An attacker with admin rights turns off recovery features, then deletes buckets, objects, Cloud SQL instances, disks and snapshots, destroys Cloud KMS key versions or shuts down projects. Soft delete, KMS destroy scheduling and the project recovery window give you days to reverse most of it, and the clock starts at the deletion. Remove the attacker's admin access, then restore what is pending deletion.
Look here
Log
Search for
Admin Activity audit log
Recovery settings weakened first: storage.buckets.update that sets soft delete to 0, suspends versioning or clears a retention policy, and cloudsql.instances.update that lowers retained backups. Then the deletions: storage.buckets.delete, cloudsql.instances.delete, cloudsql.backupRuns.delete, cloudsql.backups.delete
Admin Activity audit log
Disk, snapshot and instance deletions: gcloud logging read 'protoPayload.methodName:("compute.disks.delete" OR "compute.snapshots.delete" OR "compute.instances.delete")' --project=<project> --freshness=30d
Data Access audit log for Cloud Storage (only if enabled)
Object deletions, storage.objects.delete, and object writes that replace content. Deletions by Object Lifecycle Management are not in audit logs, so check storage.buckets.update for lifecycle rules added in the window. Lifecycle deletions are soft-deleted and can be restored
Project shutdowns. Search at the organization with --organization=<org-id>. The filter matches the v1 and v3 method names: protoPayload.methodName:"projects.delete"
Cloud Storage soft delete
Soft-deleted buckets that can come back: gcloud storage ls --buckets --soft-deleted --full
Cloud Storage soft delete
Soft-deleted objects in a bucket: gcloud storage ls gs://<bucket>/** --soft-deleted
Admin Activity audit log (backupdr.googleapis.com) and backup servers
Attacks on the backup platform. Management console actions, such as expiring or deleting backup images, are also Admin Activity entries for backupdr.googleapis.com. For third-party backup servers on Compute Engine, check their own audit logs and sign-ins. Methods: google.cloud.backupdr.v1.BackupDR.DeleteBackupVault, google.cloud.backupdr.v1.BackupDR.DeleteBackup, google.cloud.backupdr.v1.BackupDR.UpdateBackup, google.cloud.backupdr.v1.BackupDR.DeleteBackupPlan, google.cloud.backupdr.v1.BackupDR.DeleteBackupPlanAssociation
Backup and DR appliance log
Backup/recovery appliance events and errors: backupdr.googleapis.com%2Fbackup_recovery_appliance_events
Security Command Center
Backup and DR findings, and the Compute Engine finding for mass deletion: Impact: Deleted Google Cloud Backup and DR BackupImpact: Deleted Google Cloud Backup and DR VaultImpact: Google Cloud Backup and DR expire all imagesImpact: Google Cloud Backup and DR reduced backup expirationImpact: Many Instances Deleted
Contain
#
Item
1
Remove the attacker's admin access at the organization, following the org admin or service account key playbook. Every other step fails while the attacker can still delete
2
Restore every KMS key version in DESTROY_SCHEDULED: gcloud kms keys versions restore <version> --key=<key> --keyring=<keyring> --location=<location>
3
Enable each restored version, which comes back disabled: gcloud kms keys versions enable <version> --key=<key> --keyring=<keyring> --location=<location>
Add a lien to each restored project so it cannot be shut down again: gcloud alpha resource-manager liens create --project=<project-id> --restrictions=resourcemanager.projects.delete --reason=<case-id>
6
Restore soft-deleted buckets. The gcloud CLI restores the bucket empty: gcloud storage restore gs://<bucket>#<generation>
Raise soft delete on surviving buckets so new deletions stay recoverable: gcloud storage buckets update gs://<bucket> --soft-delete-duration=90d
9
Set deletion protection on Cloud SQL instances and keep backups past deletion: gcloud sql instances patch <instance> --deletion-protection --retain-backups-on-delete
10
Snapshot surviving disks under a case label before anyone cleans up: gcloud compute disks snapshot <disk> --zone=<zone> --labels=case=<case-id>
Eradicate and recover
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Item
1
Restore Cloud SQL from retained backups or Backup and DR vaults, then verify data with the owners
2
Restore noncurrent object versions over objects the attacker overwrote or encrypted
3
Store backups in a Backup and DR backup vault with enforced minimum retention, and lock it after testing
4
Rotate backup server, appliance and console credentials. Treat them as compromised
5
Give backup administration to a separate group with its own accounts, and run backup management servers in their own project
6
Set a retention policy on log and backup buckets: gcloud storage buckets update gs://<bucket> --retention-period=<seconds>
7
Lock the retention policy only after testing irreversible: gcloud storage buckets update gs://<bucket> --lock-retention-period
8
Enforce a minimum destroy-scheduled duration for key versions at the organization: constraints/cloudkms.minimumDestroyScheduledDuration
9
Require key versions to be disabled before they can be destroyed: constraints/cloudkms.disableBeforeDestroy
10
Place liens on production projects and remove resourcemanager.projects.updateLiens from everyone outside a small admin group
Watch out
Soft delete keeps a deleted object for the duration in force when it was deleted: 7 days by default, up to 90. An attacker who sets the duration to 0 first leaves nothing to restore.
A shut-down project stays in DELETE_REQUESTED for 30 days, but buckets with soft delete disabled can be deleted at once. Restored projects can take up to 36 hours to work again.
A KMS key version is destroyed 30 days after scheduling unless the key was created with another duration. Data encrypted only with a destroyed version cannot be decrypted by anyone.
Restoring a bucket with the gcloud CLI restores an empty bucket. Restore its objects in a second step.
Google Cloud documentation: Cloud Storage soft delete, use soft delete, restore soft-deleted objects and buckets, bucket lock, Cloud Storage audit logging; Cloud KMS destroy and restore key versions, control key version destruction, Cloud KMS audit logging; Resource Manager delete and restore projects, project liens, Resource Manager audit logging; Backup and DR backup vaults, Backup and DR Service audit logging and audited API operations, backup/recovery appliance event logs; Cloud SQL for MySQL audit logging; gcloud sql instances patch reference; Security Command Center threat findings index. Checked September 2026. Re-checked October 2026: Cloud Storage soft delete (7-day default, 7 to 90 days or 0 to disable, lifecycle deletions soft-deleted, gcloud restores an empty bucket); gcloud reference for alpha resource-manager liens create (still alpha only); Destroy and restore key versions (30-day default); Delete and restore projects (30-day recovery period, up to 36 hours for services to work).