PIVTR-D
RGoogle Cloud playbook · Data and storage

Secret Manager secrets and Cloud KMS keys stolen

An attacker with a stolen identity reads secret payloads from Secret Manager, or calls Cloud KMS to decrypt data the attacker has already copied. Both reads write only Data Access audit entries, which are off by default for both services, so many projects have no record of which secrets were read. Contain the reader, then rotate every secret it could read at its source.

Look here

LogSearch for
Data Access audit log for secretmanager.googleapis.com (only if DATA_READ is enabled)Payload reads. Group by principalEmail, callerIp and resourceName: gcloud logging read 'protoPayload.methodName="google.cloud.secretmanager.v1.SecretManagerService.AccessSecretVersion"' --project=<project> --freshness=30d
Data Access audit log for secretmanager.googleapis.com (only if ADMIN_READ is enabled)Enumeration before theft: google.cloud.secretmanager.v1.SecretManagerService.ListSecrets, ListSecretVersions, GetIamPolicy
Admin Activity audit log, Secret ManagerGrants, new versions and destruction: google.cloud.secretmanager.v1.SecretManagerService.SetIamPolicy, AddSecretVersion, DisableSecretVersion, DestroySecretVersion, DeleteSecret, UpdateSecret
Data Access audit log for cloudkms.googleapis.com (only if DATA_READ is enabled)Decrypt and sign calls by user and workload principals. Calls from customer-managed encryption key (CMEK) service agents are normal service traffic: protoPayload.serviceName="cloudkms.googleapis.com" AND protoPayload.methodName=("Decrypt" OR "AsymmetricDecrypt" OR "AsymmetricSign")
Admin Activity audit log, Cloud KMSKey grants and key version changes: SetIamPolicy, DestroyCryptoKeyVersion, UpdateCryptoKeyPrimaryVersion, CreateCryptoKeyVersion
Secret IAM policiesNew roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor grants, and bindings with IAM conditions that widen access, on each secret: gcloud secrets get-iam-policy <secret>
Key IAM policiesThe same on each key: gcloud kms keys get-iam-policy <key> --keyring=<keyring> --location=<location>
Admin Activity and iamcredentials Data Access logsHow the reader got in. Open leaked service account key or impersonation for that identity

Contain

#Item
1Export Data Access entries for both services now. The _Default bucket keeps them 30 days by default: gcloud logging copy _Default storage.googleapis.com/<bucket> --location=global --log-filter='protoPayload.serviceName=("secretmanager.googleapis.com" OR "cloudkms.googleapis.com")' --project=<project>
2Contain the identity that read the secrets. For a user, follow account takeover. Disable a service account: gcloud iam service-accounts disable <sa-email>
3Remove the reader's secret grants. Check project and folder bindings too: gcloud secrets remove-iam-policy-binding <secret> --member='<type>:<member>' --role=roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor --all
4Remove the reader's key grants: gcloud kms keys remove-iam-policy-binding <key> --keyring=<keyring> --location=<location> --member='<type>:<member>' --role=<role> --all
5Turn on Data Access audit logs for secretmanager.googleapis.com and cloudkms.googleapis.com in the project or organization IAM policy auditConfigs to record further reads
6Disable each stolen secret version after its replacement is live. Consumers pinned to that version fail: gcloud secrets versions disable <version> --secret=<secret>
7Disable a KMS key version only after listing what it protects destructive to availability: gcloud kms keys versions disable <version> --key=<key> --keyring=<keyring> --location=<location>

Eradicate and recover

#Item
1Rotate the credential at its source, then store the new value. A new Secret Manager version alone leaves the stolen value valid: gcloud secrets versions add <secret> --data-file=<file>
2List CMEK resources before any key change. The Cloud KMS Inventory API must be enabled: gcloud kms inventory get-protected-resources-summary --keyname=projects/<project>/locations/<location>/keyRings/<keyring>/cryptoKeys/<key>
3Create a new primary key version: gcloud kms keys versions create --key=<key> --keyring=<keyring> --location=<location> --primary
4Re-encrypt data the attacker could have copied with the new key version
5Set delayed destruction on secrets so a destroy can be reversed. The duration can be 1 to 1,000 days: gcloud secrets update <secret> --version-destroy-ttl=<duration>
6Enforce a minimum destroy-scheduled duration for key versions at the organization: constraints/cloudkms.minimumDestroyScheduledDuration
7Require key versions to be disabled before they can be destroyed: constraints/cloudkms.disableBeforeDestroy
8Grant roles/secretmanager.secretAccessor on individual secrets, and use IAM conditions to limit access by secret name prefix or date
9Destroy old versions after evidence and recovery are complete destructive: gcloud secrets versions destroy <version> --secret=<secret>
Watch out
  • Without Data Access logs, nothing records which secrets were read. Treat every secret the identity could access as stolen and rotate each one at its source.
  • Disabling or destroying a key used as CMEK makes data in the dependent services unreadable, and some services lose data permanently if the key stays unavailable too long.
  • A KMS key version scheduled for destruction waits 30 days by default. gcloud kms keys versions restore brings it back as disabled within that period. After it, data encrypted with the version is lost.
  • Without a version destroy TTL, gcloud secrets versions destroy is immediate and permanent.

Google Cloud documentation: Cloud Audit Logs overview; Secret Manager audit logging; Secret Manager access control with IAM; Destroy a secret version; Delay destruction of secret versions; Cloud KMS audit logging; Destroy and restore key versions; Control key version destruction; View key usage; Customer-managed encryption keys (CMEK); gcloud reference for secrets and kms. Checked September 2026. Re-checked October 2026: gcloud reference for logging copy; Destroy and restore key versions (30-day default scheduled for destruction duration); Store log entries (_Default 30 days by default).

Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.