PIVTR-D
RAWS playbook · Data and storage

RDS or snapshot exposed or copied

The attacker shares a manual RDS snapshot with their own account or with the public, makes a DB instance publicly accessible, or exports a snapshot to an S3 bucket. A typical run copies an automated snapshot to a manual one, shares it, and restores it in another account where your logs cannot see it. Remove the share first, because a restore in the other account happens outside your control.

Look here

LogSearch for
CloudTrail, rds.amazonaws.comSnapshot shares, copies, exports and public access changes: ModifyDBSnapshotAttribute and ModifyDBClusterSnapshotAttribute with attribute restore, CopyDBSnapshot, CopyDBClusterSnapshot, CreateDBSnapshot, StartExportTask, and ModifyDBInstance that sets publiclyAccessible or changes the master password
RDS snapshot sharingAccounts that can restore a snapshot. The value all under restore means public: aws rds describe-db-snapshot-attributes --db-snapshot-identifier <snapshot>
Public snapshotsPublic snapshots from your account. Match your account ID in each Amazon Resource Name (ARN): aws rds describe-db-snapshots --snapshot-type public --include-public
RDS export tasksDestination bucket, IAM role and KMS key of each export: aws rds describe-export-tasks
Database logsLogins and SQL, from the engine's query or audit log or from Database Activity Streams, if they were on before the incident. CloudTrail records RDS API calls and contains no logins or SQL
GuardDuty RDS ProtectionFindings for unusual or brute-forced database logins, only when the plan is on. It covers supported Aurora, RDS for PostgreSQL, MySQL and MariaDB versions: CredentialAccess:RDS/AnomalousBehavior.SuccessfulLogin, CredentialAccess:RDS/AnomalousBehavior.SuccessfulBruteForce, CredentialAccess:RDS/MaliciousIPCaller.SuccessfulLogin
IAM Access Analyzer and Security Hub CSPMSnapshots shared outside the account, and public DB instances. Access Analyzer raises external access findings on RDS DB snapshots and DB cluster snapshots. Security Hub CSPM checks controls RDS.1 (RDS snapshot should be private) and RDS.2 (public access by PubliclyAccessible)
DynamoDB and RedshiftItem reads and snapshot shares. DynamoDB item reads (GetItem, Query, Scan, BatchGetItem) are data events, off by default. Redshift logs every API call, including AuthorizeSnapshotAccess

Contain

#Item
1Save the sharing attributes of every snapshot in scope as evidence before any change
2Remove public sharing from a DB snapshot: aws rds modify-db-snapshot-attribute --db-snapshot-identifier <snapshot> --attribute-name restore --values-to-remove all
3Remove public sharing from an Aurora DB cluster snapshot: aws rds modify-db-cluster-snapshot-attribute --db-cluster-snapshot-identifier <snapshot> --attribute-name restore --values-to-remove all
4Remove each unknown account the same way, with --values-to-remove <account-id>
5Stop a running export. Data already written to S3 stays there: aws rds cancel-export-task --export-task-identifier <task>
6Close public access on the DB instance, and remove internet-facing rules from its security groups as well: aws rds modify-db-instance --db-instance-identifier <db> --no-publicly-accessible --apply-immediately
7Reset the master password by moving it to Secrets Manager. The change applies asynchronously: aws rds modify-db-instance --db-instance-identifier <db> --manage-master-user-password --apply-immediately
8Revoke a Redshift snapshot share: aws redshift revoke-snapshot-access --snapshot-identifier <snapshot> --account-with-restore-access <account-id>
9Contain the identity that made the changes with the IAM user access keys or console user playbook

Eradicate and recover

#Item
1Treat every snapshot that was shared or exported as copied, and list the tables it contained for the Legal advisor and notification deadlines
2Follow each export into its S3 bucket and handle that bucket with the S3 playbook
3Rotate database users and application credentials stored in the database, and review the KMS key policy of each shared encrypted snapshot for foreign accounts
4Resolve the Access Analyzer findings and confirm RDS.1 and RDS.2 pass
5Turn on RDS Protection, database audit logging and DynamoDB data events for sensitive tables before return to service
6Delete manual snapshots the attacker created destructive, after the evidence is exported: aws rds delete-db-snapshot --db-snapshot-identifier <snapshot>
Watch out
  • Removing a share stops future restores and copies. A copy the other account already made belongs to that account and stays outside your control.
  • Automated snapshots cannot be shared, and snapshots under the default AWS managed KMS key cannot be shared. An attacker first copies them, so look for CopyDBSnapshot with a new kmsKeyId before the share.
  • Only unencrypted manual snapshots can be public. An encrypted snapshot shared with another account also needs a KMS key policy that grants that account use of the key.

AWS documentation: RDS sharing a DB snapshot, sharing public snapshots, stopping snapshot sharing, exporting and canceling snapshot exports to S3, CloudTrail logging for RDS; CLI reference for modify-db-instance and Redshift revoke-snapshot-access; Redshift logging with CloudTrail; DynamoDB logging with CloudTrail; GuardDuty RDS Protection and its finding types; IAM Access Analyzer resource types; Security Hub CSPM controls for RDS. Security Hub CSPM controls and GuardDuty finding types checked October 2026; other topics checked September 2026.

Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.