PIVTR-D
RAWS playbook · Data and storage

Data deletion, ransomware and key destruction

The attacker deletes objects, snapshots and backups, schedules deletion of the KMS keys that protect them, or rewrites S3 objects under a key you do not control. A typical run disables versioning or adds an expiring lifecycle rule, deletes recovery points and snapshots, then leaves a ransom note in the bucket. Cancel pending key deletions and stop further deletes first, then protect the recovery points that survive.

Rewrites use a KMS key in an account the attacker controls, or server-side encryption with customer-provided keys (SSE-C), a key S3 never stores. The Codefinger campaign, reported in January 2025, used stolen keys to rewrite objects with SSE-C and set them to expire in seven days.

Look here

LogSearch for
CloudTrail, S3 management eventsChanges to versioning, lifecycle, encryption, Object Lock and policy: PutBucketVersioning, PutBucketLifecycle (the event name for PutBucketLifecycleConfiguration), PutBucketEncryption, PutBucketObjectLockConfiguration, DeleteBucket, PutBucketPolicy
CloudTrail, S3 data events (off by default)Bulk deletes and rewrites, counted per principal: DeleteObject, DeleteObjects, PutObject, CopyObject. A CopyObject or PutObject that names a KMS key ARN from another account marks re-encryption
CloudTrail, SSE-C writes (S3 data events, off by default)Objects rewritten with SSE-C: PutObject and CopyObject with SSEApplied of SSE_C in additionalEventData. In CloudTrail Lake: WHERE eventSource = 's3.amazonaws.com' AND element_at(additionalEventData, 'SSEApplied') = 'SSE_C'
CloudTrail, kms.amazonaws.comKey deletion, disabling and policy changes: ScheduleKeyDeletion, DisableKey, PutKeyPolicy, DeleteImportedKeyMaterial, CreateGrant. Use of a key in another account appears as GenerateDataKey or Decrypt in both accounts
CloudTrail, backups and snapshotsDeleted recovery points, vaults and snapshots: DeleteRecoveryPoint, DeleteBackupVault, DeleteBackupVaultLockConfiguration, UpdateRecoveryPointLifecycle, DeleteSnapshot, DeleteDBSnapshot, DeleteDBClusterSnapshot, DeleteDBInstance
Backup platformChanges to backup plans and vault policies: DeleteBackupPlan, UpdateBackupPlan, DeleteBackupSelection, PutBackupVaultAccessPolicy. Also calls by the IAM role or keys of any third-party backup server, such as snapshot or repository object deletes
Key and object stateThe state of each key and the key on each object. Check KeyState and DeletionDate with aws kms describe-key --key-id <key>, and SSEKMSKeyId with: aws s3api head-object --bucket <bucket> --key <key>
GuardDutyFindings for unusual deletes and writes: Impact:S3/AnomalousBehavior.Delete, Impact:S3/AnomalousBehavior.Write, Impact:IAMUser/AnomalousBehavior, AttackSequence:S3/CompromisedData

Contain

#Item
1Cancel each pending key deletion: aws kms cancel-key-deletion --key-id <key>
2Enable each canceled key, which stays disabled until you do: aws kms enable-key --key-id <key>
3Contain the identity that made the calls with the IAM user access keys or root account playbook
4Attach a service control policy (SCP) to the account that denies s3:DeleteObjectVersion, s3:PutBucketVersioning, s3:PutLifecycleConfiguration, kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion, kms:DisableKey, backup:DeleteRecoveryPoint, ec2:DeleteSnapshot and rds:DeleteDBSnapshot to all but the responder role
5Add a bucket policy that denies PutObject unless this condition key equals your own key ARN: s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption-aws-kms-key-id
6Block SSE-C writes on each bucket. Read the current setting with get-bucket-encryption and keep its default encryption in the rule: aws s3api put-bucket-encryption --bucket <bucket> --server-side-encryption-configuration '{"Rules":[{"BlockedEncryptionTypes":{"EncryptionType":["SSE-C"]}}]}'
7Block SSE-C across accounts with a resource control policy (RCP) or SCP that denies s3:PutObject when this condition key is not null: s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption-customer-algorithm
8Replace attacker lifecycle rules with the known-good configuration before the next expiration run: aws s3api put-bucket-lifecycle-configuration --bucket <bucket> --lifecycle-configuration file://known-good.json
9Re-enable versioning where it was suspended: aws s3api put-bucket-versioning --bucket <bucket> --versioning-configuration Status=Enabled
10Copy the surviving recovery points to a vault in a separate account before further loss, and see Ransomware

