ROracle Cloud playbook · Data and storage
Object Storage exposed or data exfiltrated
The attacker makes a bucket public, creates a pre-authenticated request (PAR) that anyone with the URL can use, or reads objects in bulk with stolen credentials. Some attackers add a replication policy that copies a bucket to another region. Close public access first, then save the PAR list and delete the PARs nobody owns.
Look here
| Log | Search for |
|---|---|
| Audit | Bucket visibility, PAR, replication, lifecycle and retention changes: UpdateBucket, CreateBucket, CreatePreauthenticatedRequest, DeletePreauthenticatedRequest, CreateReplicationPolicy, PutObjectLifecyclePolicy, DeleteRetentionRule |
Object Storage read log | Read volume by source address for the bucket: search "<compartment-ocid>/<log-group-ocid>/<log-ocid>" | where data.bucketName = '<bucket>' and data.requestAction = 'GET' | summarize count() as cnt by data.clientIpAddress |
Object Storage read log, PAR use | Requests made with a PAR. Record data.objectName, data.clientIpAddress and data.userAgent: search "<compartment-ocid>/<log-group-ocid>/<log-ocid>" | where data.isPar |
| Bucket visibility | The public-access-type value in the output of oci os bucket get -bn <bucket> |
| Existing PARs | PARs on the bucket that no owner created: oci os preauth-request list -bn <bucket> --all |
| Replication | Replication policies that copy the bucket elsewhere: oci os replication list-replication-policies -bn <bucket> |
Contain
| # | Item |
|---|---|
| 1 | Close the bucket, then test from an unauthenticated client: oci os bucket update -bn <bucket> --public-access-type NoPublicAccess |
| 2 | Block the credentials that read the data, as in credential leak |
| 3 | Enable the read and write logs now if they were off |
| 4 | Delete unknown PARs after saving the PAR list destructive. Access through them ends at once: oci os preauth-request delete -bn <bucket> --par-id <par-id> |
| 5 | Remove unknown replication destructive: oci os replication delete-replication-policy -bn <bucket> --replication-id <id> |
Eradicate and recover
| # | Item |
|---|---|
| 1 | List the objects read and by whom. Give the list to the Legal advisor for notification deadlines |
| 2 | Where the read log was off, record that object access cannot be ruled out |
| 3 | Restore lifecycle policies, retention rules and deleted objects from backup or versioned copies |
| 4 | Grant PAR_MANAGE only to groups that need it |
| 5 | Put sensitive buckets in a Security Zone whose recipe includes deny public_buckets |
Watch out
- A PAR survives key rotation and works until it expires or is deleted, or until its creator is deleted or loses permission. The expiry date has no upper limit. List PARs on every bucket in scope.
- Bucket and prefix PARs can allow object listing if the creator enabled it. One URL can expose the whole bucket.
OCI CLI 3.94.2 help for os bucket, os preauth-request and os replication, including the allowed values of the public access type. Oracle documentation: Audit overview (Object Storage bucket events only). Checked October 2026.