PIVTR-D
RGoogle Cloud playbook · Evasion and guardrails

Logging or guardrails disabled

An attacker deletes or disables log sinks, adds exclusions, removes Data Access audit config, loosens organization policies or mutes Security Command Center findings. Admin Activity entries still land in _Required and record each change. Restore routing and audit config first, and record the gap as missing evidence.

Look here

LogSearch for
Admin Activity audit log (logging.googleapis.com)Sink, exclusion, bucket and settings changes, by method: google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.DeleteSink, UpdateSink, CreateExclusion, UpdateExclusion, UpdateBucket, DeleteBucket, UpdateSettings
Admin Activity audit log (logging.googleapis.com)Every logging configuration change at the organization. Repeat with --project for each project: gcloud logging read 'logName:"cloudaudit.googleapis.com%2Factivity" AND protoPayload.serviceName="logging.googleapis.com"' --organization=<org-id> --freshness=30d
Admin Activity audit logAudit config changes, with removed log types and new exemptedMembers: protoPayload.methodName="SetIamPolicy" AND protoPayload.serviceData.policyDelta.auditConfigDeltas:*
Admin Activity audit log (orgpolicy.googleapis.com)Organization policy changes. Calls to the v1 API log under cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com: google.cloud.orgpolicy.v2.OrgPolicy.UpdatePolicy, google.cloud.orgpolicy.v2.OrgPolicy.DeletePolicy, google.cloud.orgpolicy.v2.OrgPolicy.CreatePolicy
Admin Activity audit log (Security Command Center)Detection services or modules turned off: google.cloud.securitycentermanagement.v1.SecurityCenterManagement.UpdateSecurityCenterService
Admin Activity audit log (Security Command Center)New mute rules: CreateMuteConfig, UpdateMuteConfig
Security Command CenterThe finding for organization policy changes: Defense Evasion: Organization Policy Changed

Contain

#Item
1Contain the principal that made the change, following credential leak or account takeover
2Re-enable a disabled sink. Recreate a deleted one with gcloud logging sinks create: gcloud logging sinks update <sink> --no-disabled --organization=<org-id>
3Save the organization IAM policy to a file: gcloud organizations get-iam-policy <org-id> > policy.yaml
4Restore only auditConfigs in the file, keep the etag, and apply it: gcloud organizations set-iam-policy <org-id> policy.yaml
5Restore each loosened constraint from a known-good file: gcloud org-policies set-policy <file>
6Confirm each restored constraint: gcloud org-policies describe <constraint> --organization=<org-id> --effective
7Delete attacker mute rules and review findings muted during the window. Muting single findings with SetMute or BulkMuteFindings is a Data Access event, so without Data Access logs for securitycenter.googleapis.com the finding's mute state is the only record

Eradicate and recover

#Item
1Compare sinks, exclusions, bucket retention, audit configs and organization policies against the infrastructure-as-code baseline
2Set the retention of the central log bucket, and check the value: gcloud logging buckets update <bucket> --location=<location> --retention-days=<days>
3Lock the central log bucket irreversible. A locked bucket and its retention cannot be changed, and the bucket cannot be deleted until every entry has passed its retention: gcloud logging buckets update <bucket> --location=<location> --locked
4Record which log types went unstored during the gap and tell the Legal advisor
5Limit who has logging configuration and organization policy administration roles
6Alert in the security information and event management (SIEM) system on every method name in the Look here table
Watch out
  • UpdateSink can set disabled or narrow the filter. The sink still appears in the list while routing nothing.
  • Security Command Center notification config changes are Data Access events. Without Data Access logs for that service they leave no audit record.

Google Cloud documentation: gcloud reference for logging sinks update (--disabled and --no-disabled), logging buckets update (--locked, --retention-days) and logging read. Checked October 2026.

Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.