PIVTR-D
RAWS playbook · Identity and access

Root or management account compromise

The attacker uses the root user of an account, or an administrator in the Organizations management account, and so reaches every member account. A typical run changes the root email or contact phone to own recovery, assumes OrganizationAccountAccessRole into member accounts, and detaches service control policies (SCPs) or registers a delegated administrator. Secure the management account root user first, because SCPs do not apply in the management account.

Look here

LogSearch for
CloudTrail, root activitySign-ins and credential changes by the root user: ConsoleLogin, ChangePassword, EnableMFADevice, CreateAccessKey with userIdentity.type, Root. Root sign-ins land in us-east-1, us-east-2 or us-west-2
CloudTrail LakeEvery root call since the start time: SELECT eventTime, recipientAccountId, eventSource, eventName, sourceIPAddress FROM <event-data-store-id> WHERE userIdentity.type = 'Root' AND eventTime > '<utc>' ORDER BY eventTime
CloudTrail, account.amazonaws.comChanges to the account email, contacts and name: StartPrimaryEmailUpdate, AcceptPrimaryEmailUpdate, PutContactInformation, PutAlternateContact, PutAccountName
CloudTrail, organizations.amazonaws.com, us-east-1Changes to accounts, policies and delegated administrators: CreateAccount, InviteAccountToOrganization, MoveAccount, RemoveAccountFromOrganization, CloseAccount, DetachPolicy, UpdatePolicy, DisablePolicyType, RegisterDelegatedAdministrator, EnableAWSServiceAccess
CloudTrail, member accountsEntry into member accounts from the management account: AssumeRole on OrganizationAccountAccessRole, and AssumeRoot. In the management account, look for these two events: DisableOrganizationsRootSessions, DisableOrganizationsRootCredentialsManagement
IAM root stateWhether root has MFA, access keys or a password: AccountMFAEnabled, AccountAccessKeysPresent and AccountPasswordPresent in aws iam get-account-summary. The credential report shows root key use
GuardDutyFindings for root credential use, including restricted root credentials from AssumeRoot: Policy:IAMUser/RootCredentialUsage, Policy:IAMUser/ShortTermRootCredentialUsage

Contain

#Item
1Export the account list for evidence, as in Evidence: aws organizations list-accounts
2Export the delegated administrators: aws organizations list-delegated-administrators
3Export the SCPs: aws organizations list-policies --filter SERVICE_CONTROL_POLICY
4Secure the management account root user destructive for its access keys. Sign in as root, change the password, remove unknown MFA devices and delete root access keys. Only the root user can manage its own keys
5If the root email no longer works, contact AWS Support through Contact Us, "Still unable to log into your AWS account"
6Deny compromised users and roles in the management account with an inline deny-all policy, because SCPs do not apply there: aws iam put-role-policy --role-name <role> --policy-name ir-deny-all --policy-document file://deny-all.json
7Revoke sessions on OrganizationAccountAccessRole in each member account the attacker entered: aws iam put-role-policy --role-name OrganizationAccountAccessRole --policy-name AWSRevokeOlderSessions --policy-document file://revoke.json
8Move each affected member account to a quarantine organizational unit (OU) whose SCP denies all but your responder role: aws organizations move-account --account-id <id> --source-parent-id <ou> --destination-parent-id <quarantine-ou>
9Get a root session in each affected member account, scoped to deleting root credentials: aws sts assume-root --target-principal <account> --task-policy-arn arn=arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/root-task/IAMDeleteRootUserCredentials --region <region>
10With that session, delete the member root password, access keys and signing certificates and deactivate its MFA devices destructive, with delete-login-profile, delete-access-key, delete-signing-certificate and deactivate-mfa-device. Omit --user-name so each call defaults to the member account root user
11Deregister delegated administrators the attacker added destructive: aws organizations deregister-delegated-administrator --account-id <id> --service-principal <service>

Eradicate and recover

#Item
1Restore the primary email, contact phone and alternate contacts. Check the phone with aws account get-contact-information and the email with: aws account get-primary-email --account-id <id>
2Register two or more FIDO security keys on each root user you keep. Root accepts up to eight MFA devices
3Turn on trusted access for IAM in Organizations: aws organizations enable-aws-service-access --service-principal iam.amazonaws.com
4Turn on central management of member root credentials: aws iam enable-organizations-root-credentials-management
5Turn on privileged root sessions for member accounts: aws iam enable-organizations-root-sessions
6Restore SCPs, trails and detectors from baseline. See CloudTrail, GuardDuty or guardrails disabled
7Compare the account list and open invitations with your inventory: aws organizations list-handshakes-for-organization
8Sweep every member account for backdoors. See Backdoor roles, keys and trust policies
Watch out
  • SCPs do not affect users, roles or the root user of the management account. Only IAM policy and root credential changes contain an attacker there.
  • Root MFA recovery uses the account email and primary contact phone. An attacker who changed both can recover root after you reset it.
  • Centralizing root access leaves existing member root credentials in place. Delete them per account.
  • AssumeRoot sessions last at most 900 seconds and need a Regional STS endpoint.

AWS documentation: IAM root user, privileged tasks on member accounts, centralized root access, root password reset and MFA recovery; STS AssumeRoot; Organizations SCPs, API actions and OrganizationAccountAccessRole; Account Management API actions; CloudTrail sign-in events and userIdentity; IAM GetAccountSummary; GuardDuty IAM finding types. Checked September 2026. Re-checked October 2026: privileged tasks on member accounts (Regional STS endpoint, IAMDeleteRootUserCredentials task policy, user name omitted to default to the member account, root password, access keys, signing certificates and MFA).

Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.