An attacker signs in as a Global Administrator, or activates the role through Privileged Identity Management (PIM), then adds Global Administrators of their own and elevates to User Access Administrator at root scope. From root scope the attacker assigns themselves Owner on management groups and every subscription, and changes tenant-wide settings so their access survives. Work from an emergency access account on a clean workstation, and remove the attacker's admins and root-scope access first.
Look here
Log
Search for
AuditLogs, roles
Admin roles added directly, and PIM settings changed: Add member to role, Add eligible member to role and Update role setting in PIM
AuditLogs, PIM
PIM activations and permanent PIM assignments: AuditLogs | where OperationName in ("Add member to role completed (PIM activation)", "Add member to role in PIM completed (permanent)", "Add eligible member to role in PIM completed (permanent)") | project TimeGenerated, OperationName, InitiatedBy, TargetResources
AuditLogs, elevated access
Elevation to User Access Administrator at root scope, under the service Azure RBAC (Elevated Access). These entries are in preview: User has elevated their access to User Access Administrator for their Azure Resources
AuditLogs, elevation removed
Removal of that elevation, under the same service: The role assignment of User Access Administrator has been removed from the user
Directory activity log
Tenant-level Azure operations, readable as Global Administrator. Set the start as a UTC time such as 2026-10-01T00:00:00Z, then search the file for elevateAccess, the action Microsoft.Authorization/elevateAccess/action: az rest --url "https://management.azure.com/providers/Microsoft.Insights/eventtypes/management/values?api-version=2015-04-01&\$filter=eventTimestamp ge '<utc-start>'" > directory-activity.json
AzureActivity
Role assignments and role definitions the attacker wrote in each subscription, under Microsoft.Authorization: roleAssignments/write and roleDefinitions/write
AuditLogs, tenant settings
Tenant-wide changes: Update authorization policy, Update company settings, Set Company Information, Set password policy, Update security defaults, Update Conditional Access policy, Set federation settings on domain and Update the company default cross-tenant access setting
SigninLogs
Sign-ins by Global Administrators and emergency access accounts, by IPAddress and UserAgent
SecurityAlert
Defender for Resource Manager alerts: ARM_AnomalousElevateAccess (Suspicious elevate access operation), ARM_PowerZure.AzureElevatedPrivileges, ARM_AnomalousRBACRoleAssignment and ARM_PrivilegedRoleDefinitionCreation
Contain
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Item
1
From an emergency access account or a known-clean Global Administrator on a clean workstation, disable the compromised admin and revoke its sessions as in the account takeover playbook
2
Export the active Global Administrator assignments. Repeat with the role IDs for Privileged Role Administrator (e8611ab8-c189-46e8-94e1-60213ab1f814) and Privileged Authentication Administrator (7be44c8a-adaf-4e2a-84d6-ab2649e08a13): Get-MgRoleManagementDirectoryRoleAssignment -Filter "roleDefinitionId eq '62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10'"
3
Export the eligible assignments for the same three roles. The cmdlet needs the scope RoleEligibilitySchedule.Read.Directory: Get-MgRoleManagementDirectoryRoleEligibilitySchedule -Filter "roleDefinitionId eq '62e90394-69f5-4237-9190-012177145e10'"
4
Elevate your own access, then list User Access Administrator assignments at root scope: az role assignment list --role "User Access Administrator" --scope "/"
5
List the assignments on the tenant root management group: az role assignment list --scope "/providers/Microsoft.Management/managementGroups/<tenant-id>"
6
Remove the attacker's elevation: az role assignment delete --assignee <object-id> --role "User Access Administrator" --scope "/"
7
Remove unknown active directory role assignments. Remove unknown eligible assignments in PIM: Remove-MgRoleManagementDirectoryRoleAssignment -UnifiedRoleAssignmentId <id>
8
Restore PIM role settings changed through Update role setting in PIM, such as approval and MFA on activation
9
Remove the Owner and User Access Administrator assignments the attacker made on management groups and subscriptions: az role assignment delete --ids <assignment-id>
10
Delete admin accounts the attacker created destructive, after export. Deleted users stay restorable for 30 days
Remove your own elevated access when you finish, and confirm no user remains under Manage elevated access users in Entra ID Properties
3
Replace the credentials of every emergency access account, and confirm each is cloud-only, uses a passkey (FIDO2) or certificate, and has a permanent active Global Administrator assignment
4
Move remaining Global Administrators to eligible assignments with approval and phishing-resistant MFA on activation
5
Create a management group diagnostic setting for the tenant root group so its activity reaches the workspace
Watch out
Removing root-scope assignments needs elevated access, and your own elevation writes the same audit entries as the attacker's. Record the time you elevate so the timeline keeps them apart.
Deactivating a PIM Global Administrator activation leaves elevated access in place. Remove the root-scope User Access Administrator assignment separately.
Management group activity reaches a workspace through a management group diagnostic setting, which the REST API creates. Without one, read the management group's Activity Log in the portal.
Emergency access accounts are excluded from Conditional Access policies that block or restrict sign-in, so an attacker who controls one bypasses them. Check their sign-ins first.
Microsoft Learn: elevate access for a Global Administrator; Entra audit log activity reference; Entra built-in roles; emergency access accounts; management groups overview; List roleEligibilitySchedules; Microsoft Graph PowerShell reference for the cmdlets used. Checked October 2026. Defender for Cloud Resource Manager alerts and restore deleted users: checked October 2026.