PIVTR-D
ROracle Cloud playbook · Data and storage

Object Storage exposed or data exfiltrated

The attacker makes a bucket public, creates a pre-authenticated request (PAR) that anyone with the URL can use, or reads objects in bulk with stolen credentials. Some attackers add a replication policy that copies a bucket to another region. Close public access first, then save the PAR list and delete the PARs nobody owns.

Look here

LogSearch for
AuditBucket visibility, PAR, replication, lifecycle and retention changes: UpdateBucket, CreateBucket, CreatePreauthenticatedRequest, DeletePreauthenticatedRequest, CreateReplicationPolicy, PutObjectLifecyclePolicy, DeleteRetentionRule
Object Storage read logRead volume by source address for the bucket: search "<compartment-ocid>/<log-group-ocid>/<log-ocid>" | where data.bucketName = '<bucket>' and data.requestAction = 'GET' | summarize count() as cnt by data.clientIpAddress
Object Storage read log, PAR useRequests made with a PAR. Record data.objectName, data.clientIpAddress and data.userAgent: search "<compartment-ocid>/<log-group-ocid>/<log-ocid>" | where data.isPar
Bucket visibilityThe public-access-type value in the output of oci os bucket get -bn <bucket>
Existing PARsPARs on the bucket that no owner created: oci os preauth-request list -bn <bucket> --all
ReplicationReplication policies that copy the bucket elsewhere: oci os replication list-replication-policies -bn <bucket>

Contain

#Item
1Close the bucket, then test from an unauthenticated client: oci os bucket update -bn <bucket> --public-access-type NoPublicAccess
2Block the credentials that read the data, as in credential leak
3Enable the read and write logs now if they were off
4Delete unknown PARs after saving the PAR list destructive. Access through them ends at once: oci os preauth-request delete -bn <bucket> --par-id <par-id>
5Remove unknown replication destructive: oci os replication delete-replication-policy -bn <bucket> --replication-id <id>

Eradicate and recover

#Item
1List the objects read and by whom. Give the list to the Legal advisor for notification deadlines
2Where the read log was off, record that object access cannot be ruled out
3Restore lifecycle policies, retention rules and deleted objects from backup or versioned copies
4Grant PAR_MANAGE only to groups that need it
5Put sensitive buckets in a Security Zone whose recipe includes deny public_buckets
Watch out
  • A PAR survives key rotation and works until it expires or is deleted, or until its creator is deleted or loses permission. The expiry date has no upper limit. List PARs on every bucket in scope.
  • Bucket and prefix PARs can allow object listing if the creator enabled it. One URL can expose the whole bucket.

OCI CLI 3.94.2 help for os bucket, os preauth-request and os replication, including the allowed values of the public access type. Oracle documentation: Audit overview (Object Storage bucket events only). Checked October 2026.

Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.