The attacker uses the root user of an account, or an administrator in the Organizations management account, and so reaches every member account. A typical run changes the root email or contact phone to own recovery, assumes OrganizationAccountAccessRole into member accounts, and detaches service control policies (SCPs) or registers a delegated administrator. Secure the management account root user first, because SCPs do not apply in the management account.
Look here
Log
Search for
CloudTrail, root activity
Sign-ins and credential changes by the root user: ConsoleLogin, ChangePassword, EnableMFADevice, CreateAccessKey with userIdentity.type, Root. Root sign-ins land in us-east-1, us-east-2 or us-west-2
CloudTrail Lake
Every root call since the start time: SELECT eventTime, recipientAccountId, eventSource, eventName, sourceIPAddress FROM <event-data-store-id> WHERE userIdentity.type = 'Root' AND eventTime > '<utc>' ORDER BY eventTime
CloudTrail, account.amazonaws.com
Changes to the account email, contacts and name: StartPrimaryEmailUpdate, AcceptPrimaryEmailUpdate, PutContactInformation, PutAlternateContact, PutAccountName
Changes to accounts, policies and delegated administrators: CreateAccount, InviteAccountToOrganization, MoveAccount, RemoveAccountFromOrganization, CloseAccount, DetachPolicy, UpdatePolicy, DisablePolicyType, RegisterDelegatedAdministrator, EnableAWSServiceAccess
CloudTrail, member accounts
Entry into member accounts from the management account: AssumeRole on OrganizationAccountAccessRole, and AssumeRoot. In the management account, look for these two events: DisableOrganizationsRootSessions, DisableOrganizationsRootCredentialsManagement
IAM root state
Whether root has MFA, access keys or a password: AccountMFAEnabled, AccountAccessKeysPresent and AccountPasswordPresent in aws iam get-account-summary. The credential report shows root key use
GuardDuty
Findings for root credential use, including restricted root credentials from AssumeRoot: Policy:IAMUser/RootCredentialUsage, Policy:IAMUser/ShortTermRootCredentialUsage
Contain
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Item
1
Export the account list for evidence, as in Evidence: aws organizations list-accounts
2
Export the delegated administrators: aws organizations list-delegated-administrators
3
Export the SCPs: aws organizations list-policies --filter SERVICE_CONTROL_POLICY
4
Secure the management account root user destructive for its access keys. Sign in as root, change the password, remove unknown MFA devices and delete root access keys. Only the root user can manage its own keys
5
If the root email no longer works, contact AWS Support through Contact Us, "Still unable to log into your AWS account"
6
Deny compromised users and roles in the management account with an inline deny-all policy, because SCPs do not apply there: aws iam put-role-policy --role-name <role> --policy-name ir-deny-all --policy-document file://deny-all.json
7
Revoke sessions on OrganizationAccountAccessRole in each member account the attacker entered: aws iam put-role-policy --role-name OrganizationAccountAccessRole --policy-name AWSRevokeOlderSessions --policy-document file://revoke.json
8
Move each affected member account to a quarantine organizational unit (OU) whose SCP denies all but your responder role: aws organizations move-account --account-id <id> --source-parent-id <ou> --destination-parent-id <quarantine-ou>
9
Get a root session in each affected member account, scoped to deleting root credentials: aws sts assume-root --target-principal <account> --task-policy-arn arn=arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/root-task/IAMDeleteRootUserCredentials --region <region>
10
With that session, delete the member root password, access keys and signing certificates and deactivate its MFA devices destructive, with delete-login-profile, delete-access-key, delete-signing-certificate and deactivate-mfa-device. Omit --user-name so each call defaults to the member account root user
Restore the primary email, contact phone and alternate contacts. Check the phone with aws account get-contact-information and the email with: aws account get-primary-email --account-id <id>
2
Register two or more FIDO security keys on each root user you keep. Root accepts up to eight MFA devices
3
Turn on trusted access for IAM in Organizations: aws organizations enable-aws-service-access --service-principal iam.amazonaws.com
4
Turn on central management of member root credentials: aws iam enable-organizations-root-credentials-management
5
Turn on privileged root sessions for member accounts: aws iam enable-organizations-root-sessions
SCPs do not affect users, roles or the root user of the management account. Only IAM policy and root credential changes contain an attacker there.
Root MFA recovery uses the account email and primary contact phone. An attacker who changed both can recover root after you reset it.
Centralizing root access leaves existing member root credentials in place. Delete them per account.
AssumeRoot sessions last at most 900 seconds and need a Regional STS endpoint.
AWS documentation: IAM root user, privileged tasks on member accounts, centralized root access, root password reset and MFA recovery; STS AssumeRoot; Organizations SCPs, API actions and OrganizationAccountAccessRole; Account Management API actions; CloudTrail sign-in events and userIdentity; IAM GetAccountSummary; GuardDuty IAM finding types. Checked September 2026. Re-checked October 2026: privileged tasks on member accounts (Regional STS endpoint, IAMDeleteRootUserCredentials task policy, user name omitted to default to the member account, root password, access keys, signing certificates and MFA).