The attacker signs in as a member of the tenancy's Administrators group or has the Identity Domain Administrator role, and can change anything. Typical steps are adding users to the Administrators group, writing wide policies, weakening multi-factor authentication (MFA) in the identity domain, adding an identity provider, and turning off Cloud Guard. Secure a break-glass administrator first, then treat every compartment and identity domain the administrator could reach as in scope.
Look here
Log
Search for
Audit, home region and root compartment
IAM, federation, key and compartment changes, which occur in the home region only: AddUserToGroup, CreateUser, CreatePolicy, UpdatePolicy, CreateIdentityProvider, UpdateIdentityProvider, CreateDynamicGroup, UpdateDynamicGroup, UploadApiKey, CreateCompartment, MoveCompartment. Export them with: oci audit event list -c <tenancy-ocid> --region <home-region> --start-time <utc> --end-time <utc> --all
Audit, identity domain events
Administrative changes in the identity domain. Filter data.additionalDetails.eventId for values that begin with admin., such as admin.user.create.success, admin.group.add.member.success, admin.grant.create.success and admin.app.create.success. Read those that change sign-on policy rules, MFA settings and administrator role grants
Administrators group
The group's OCID. The default policy lets this group manage any resource in the tenancy: oci iam group list -c <tenancy-ocid> --name Administrators
Administrators group members
Members who are not on your approved list: oci iam group list-users --group-id <group-ocid>
Wide policies
Statements such as manage all-resources in tenancy, Allow any-user statements, and new Admit statements for other tenancies: oci iam policy list -c <tenancy-ocid> --all --query "data[?contains(to_string(statements), 'all-resources')]"
Sign-on policy for the Console
Changes to the default Security Policy for OCI Console, which requires MFA for administrators and for all users. A domain administrator can modify or delete it, and a policy deleted through the API is not re-created. Check the identity domain's sign-on policies and their exclusion rules in the Console
Identity domains
Administrator role grants in each domain. An Identity Domain Administrator has superuser rights in that domain and can enable or disable MFA. In domains other than the default, the role covers that domain only
Sign in with a break-glass administrator whose credentials the suspect never had, and confirm it still belongs to the Administrators group. The group must keep at least one user, so removals cannot empty it
2
Save the Administrators group membership, the tenancy policies and the identity domain settings as evidence. See Evidence
3
Remove unknown members from the group: oci iam group remove-user --user-id <user-ocid> --group-id <group-ocid>
4
Block the credentials of each compromised administrator. Also deactivate the user in the identity domain so the user cannot sign in to the Console, and reset the user's MFA devices: oci iam user update-user-capabilities --user-id <user-ocid> --can-use-api-keys false --can-use-auth-tokens false --can-use-customer-secret-keys false --can-use-o-auth2-client-credentials false --can-use-smtp-credentials false --can-use-db-credentials false
5
Restore each changed policy. Save it first with oci iam policy get --policy-id <ocid>, then restore it: oci iam policy update --policy-id <ocid> --statements file://known-good.json
6
Restore the sign-on policy in each identity domain, with MFA for administrators and for all users, and remove exclusion rules that the attacker added
Delete policies the attacker created, after saving them destructive
9
Delete identity providers the attacker added destructive. Save their configuration first. Federated sign-in cannot return once they are gone. Find them with: oci iam identity-provider list --protocol SAML2 -c <tenancy-ocid>
Eradicate and recover
#
Item
1
Treat every resource the administrator could reach as exposed. Rotate secrets in Vault, database passwords, API keys and auth tokens, working from the scope in Scope
2
Review every compartment for resources created or moved in the window: instances, buckets, databases, functions and network changes. Look for compartments created or moved with CreateCompartment and MoveCompartment
3
List every user in the tenancy and every domain administrator, and confirm each has an owner: oci iam user list -c <tenancy-ocid> --all
4
Keep the Administrators group to a small named set. Move daily work to groups with scoped policies, and require MFA for every administrator
5
Give each identity domain at least two named domain administrators, with one break-glass account whose credentials are stored offline and whose use raises an alert
6
Re-enable Cloud Guard and Security Zones on the root compartment, and add Events rules that notify on changes to policies, users, groups and identity providers
A domain administrator can delete the MFA sign-on policy, and Oracle does not re-create a policy deleted through the API. Confirm the policy exists after every containment step.
The default policy for the Administrators group cannot be deleted. Reduce exposure by shrinking the group, and leave the policy in place.
The Identity Domain Administrator role in a domain other than the default covers that domain only. The default domain's Administrators group covers the tenancy. Check both.
Users, groups, policies and dynamic groups change only in the home region. Search Audit there, and search every subscribed region for what the administrator built.
Oracle documentation: the default identity domain and the Administrators group; understanding administrator roles in identity domains; the Security Policy for OCI Console sign-on policy; OCI CLI reference for iam group and iam policy. Checked September 2026. Rechecked October 2026: every command against OCI CLI 3.94.2.