PIVTR-D
RGoogle Cloud playbook · Provider and accidental

Data exposed by a vendor or product bug

A code or configuration change shows one customer's data to another with no attacker involved, at a vendor such as Google or in your own multi-tenant product on Google Cloud. In Vanta's Inc-868, a performance change deployed May 22, 2025 removed a domain ID filter. Integration data of fewer than 4% of customers was written into other customers' tenants until Vanta reverted the change on May 27. Preserve the logs and stop the exposure before you count records.

Look here

LogSearch for
Advisory NotificationsSecurity and Privacy Advisory notices from Google in the Google Cloud console, sent to Essential Contacts. Check the contacts: gcloud essential-contacts list --organization=<org-number>
Personalized Service HealthIncidents affecting your projects. Google Cloud Service Health at status.cloud.google.com carries broad incidents: gcloud service-health events list --project=<project> --location=global
Security bulletinsThe Google Cloud security bulletins page and its feed: https://cloud.google.com/feeds/google-cloud-security-bulletins.xml
Access Transparency logGoogle personnel access to your data, with reason and accessor location. Reading it needs the Private Logs Viewer role: logName="projects/<project>/logs/cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Faccess_transparency"
Data Access audit logs (only if enabled; BigQuery is on by default)Which principal read which objects or tables in the window: gcloud logging read 'logName:"cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Fdata_access" AND protoPayload.resourceName:"<resource>"' --project=<project> --freshness=30d
Cloud Run request logs, load balancer logsRequests by tenant and path in run.googleapis.com%2Frequests, written by default. Load balancer logs exist only where backend service logging was enabled
Cloud SQL for PostgreSQLRow-level reads, only where pgAudit was on (cloudsql.enable_pgaudit) and Data Access audit logs were enabled
Deploy recordsThe change and its time, from gcloud builds list, Cloud Deploy rollouts and the Admin Activity entries for the deploy. Cloud Run revisions: gcloud run revisions list --service=<service> --region=<region>

Contain

#Item
1Copy the exposure window's logs to a locked bucket before retention removes them: gcloud logging copy _Default storage.googleapis.com/<bucket> --location=global --log-filter='timestamp>="<start>" AND timestamp<="<end>"' --project=<project>
2Roll Cloud Run back to the last good revision, and keep the bad revision for evidence: gcloud run services update-traffic <service> --region=<region> --to-revisions=<good-revision>=100
3Roll back a Cloud Deploy target: gcloud deploy targets rollback <target> --delivery-pipeline=<pipeline> --region=<region> --release=<good-release>
4Roll back an App Engine service: gcloud app services set-traffic <service> --splits=<good-version>=1
5Turn off the feature flag or take the affected feature offline if no clean version exists
6From a vendor, get in writing the affected records, the time window, the recipients and the fix date. Ask Google through a support case that references the notice
7Suspend the vendor integration or revoke its tokens if exposure is still happening

Eradicate and recover

#Item
1List every record served to the wrong tenant, and when, from the request and Data Access logs
2Delete misplaced records from the receiving tenants and ask customers who downloaded them to delete their copies
3Take the facts to the Legal advisor for the notification decision. Treat a vendor's exposure as a supply chain event under supply chain
4Add a test that fails when a query or cache key lacks the tenant filter, and block the release until it passes
5Enable Data Access audit logs on stores that contain tenant data, so the next exposure shows who read what
6Subscribe the security team to the security and technical-incidents Essential Contacts categories: gcloud essential-contacts create --email=<address> --notification-categories=security,technical-incidents --language=en-US --organization=<org-number>
Watch out
  • A customer may find the exposure before you do. In Inc-868 a customer reported the bug on May 26, four days after the deploy, and Vanta finished remediation June 3.
  • Data Access audit logs cover only the period they were enabled. Where they were off, assume every record in reach of the bug was served.
  • Access Transparency records Google personnel access on supported services only. For a Google product fault, the list of affected resources and recipients comes from Google's notice and support case.
  • Redeploying the previous revision leaves exposed data in caches and exports. Clear them before you close containment.

Vanta RCA of product bug Inc-868 (vanta.com/resources/rca-inc-868), checked October 2026. Google Cloud documentation: Advisory Notifications overview; Essential Contacts notification categories; Personalized Service Health overview and incident communication; Security bulletins; Access Transparency overview, enable and read logs; Cloud Audit Logs overview; Cloud Run logging; pgAudit for Cloud SQL; gcloud reference for essential-contacts, service-health events list, logging copy, run services update-traffic, deploy targets rollback and app services set-traffic. Checked September 2026. Re-checked October 2026: gcloud reference for logging copy.

Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.