vault management operations
Secret updates, scheduled and canceled deletions, and new key versions. The events use API operation names such as UpdateSecret, ScheduleSecretDeletion, CancelSecretDeletion, ScheduleKeyDeletion, CancelKeyDeletion, CreateKeyVersion and ScheduleVaultDeletion. Confirm the exact event names in your export: oci audit event list -c <compartment-ocid> --start-time <utc> --end-time <utc> --all
Key Management service log, category Crypto Operations
Decrypt, data key and export calls by principal, which Audit does not record. When the Crypto Operations log is enabled for the vault, entries carry data.principalId, data.clientIpAddress, data.keyVersionId, data.requestAction and data.statusCode. requestAction takes the values ENCRYPT, DECRYPT, SIGN, VERIFY, GENERATEDEK and EXPORTKEY. Enable the log for each regional vault
Secret reads
Whether a call that retrieves a secret bundle appears in Audit, which the documentation reviewed for this page does not say. Test it in a non-production vault before you rely on it. If it does not appear, treat every secret that the suspect principal could read as read
Who could read
Policies that let principals read secret contents. The permission is SECRET_BUNDLE_READ, granted by read secret-bundles or the aggregate read secret-family. Search for those statements and for use keys, manage keys and manage secret-family: oci iam policy list -c <compartment-ocid> --all --query "data[?contains(to_string(statements), 'secret-family') || contains(to_string(statements), 'secret-bundles')]"
Dynamic groups
Resources that should not match the dynamic groups named in those policies. Resource principals and instance principals read secrets through dynamic groups: oci iam dynamic-group list -c <tenancy-ocid>
Secrets
Secrets in PENDING_DELETION, and recent time-created and time-updated values: oci vault secret list -c <compartment-ocid> --vault-id <vault-ocid> --all
Secret versions
The versions of one secret: oci vault secret-version list --secret-id <secret-ocid>
Keys
Keys in PENDING_DELETION, and keys with the protection mode SOFTWARE, which can be exported. Keys protected by a hardware security module (HSM) cannot be exported: oci kms management key list -c <compartment-ocid> --endpoint <management-endpoint>
Consumers of the secret
Use of a stolen credential from an address the workload does not use, in the sign-in log of the database, API or service that the secret unlocks
Contain
#
Item
1
Save the Audit entries, the policies that grant Vault access and the dynamic group rules as evidence. See Evidence
2
Cancel key deletions the attacker scheduled, first. Data encrypted by a key that is pending deletion is inaccessible until you cancel: oci kms management key cancel-deletion --key-id <key-ocid> --endpoint <management-endpoint>
Cut off the principal that read the secrets. Remove the user from its groups and block its key-based credentials as in credential leak, or change the dynamic group matching rule so the resource no longer matches: oci iam dynamic-group update --dynamic-group-id <ocid> --matching-rule '<rule>'
5
Narrow the policy statements that give read access to the secrets, working in a copy first: oci iam policy update --policy-id <ocid> --statements file://known-good.json
6
Rotate the secrets the attacker could read, starting with the ones that unlock databases and identity systems. The command creates a new current version. A secret that is scheduled for deletion cannot receive a new version: oci vault secret update-base64 --secret-id <secret-ocid> --secret-content-content <base64-value>
7
Change the password or token at the target system so the stolen value stops working. A new secret version in Vault does not change the credential in the database or the API
8
Record which keys the attacker could use for Decrypt or EXPORTKEY, and which data is encrypted with them. Give the list to the person who runs Scope
Eradicate and recover
#
Item
1
Rotate key versions for keys the attacker could use. A new version applies to data encrypted from then on. Data encrypted under earlier versions still needs those versions, and anyone who has a copy of exported key material can still decrypt it: oci kms management key-version create --key-id <key-ocid> --endpoint <management-endpoint>
2
For software-protected keys that the attacker could export, plan to re-encrypt the data under a new key, and consider an HSM-protected key for new data. HSM-protected key material cannot leave the HSM
3
Rotate the credentials in every consumer, including database administrator passwords, API tokens, wallet passwords and private keys stored as secrets. Follow the scope in Scope
4
Split secrets by application and give each workload read secret-bundles on its own secrets only. Add a policy condition to limit a statement to named secrets, using the variables listed in the Vault policy reference
5
Separate duties. The group that manages keys and the group that reads secret contents should differ, and no dynamic group should have manage keys or manage secret-family
6
Enable the Crypto Operations service log for each vault, set its retention, and archive it. Add Events rules that notify on ScheduleKeyDeletion, ScheduleSecretDeletion and policy changes that touch Vault resources
7
Give the Legal advisor the data sets that the affected keys and secrets protect, for notification deadlines
Watch out
Audit shows the management side of Vault. Decrypt and data key generation are visible only in the Crypto Operations service log, and only if it was on before the incident.
A key in PENDING_DELETION makes everything encrypted by it inaccessible at once, and the key cannot be updated until you cancel. Deletion is scheduled for 7 to 30 days out, and the material is destroyed when it completes. Check for scheduled deletions early.
Rotating a secret in Vault does nothing to the password in the database. The stolen value works until you change it at the target.
A secret with a scheduled deletion cannot get a new version. Cancel the deletion first, then update it.
Oracle documentation: Vault, Key Management and Secret Management overview; monitoring key usage; details for Key Management logs; Vault policy reference (resource types, verbs and permissions); deleting a key; deleting a secret; updating a secret's content; OCI CLI reference for vault secret, secrets secret-bundle and kms management key. Checked September 2026. Rechecked October 2026: every command, and the 7 to 30 day key deletion window, against OCI CLI 3.94.2; deleting a secret (1 to 30 days, default 30).