PIVTR-D
ROracle Cloud playbook · Identity and access

Cross-tenancy policy or third-party access abused

Access that you gave to another tenancy, a partner or a service provider is used from outside your control. In OCI the usual forms are a cross-tenancy policy pair (Endorse in the source tenancy and Admit in the destination tenancy), a federated identity provider that a partner runs, a broad Allow any-user statement, and delegated access for a service provider. An attacker who controls the partner side can act in your tenancy without a single credential of yours, so remove the half of the trust that sits in your tenancy first.

Look here

LogSearch for
Policies with AdmitStatements that admit another tenancy. An Admit statement lives in the tenancy that grants access, and it does nothing unless the other tenancy has a matching Endorse. Repeat for child compartments, since policies can sit in any compartment, and read the Define lines to see which tenancy OCID and group each alias names: oci iam policy list -c <tenancy-ocid> --all --query "data[?contains(to_string(statements), 'Admit')]"
Policies with EndorseStatements that let your own groups cross into another tenancy, often with in any-tenancy. If your tenancy was the source, an attacker in one of your groups can act in the partner's tenancy. Search with: contains(to_string(statements), 'Endorse')
Audit, policy changesStatements that add Define, Admit, Endorse or Allow any-user, in CreatePolicy and UpdatePolicy. IAM changes occur in the home region only: oci audit event list -c <tenancy-ocid> --region <home-region> --start-time <utc> --end-time <utc> --all
Audit, calls from the other tenancyCalls by principals from the other tenancy. Read data.identity on events for the resources in the Admit statement, and look for a tenant ID, principal name or group that is not yours, and for addresses outside the partner's usual range. Confirm the field names in your export, because they differ by authentication type
Object Storage read and write logsObject access by the partner's principals on buckets that an Admit statement covers, in data.principalName and data.clientIpAddress. Cross-tenancy object access is the common case in the OCI documentation. Enable the logs first if they were off
Federated identity providersGroup mappings to Administrators or other wide groups, which make the provider's operators administrators of your tenancy: oci iam identity-provider list --protocol SAML2 -c <tenancy-ocid>
Identity providers in each domainThe same mappings in each identity domain: oci identity-domains identity-providers list --endpoint <domain-url>
Wide statementsStatements of the form Allow any-user to ... with no condition, which apply to every principal that can reach the resource. Read the where clause, and the policies that let other tenancies attach networks, such as remote peering with a dynamic routing gateway (DRG)
Delegated access requestsRequests by service provider operators to reach Exadata resources under Delegate Access Control. Skip this row and the next if you do not run those services: oci delegate-access-control delegated-resource-access-request list --compartment-id <compartment-ocid>
Delegation controlsWhether a delegation control approves requests automatically: oci delegate-access-control delegation-control list --compartment-id <compartment-ocid>
Partner sideThe partner's own logs, sign-ins and change history for the accounts that use the access. Ask for them through the contact in the contract. See Decide for who authorizes the request

Contain

#Item
1Save each policy that names another tenancy, the identity provider configuration and the Audit entries for the window as evidence. See Evidence
2Confirm with the partner's security contact through a channel you already trust. Do not use the partner's possibly compromised email or chat to confirm its status
3Remove the Admit statement from the destination tenancy policy. Access needs both an Endorse and an Admit, so removing the half in your tenancy stops it. Save the policy first, then update it without the statement: oci iam policy update --policy-id <ocid> --statements file://without-admit.json
4If your own groups have an Endorse for another tenancy and the attacker used it from your side, remove that statement as well. Then follow backdoor users, API keys and federation for the group members
5Revoke active delegated access under Delegate Access Control: oci delegate-access-control delegated-resource-access-request revoke --delegated-resource-access-request-id <ocid>
6Reject pending delegated access requests with the reject subcommand, and set the delegation control to require approval
7Add a condition to Allow any-user statements, or delete them, and revoke pre-authenticated requests for buckets that the partner could reach destructive. See storage exposure
8Save the configuration of the identity provider the partner runs, then disable or delete it destructive

Eradicate and recover

#Item
1List what the other tenancy could reach: the compartments, buckets, networks and databases that each Admit statement covered. Search Audit and service logs for its principals across that scope, using Scope
2Rotate the secrets and credentials in that scope, including customer secret keys, database passwords and pre-authenticated requests
3Rewrite the cross-tenancy policy with the smallest scope: one group, one compartment and the verbs it needs, such as read object-family in place of manage object-family in tenancy. Restore it only after the partner shows the fix on its side
4Name the tenancy OCID and group OCID in the Define lines, and avoid any-tenancy in Endorse statements
5Review every existing partner integration for the same pattern, and record its owner, purpose and review date
6Add Events rules that notify on CreatePolicy and UpdatePolicy in every compartment, and on new identity providers
7Check contract terms and notification deadlines with the Legal advisor, since the partner may owe you a report and you may owe others one
Watch out
  • Both tenancies must agree. Access needs an Admit and an Endorse, and either one alone grants nothing. An attacker who controls the source tenancy can add the missing half, and you cannot see the source tenancy's policies from yours.
  • The documentation examples for Endorse and Admit name groups. Check whether your policies use another principal type before you assume a group list covers all the access.
  • Cross-tenancy access works only in regions where both tenancies are subscribed. Search Audit in every shared region, since the region of a call depends on where the resource is.
  • A federated identity provider run by a partner is a trust in the partner's systems. Removing the group mapping and the provider is the fix, and resetting passwords does not change it.

Oracle documentation: cross-tenancy access policies (Define, Endorse and Admit); accessing Object Storage resources across tenancies; IAM policy reference; Delegate Access Control overview; OCI CLI reference for iam policy, iam identity-provider and delegate-access-control. Checked September 2026. Rechecked October 2026: every command against OCI CLI 3.94.2.

Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.