Eradicate and recover

#Item
1Find deleted and overwritten objects: aws s3api list-object-versions --bucket <bucket> --prefix <prefix>
2Bring back the prior version of a deleted object by deleting its delete marker: aws s3api delete-object --bucket <bucket> --key <key> --version-id <delete-marker-id>
3Restore objects re-encrypted under a foreign KMS key or an attacker SSE-C key from the prior version encrypted under your key
4Restore deleted EBS snapshots that a Recycle Bin rule retained. The bin keeps only snapshots that matched a rule at deletion time. List them with aws ec2 list-snapshots-in-recycle-bin, then restore each one: aws ec2 restore-snapshot-from-recycle-bin --snapshot-id <snap>
5Find recovery points in AWS Backup, then restore each one with aws backup start-restore-job: aws backup list-recovery-points-by-backup-vault --backup-vault-name <vault>
6Rotate the credentials and roles of backup servers and operators, rebuild backup management servers from a known-good image, and keep copies in a logically air-gapped vault in a separate account
7Protect what remains: Object Lock on critical versioned buckets, new or existing; MFA delete set by the root user with --mfa; Recycle Bin rules for snapshots and AMIs; and a vault lock
8Delete object versions encrypted under the foreign key destructive once the restore is verified
Watch out
  • A key in PendingDeletion fails every cryptographic call. The waiting period is 7 to 30 days, 30 by default. After deletion, data encrypted under the key is unrecoverable, and a canceled key stays Disabled until you enable it.
  • DeleteImportedKeyMaterial takes effect at once. The key works again only if you reimport the same key material.
  • Object Lock retention and legal holds protect object versions. A plain delete still adds a delete marker, which hides the object until you remove the marker. Object Lock cannot be turned off once on.
  • A vault lock in compliance mode cannot be removed after its grace time of at least 3 days, even by the root user. Use governance mode during an incident.
  • Since April 2026, S3 blocks SSE-C on new general purpose buckets in every Region except Middle East (Bahrain) and Middle East (UAE). It also blocked SSE-C on existing buckets in accounts that had no SSE-C objects. Accounts that had SSE-C objects kept their bucket settings, so check older buckets there.

AWS documentation: S3 CloudTrail events, configuring MFA delete, Object Lock, SSE-KMS and specifying SSE-KMS; KMS deleting keys, scheduling key deletion, CloudTrail log entry examples and cross-account key use; AWS Backup Vault Lock and CloudTrail logging; EBS Recycle Bin concepts and snapshot recovery; GuardDuty S3 and IAM finding types; S3 SSE-C, specifying SSE-C, blocking SSE-C and the default SSE-C setting FAQ; monitoring default encryption with CloudTrail; AWS Backup API operations and logically air-gapped vaults. Halcyon research on the Codefinger SSE-C campaign. The SSE-C default setting FAQ, blocking SSE-C, configuring Object Lock, AWS Backup Vault Lock, Recycle Bin concepts and GuardDuty finding types checked October 2026; other topics checked September 2026.

Adapts material from Dynamic Incident Response: A Framework for Security Teams by Joshua Wright, © 2026 The Escal Institute of Advanced Technologies, Inc. d/b/a SANS Institute, licensed under CC BY 4.0. Figures reproduced under that license. Changes were made. Not published by, endorsed by, or affiliated with the SANS Institute.