PIVTR-D
RGoogle Cloud playbook · Identity and access

Google account takeover

An attacker signs in as a Workspace or Cloud Identity user and may change 2-Step Verification, recovery details or mail forwarding to keep access. The session carries every Google Cloud role granted to that user. End the sessions and remove high-privilege roles first.

Look here

LogSearch for
Workspace Login audit in Cloud Logging (login.googleapis.com, organization level, present only if Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is on; otherwise use the Admin console)Every sign-in event for the user: gcloud logging read 'protoPayload.serviceName="login.googleapis.com" AND protoPayload.authenticationInfo.principalEmail="<user>"' --organization=<org-id> --freshness=30d
Workspace Login auditSuspicious sign-ins and changes to sign-in settings. Compare callerIp with the user's normal locations, and treat google.login.LoginService.loginSuccess with is_suspicious true as a lead. Methods: google.login.LoginService.suspiciousLogin, google.login.LoginService.2svDisable, google.login.LoginService.2svEnroll, google.login.LoginService.passwordEdit, google.login.LoginService.recoveryEmailEdit, google.login.LoginService.recoveryPhoneEdit, google.login.LoginService.emailForwardingOutOfDomain
Admin consoleThe user's activity over the last 6 months under Reporting > Audit and investigation > User log events. OAuth Token log events show apps granted access in the window
Admin Activity audit logCloud changes made by the user, with principalEmail set to the user: SetIamPolicy, google.iam.admin.v1.CreateServiceAccountKey, google.iam.admin.v1.CreateServiceAccount
Security Command CenterWorkspace threat findings: Initial Access: Suspicious Login Blocked Initial Access: Account Disabled Hijacked Persistence: Two Step Verification Disabled Persistence: Strong Authentication Disabled Persistence: SSO Settings Changed

Contain

#Item
1Reset the user's password in the Admin console
2Reset the user's sign-in cookies under Directory > Users > user > Security > Sign-in cookies > Reset, or call the Directory API method users.signOut
3Suspend the user if the attacker may still have access. Suspension also resets sign-in cookies
4Revoke app passwords and connected application access in the user's Security panel
5Remove security keys and passkeys the user did not register
6Remove the user's high-privilege cloud bindings until the user is cleared: gcloud projects remove-iam-policy-binding <project> --member='user:<email>' --role=<role> --all

Eradicate and recover

#Item
1Revert recovery email, recovery phone and out-of-domain forwarding changes found in the Login audit
2Revert single sign-on (SSO) profile or setting changes found in the Admin audit
3Revoke third-party OAuth grants made during the window
4Reverse keys, service accounts and bindings the user created in the window, following leaked service account keys
5Enforce 2-Step Verification with security keys for administrators and users with cloud admin roles
Watch out
  • Resetting sign-in cookies does not sign the user out of apps such as Gmail and Google Drive for desktop. Revoke app passwords and OAuth access as well.
  • Password reset, cookie reset and suspension leave Google Cloud CLI and API tokens the attacker already has working. Revoke the Google Cloud SDK and other connected-app grants for the user, and revoke any captured token at https://oauth2.googleapis.com/revoke. Keep the user's IAM bindings removed until access tokens expire, up to 60 minutes.
Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.