Organization administrator or super admin compromise
An attacker signs in as a Google Workspace or Cloud Identity super admin, or as an Organization Administrator. From there the attacker changes admin roles, 2-Step Verification enforcement, single sign-on (SSO), domain-wide delegation, organization policies and organization IAM bindings. Every project is in scope. Work from a clean super admin account and remove the attacker's admin roles first.
Admin role grants and delegation changes. Read every Security Settings event in the window as well, because enforcement and SSO changes have more names than this list: GRANT_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE, ASSIGN_ROLE, CREATE_ROLE, ADD_PRIVILEGE, AUTHORIZE_API_CLIENT_ACCESS, ALLOW_STRONG_AUTHENTICATION
Workspace Admin audit in Cloud Logging (admin.googleapis.com, organization level)
Admin console actions, with method names like google.admin.AdminService.<action>: gcloud logging read 'protoPayload.serviceName="admin.googleapis.com"' --organization=<org-id> --bucket=_Required --location=global --view=_AllLogs --freshness=30d
Workspace Login audit in Cloud Logging (login.googleapis.com, Data Access type)
Suspicious sign-ins and sign-in changes for each admin: google.login.LoginService.loginSuccess with is_suspicious true, google.login.LoginService.2svDisable, google.login.LoginService.passwordEdit
Admin Activity audit log, Resource Manager
Added bindings such as roles/resourcemanager.organizationAdmin or roles/owner. Read each entry: gcloud logging read 'protoPayload.serviceName="cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com" AND protoPayload.methodName:"setIamPolicy"' --organization=<org-id> --freshness=30d
Export Admin and User log events from the Admin console
2
Save the organization IAM policy: gcloud organizations get-iam-policy <org-id> --format=json
3
Save the organization policies: gcloud org-policies list --organization=<org-id> --format=json
4
Work from a super admin account with no suspect activity, on a clean device with a security key. With none, start the Admin console account recovery process, which asks for proof of DNS domain ownership
5
For each suspect admin, reset the password and sign-in cookies, remove unknown security keys and passkeys, and suspend the account if the attacker may have access
6
Remove admin roles the attacker assigned under Account > Admin roles, using the ASSIGN_ROLE and GRANT_ADMIN_PRIVILEGE events as the list
7
Delete attacker entries under Security > Access and data control > API controls > Manage Domain Wide Delegation destructive, after recording client ID and scopes. Deletion stops the application immediately
8
Remove bindings the attacker added. Repeat for folders and projects: gcloud organizations remove-iam-policy-binding <org-id> --member='<type>:<member>' --role=<role> --all
9
Deny sensitive permissions to the compromised identities. The policy file names them in deniedPrincipals and lists permissions from the deny-supported list in deniedPermissions: gcloud iam policies create <policy-id> --attachment-point=cloudresourcemanager.googleapis.com/organizations/<org-id> --kind=denypolicies --policy-file=<file>
10
Restore changed constraints from a known-good file with gcloud org-policies set-policy <file>. Then confirm: gcloud org-policies describe <constraint> --organization=<org-id> --effective
Eradicate and recover
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Item
1
Enforce 2-Step Verification with security keys under Security > Authentication > 2-step verification, Methods set to Only security key. Start with administrators
2
Revert SSO profile changes and rotate the identity provider signing certificate
Rebuild admin access with at least two super admin accounts, assigned to separate people and kept apart from daily accounts, each with several security keys stored offline. Grant Organization Administrator to a private group that excludes super admin users
7
Delete admin users, custom roles and Organization Administrator bindings the attacker created destructive, after evidence is recorded. Delete users in the Admin console, and custom roles with: gcloud iam roles delete <role-id> --organization=<org-id>
Watch out
Workspace audit entries reach Cloud Logging only while Workspace data sharing with Google Cloud is on. Login audit entries sit in the organization _Default bucket, which keeps 30 days unless you set custom retention. The Admin console keeps 6 months, so export from it first.
Deny policies and organization policies apply to Google Cloud resources. They do not restrict actions in the Admin console, and most Workspace actions have no gcloud command, so contain a super admin in the console.
Organization policy changes take up to 15 minutes to enforce. Deny policies usually take 2 minutes and can take 7 or more. A domain-wide delegation authorization or edit can take up to 24 hours.
Google Cloud documentation: Audit logs for Google Workspace; Google Workspace login audit samples; Organization Policy Service audit logging; Manage organization policies; Deny policies; Super administrator account best practices; Google Workspace and IAM threat findings; gcloud reference for org-policies list, organizations get-iam-policy, logging read and iam policies create; Cloud Asset Inventory IAM policy search. Google Workspace documentation: Admin log events; data retention and lag times; Deploy 2-Step Verification; domain-wide delegation; security best practices for administrator accounts; Admin audit activity events. Checked September 2026. Re-checked October 2026: gcloud reference for logging read (--bucket, --location, --view); Deny access to resources (2 minutes, up to 7 or more).